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Summary 
The sheer amount of different opinions about what consciousness is 
highlights its multifaceted character. The clinical study of consciousness in 
coma survivors provides unique opportunities, not only to better 
comprehend normal conscious functions, but also to confront clinical and 
medico-ethical challenges. For example, pain in vegetative 
state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome patients (VS/UWS; i.e. awaken, 
but unconscious) and patients in minimally conscious states (MCS; awaken, 
with fluctuating signs of awareness) cannot be communicated and needs to 
be inferred. Behaviorally, we developed the Nociception Coma Scale, a 
clinical tool which measures patients’ motor, verbal, visual, and facial 
responsiveness to noxious stimulation. Importantly, the absence of proof of 
a behavioral response cannot be taken as proof of absence of pain. 
Functional neuroimaging studies show that patients in VS/UWS exhibit no 
evidence of control-like brain activity, when painfully stimulated, in 
contrast to patients in MCS. Similarly, the majority of clinicians ascribe 
pain perception in MCS patients. Interestingly, their opinions appear less 
congruent with regards to pain perception in VS/UWS patients, due to 
personal and cultural differences. The imminent bias in clinical practice due 
to personal beliefs becomes more ethically salient in complex clinical 
scenarios, such as end-of-life decisions. Surveys among clinicians show 
that the majority agrees with treatment withdrawal for VS/UWS, but fewer 
respondents would do so for MCS patients. For the issue of pain in patients 
with disorders of consciousness, the more the respondents ascribed pain 
perception in these states the less they supported treatment withdraw from 
these patients. Such medico-ethical controversies require an objective and 
valid assessment of pain (and eventually of consciousness) in non-
communicating patients. 
Functional neuroimaging during “resting state” (eyes closed, no task 
performance) is an ideal paradigm to investigate residual cognition in non-
communicating patients, because it does not require sophisticated technical 
support or subjective input on patients’ behalf. With the ultimate intention 
to use this paradigm in patients, we first aimed to validate it in controls. We 
initially found that, in controls, fMRI “resting state” activity correlated with 
subjective reports of “external” (perception of the environment through the 
senses) or “internal” awareness (self-related mental processes). Then, using 
hypnosis, we showed that there was reduced fMRI connectivity in the 
“external network”, reflecting decreased sensory awareness. When more 
cerebral networks were tested, increased functional connectivity was 
observed for most of the studied networks (except the visual). These results 
indicate that resign state fMRI activity reflects, at least partially, ongoing 
conscious cognition, which changes under different conditions. Using the 
resting state paradigm in patients with disorders of consciousness, we 
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showed intra- and inter-network connectivity breakdown in sensory-
sensorimotor and “higher-order” networks, possibly accounting for 
patients’ limited capacities for conscious cognition. We have further 
observed positive correlation between the Nociception Coma Scale scores 
and the pain-related (salience) network connectivity, potentially reflecting 
nociception-related processes in these patients, measured in the absence of 
an external stimulus.  
These results highlight the utility of resting state analyses in clinical 
settings, where short and simple setups are preferable to activation 
protocols with somatosensory, visual, and auditory stimulation devices. 
Especially for neuroimaging studies, it should be stressed that such 
experimental investigations tackle the necessary conditions supporting 
conscious processing. The sufficiency of the identified neural correlates 
accounting for conscious awareness remains to be identified via dynamic 
and causal information flow investigations. Importantly, the quest of 
subjectivity in non-communicating patients can be better understood by 
adopting an interdisciplinary biopsychosocial approach, combining basic 
neuroscience (bio), psychological-cognitive-emotional processing (psycho), 
and the influence of different socioeconomic, cultural, and technological 
factors (social). 
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Résumé 
L’abondance d'opinions sur la définition scientifique de la conscience met 
en évidence son caractère multiforme. C’est la raison pour laquelle l’étude 
clinique de la conscience chez les patients qui survivent à un accident 
cérébral sévère procure d’une part une opportunité unique de comprendre le 
fonctionnement « normal » et « pathologique » de la conscience, mais 
également de confronter les données cliniques obtenues lors des différentes 
recherches avec les questions socio-éthiques omniprésentes au sein de notre 
société. Un exemple marquant peut être mis en évidence lors de l’étude de 
la douleur chez les patients qui ne peuvent communiquer leurs ressentis tels 
que les patients en état végétatif/syndrome d’éveil non répondant (EV/SEN) 
et en état de conscience minimale (ECM ; patients éveillés présentant des 
signes clairs mais fluctuants de conscience). Afin de pallier ce problème, 
nous avons mis en au point la « Nociception Coma Scale », un outil 
clinique qui permet de mesurer et d’évaluer les réponses motrices, verbales, 
visuelles et faciales des patients en réponses à diverses stimulations 
nociceptives. Toutefois, il est important de signaler que l’absence de 
réponse comportementale ne doit pas être interprétée comme une absence 
de preuve de douleur. Des études en neuroimagerie fonctionnelle chez des 
patients EV/SEN démontrent une absence de réactions cérébrales en 
réponse aux stimulations nociceptives, en opposition aux réponses 
observées auprès des patients en ECM. Compte tenu de ces informations, il 
a été mis en évidence que la majorité des cliniciens mettent en place un 
traitement de la douleur chez ces derniers. Des études ont toutefois 
démontré que l’opinion des cliniciens concernant la perception de la 
douleur chez les patients EV/SEN est influencée par leurs traits de 
personnalité ou encore leur culture. La présence et l’influence de ces 
différents biais lors des prises de décisions éthiques deviennent encore plus 
importantes lors de la prise de décisions de fin de vie chez certain patient. 
Des études menées auprès de cliniciens montrent que la majorité d’entre-
eux sont d’accord avec l’idée d’arrêter l’hydratation et la nutrition chez les 
patients EV/SEN mais que cette majorité n’est plus d’actualité lorsque 
l’arrêt de fin de vie concerne les patients en ECM. De plus, il a été mis en 
évidence que l’attribution de la douleur chez les patients en état de 
conscience altérée était en lien avec les décisions de fin de vie. En effet, les 
participants à cette enquête refusaient d’envisager un arrêt de traitement 
chez les patients pouvant ressentir la douleur. De telles controverses socio-
éthiques nécessitent une évaluation objective et valide de la douleur (et 
éventuellement de la conscience) chez les patients non-communicants.   
La neuro-imagerie fonctionnelle durant l’état « resting state » (« état de 
repos », yeux fermés, absence de réalisation de tâche) est un paradigme 
idéal qui permet d’investiguer l’activité cognitive résiduelle des patients 
non-communicants car ce dernier ne nécessite pas de support technique 
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sophistiqué ou un apport volontaire de la part du sujet. Avant d’utiliser ce 
paradigme chez les patients, nous nous sommes tout d’abord attelés à 
valider cette technique auprès de sujets contrôles. Nous avons tout d’abord 
pu mettre en évidence que l’activité « au repos » des sujets contrôles était 
en corrélation avec la perception subjective des pensées « externes » 
(perceptions de l’environnement à travers les différents canaux sensoriels ») 
et des  pensées « internes » (processus mentaux personnels). Nous avons 
ensuite utilisé la technique de l’hypnose afin de mettre en évidence que 
durant cet état particulier, il existe une réduction de la connectivité 
cérébrale mesurée en IRMf au sein des réseaux externes, reflétant une 
diminution de la conscience sensorielle. Toutefois, lorsque d’autres réseaux 
cérébraux ont été évalués, nous avons noté une augmentation de la 
connectivité fonctionnelle dans la plupart des réseaux étudiés (excepté le 
réseau visuel). Ces résultats indiquent que l’étude de « l’état de repos » en 
IRMf reflète, au moins en partie, la conscience cognitive qui se modifie en 
fonction des différents états de conscience (état normal versus hypnose). 
Enfin, nous avons étudié ce paradigme chez les patients présentant un état 
altéré de conscience. Nous avons pu mettre en évidence une diminution de 
la connectivité intra- et inter- réseau au sein des réseaux sensori-moteur et 
de haut-niveaux traduisant une limitation des capacités cognitives des 
patients. Nous avons ensuite observé une corrélation positive entre la 
« Nociception Coma Scale » et le réseau douleur, reflétant potentiellement 
le traitement cérébral de la douleur chez ces patients en l’absence d’un 
stimulus externe.  
Ces résultats soulignent intérêt de l’utilisation de ces paradigmes « resting 
state » dans des situations cliniques extrêmes où des paradigmes simples et 
courts sont préférables aux paradigmes d’activation somato-sensoriels, 
visuels et auditifs. En ce qui concerne les études en neuroimagerie, il 
convient de souligner que de telles investigations expérimentales 
permettent de mettre en place les conditions nécessaires à l’étude de la 
conscience. Notons toutefois que les corrélats neuronaux de la conscience 
restent à être identifiés par l’intermédiaire d’investigation dynamique et 
causale (dynamic and causal information flow investigations). Enfin, la 
quête de la subjectivité chez les patients non communicants peut être mieux 
comprise par le biais d'une approche interdisciplinaire biopsychosocial, 
combinant neurosciences fondamentales (bio), les sciences psycho-
cognitive et de traitement émotionnel (psycho), ainsi que l'influence de 
différents facteurs socio-économiques, culturels et technologiques (social). 
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Introduction 
 
 
“Γνῶθι σαυτὸν” 
 
(Know thyself) 
 
Carved at the entrance of the Delfi temple 
Peloponnesos, Greece 
 
Attributed to Socrates 
 
 
 
 
Based on: 
 
Demertzi, A., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Bruno, M.-A., Schnakers, C., 
Boly, M., Boveroux, P., Maquet, P., Moonen, G., Laureys, S., 2008. 
Is there anybody in there? Detecting awareness in disorders of 
consciousness. Expert Rev Neurother. 8, 1719-30. 
Gosseries, O., Demertzi, A., Noirhomme, Q., Tshibanda, J., Boly, 
M., de Beeck, M.O., Hustinx, R., Maquet, P., Salmon, E., Moonen, 
G., Luxen, A., Laureys, S., De Tiege, X., 2008. [Functional 
neuroimaging (fMRI, PET and MEG): what do we measure?]. Rev 
Med Liege. 63, 231-7. 
Demertzi, A., Laureys, S., Boly, M., 2009. Coma, persistent 
vegetative states, and diminished consciousness. In: Encyclopedia of 
Consciousness. W.P. Banks (ed.). Elsevier, Oxford, pp. 147-156. 
Demertzi, A., Liew, C., Ledoux, D., Bruno, M.-A., Sharpe, M., 
Laureys, S., Zeman, A., 2009. Dualism persists in the science of 
mind. Ann N Y Acad Sci. 1157, 1-9. 
Demertzi, A., Schnakers, C., Soddu, A., Bruno, M.-A., Gosseries, O., 
Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Laureys, S., 2011. Neural plasticity lessons 
from disorders of consciousness. Front Psychol. 1, 1-7. 
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1.1 Consciousness 
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An operational definition of consciousness  
Consciousness is a multifaceted term for which 
there is no universal definition (Zeman, 2001). 
Clinical experience teaches that we can define 
consciousness operationally, by reducing it to two 
components: wakefulness and awareness (Posner et 
al., 2007). Wakefulness refers to the level of 
alertness and it is supported by the function of the 
subcortical arousal systems in the brainstem, the 
midbrain and the thalamus (Steriade et al., 1997). 
Clinically, it is indicated by eyes opening. 
Awareness refers to the content of consciousness 
and is thought to be supported by the functional 
integrity of the cerebral cortex and its subcortical 
connections. Awareness can be further reduced to 
awareness of environment and of self (James, 
1890). Clinically, awareness of environment is 
assessed by evaluating command following and 
observing non-reflex motor behavior, such as eye 
tracking and localized responses to pain. 
Awareness of self, a more ill-defined concept, can 
be assessed by the patients’ response to self-
referential stimuli, such as the patients’ own face in 
the mirror (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2008).  
e
(
g
An illustrative example of the relationship between 
the two components of consciousness is the 
transition from full wakefulness to deep sleep: the 
less aroused we get, the less aware we become of 
our surroundings (Figure 1.1). 
Dualism
view that m
 
Attitudes towards consciousness  
The scientific study of consciousness indicates that 
there is an intimate relationship between mind and 
brain (Tononi & Laureys, 2009). Functional 
neuroimaging technologies have contributed 
significantly to unraveling the neural correlates of 
(un)conscious states (e.g., Laureys & Boly, 2008). 
As a consequence, nowadays one could expect less 
support of the separateness between mind and 
brain, classically held by the philosophical position 
of dualism. Nonetheless, a survey among U.S. 
o
 
Functional 
neuroimaging 
techniques allow the in 
vivo study of human 
cognitive and 
sensorimotor functions 
in physiological or 
pathological conditions. 
Functional magnetic 
resonance imaging 
(fMRI) and positron 
mission tomography 
PET) measure 
haemodynamic changes 
induced by regional 
changes in neuronal 
activity with high spatial 
resolution (i.e. a few 
millimeters). 
Electroencephalography 
(EEG) and 
magnetoencephalo-
raphy (MEG) measure 
respectively the neuronal 
electrical or magnetic 
activity with high 
temporal resolution (i.e. 
milliseconds).  
 
 represents the 
ind and 
matter involve different 
kinds of “substance,” a 
view now known as 
“substance” or 
“Cartesian” dualism. In 
this view, the brain 
belongs to the physical 
world, the mind to the 
nonphysical, yet they are 
closely related to each 
ther (Descartes, 1968). 
Physical events can 
cause mental events and 
vice versa. Dualism, 
however, notoriously 
fails to explain how 
physical and mental 
entities can interact.  
scientists shows that about 40% of the sample 
believes in a personal God or in life after death 
(Larson & Witham, 1997), a similar figure to that 
obtained almost a hundred years ago (Leuba, 1916). 
Indeed, “dualistic” views are often reflected in 
religious convictions which typically endorse the 
existence of a soul independent of the body and/or 
the idea of an afterlife.  
The clinical and theoretical implications of 
endorsing dualistic attitudes have been stressed in a 
questionnaire survey. Students from various 
disciplines reported that different perspectives on 
the mind–brain problem were likely to influence 
doctors’ and psychologists’ choice of research 
methods, treatment options, and their behavior 
toward patients (Fahrenberg & Cheetham, 2000).  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Simplified illustration of the two major components of 
consciousness and the way they correlate within the different physiological, 
pharmacological and pathological modulations of consciousness. From 
Demertzi et al, “Encyclopedia of Consciousness” (2009a) (reproduced 
from Laureys, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2005)  
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Considering the relevance of personal attitudes to 
clinical practice, we aimed to update attitudes 
towards the mind-brain relationship and determine 
the variables that account for differences in views. 
Two closely-related surveys were conducted: the 
first by the University of Edinburgh (UK) 
including students of various disciplines; and the 
second by the University of Liège (Belgium) 
including attendees (i.e. healthcare workers, 
academics) of public or scientific meetings on 
consciousness. By including both students and 
healthcare professionals, the variance of 
educational level was better controlled. The two 
surveys shared four key questions asking 
participants to state their views on whether (a) the 
mind and brain are two separate things; b) the mind 
is fundamentally physical; (c) some spiritual part 
of us survives after death; (d) each of us has a soul 
that is separate from the body (see Methods box for 
more details). 
We found that the majority of undergraduates 
sampled in the Edinburgh survey endorsed that 
“mind and brain are separate” and hence they held 
dualistic views on the relationship between mind 
and brain. The majority disagreed that the mind is a 
purely physical entity by agreeing on the existence 
of a soul that is separate from the body and 
survives death. The views of a wider group of 
seniors sampled in the Liège survey were found 
less dualistic compared to the undergraduates 
(Figure 1.2). Nevertheless, over a third of the 
healthcare workers expressed dualistic opinions; 
also, half of the sample reported being religious 
(independent of practicing). Religious respondents, 
younger participants, and women, were more likely 
to endorse the dualistic statements compared to 
non-religious, older respondents, and men 
respectively (for more details, see Demertzi et al., 
2009b).   
Our results corroborate previous surveys with 
higher-educated samples (i.e. scientists). At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, 40% of 
scientists held religious convictions as reflected by 
their beliefs in a personal God 
Reductive Materialism 
(or “Identity Theory”) 
holds that there are no 
“hard questions” to be 
answered and no “gaps” 
to be explained. The 
mind cannot be 
separated from the brain. 
It is the brain.  
Experience can be 
explained simply by 
revealing what happens 
within the brain, just as 
heat is explained by the 
motion of atoms. The 
difficulty with this 
perspective is that it 
seems to give no account 
of the subjective 
qualities of experience.  
In other words, it does 
not explain why an 
experience should be 
“like something”.  This 
view, albeit convenient 
for neuroscience, has 
been accused of “leaving 
out the mind” (Searle, 
1992). 
 
 
and in afterlife (Leuba, 1916). Eighty years later, 
these figures had not considerably changed and 
seemed to characterize one third of U.S. scientists 
(Larson & Witham, 1997). Nevertheless, when the 
survey was restricted to “leading” scientists-
members of the National Academy of Science, the 
majority (72%) of respondents were found to 
“reject God”. In that respect, dualistic views have 
been reduced in this target group since the 1900’s, 
when only 53% of the “leading” scientists did not 
believe in a God (Larson & Witham, 1998).  
We need to stress that our findings must be 
considered in the context of the groups we have 
surveyed and the approach we have taken. A larger 
survey, including participants from a broader range 
of educational and cultural background, could shed 
more light on expressed opinions. Additionally, the 
closed “agree-disagree” statements used in the 
survey forced participants to endorse attitudes that 
they might have wished to further qualify. For 
example, a majority of the Liège survey did not 
support the materialistic view that mind is 
fundamentally physical. Yet the group’s 
perspective was not consistently dualistic, as a 
majority also endorsed the statement that the mind 
is not separable from the brain.  
 
 
Figure 1.2 Survey results on attitudes towards the mind-brain relationship. 
From Demertzi et al., Ann N Y Acad Sci. (2009b) 
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Such figures may reflect the complexities of the 
concept of mind or the understandable confusions 
about its nature, which remain controversial 
among philosophers. Finally, it can be argued that 
the dichotomous “agree-disagree” way that the 
respondents were asked to answer did not allow 
them to doubt the statements by providing, for 
example, an “I don’t know” response. In that 
respect, one could expect the respondents to leave 
the questions unanswered if they felt that did not 
represent their views. Considering, however, the 
small number of missing values in our data (for 
Liège survey statement a: 5%; b: 5%; c: 7%, d: 
6%), we can conclude that participants were able 
to express their attitudes in a good and 
representative way. 
 
 
Discussion 
The persistence of dualistic attitudes toward mind 
and brain has both scientific and clinical 
implications. At the scientific level, we suggest 
that dualism is at work in neuroscientific thinking 
about consciousness. Talk of consciousness being 
“generated by” or “conjured from” the brain is 
reminiscent of the Cartesian view that our mental 
lives interact with our physical being, while being 
radically separate from it. Some contemporary 
philosophers of mind  regard dualism of this kind 
as being theoretically appropriate (Chalmers, 
1996). Here, we simply draw attention to the fact 
that the widespread dualism revealed by our 
survey continues to exert an influence on scientific 
thought. Dualistic preconceptions about mind and 
brain may also influence the reception of scientific 
theories of consciousness by the general public. If 
such views remain alive among scientists who 
formulate and try to answer questions within the 
science of consciousness, they are likely to be all 
the more influential among the wider public. In 
any case, whether or not dualistic views are 
correct, their continuing influence should be 
acknowledged.  
At the clinical level, the mind–brain dichotomy 
may be utilized to reason about patients’ 
responsibility for their condition: when a problem 
is considered of a psychological-behavioral origin, 
the patients are more often thought to be 
responsible for their condition. In contrast, when a 
problem is thought to have a neurobiological 
cause, the patients are considered less 
blameworthy (Miresco & Kirmayer, 2006). 
Similarly, dualistic models about pain support that 
pain is either psychological or physical (Nicholson 
et al., 2002). Dualistic attitudes towards pain are 
likely to support biases in clinical practice, in the 
sense that clinicians will only treat the physical 
pathology (considering that pain will eventually 
subside, e.g., tissue damage) or the emotional 
distress (considering that pain is “in patients’ 
heads”, e.g., depression). Especially the issue of 
pain (see Chapter 2, this Thesis) becomes more 
ethically challenging in cases of patients who are 
not able to communicate and express their feelings, 
such as patients with disorders of consciousness.  
 
 
Methods 
The Edinburgh survey included n = 250 students from the University of Edinburgh, 
of eight academic disciplines: anthropology (33), astrophysics (19), civil engineering 
(32), computer science (30), divinity (36), medicine (30), mechanical engineering 
(34), and physics (36). The students were addressed as a class after their lectures and 
then asked to complete and return the questionnaire within the next 15 minutes. 
Participants’ views were expressed on a 4-point Likert scale (Agree- Somewhat 
agree- Somewhat disagree- Disagree), which was collapsed into two categories 
(“agree” vs. “disagree”) for further analysis. The participants were also asked to 
provide information about possible belief in the existence of a God or Gods.  
The Liège survey included n = 1858 attendees of public or scientific meetings on 
consciousness. The sample was comprised of medical professionals (782/1858); 
paramedical healthcare workers (nurses, psychologists, physiotherapists (290/1858)) 
and other professional backgrounds (455/1858; 331 missing data on profession). The 
administration was oral and it took approximately 15 minutes for the completion of 
the questionnaire. The answers were expressed dichotomously (“agree–disagree”). 
Information about belief in a personal God was also collected. The data were 
analyzed using SPSS 14.0 for Windows (SPSS, Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). Internal 
consistency was assessed by calculating inter-item correlations. Chi-square tests for 
categorical data were used to test the differences in responses between groups. 
Logistic Regression analyses (method: backward stepwise) were ordered to describe 
the relationship between agreement on the four statements and a set of explanatory 
variables (i.e. age, gender, profession, and religiosity, tests thresholded at p=.05). 
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1.2 Disorders of consciousness 
 
A short history  
About 50 years ago, before the era of neurocritical 
care, things were relatively simple. After a severe 
brain damage, patients who were in coma either 
died or, more rarely, recovered with more or less 
cognitive deficits. This picture changed after the 
invention of the positive pressure mechanical 
ventilator by Bjorn Ibsen in the 1950s, and the 
widespread use of intensive care in the 1960s in 
the industrialized world, changed the picture. 
Severely brain- damaged patients could now have 
their heartbeat and systemic circulation sustained 
by artificial respiratory support. Nevertheless, they 
could end-up unconscious. Such profound 
unconscious states had never been encountered 
before as, until that time, all these patients had 
died instantly from apnea. As a consequence, 
medicine was forced to redefine death, using a 
neurological definition, that of brain death 
(Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard 
Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain 
Death, 1968). In the meantime, Fred Plum and 
Jerome Posner described for the first time the 
locked-in syndrome (LIS), to refer to fully 
conscious coma survivors who are unable to 
communicate due to physical paralysis (Plum & 
Posner, 1966). In 1972, Bryan Jennet and Fred 
Plum published the clinical criteria of another 
artifact of modern intensive care, the vegetative 
state (VS), a state of “wakefulness without 
awareness” (Jennett & Plum, 1972).  In 2002, the 
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Coma is a time-limited 
condition leading to 
death, recovery of 
onsciousness, or 
ansition to vegetative 
Laureys, 2007). It 
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ihemispheric diffuse 
cortical or white matter 
damage or brainstem 
lesions bilaterally, 
ecting the subcortical 
icular arousing 
ystems. After three days 
utcome is heralded by 
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teral absent cortical 
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otentials, and, for 
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euron-specific enolase) 
(Wijdicks et al., 2006). 
Neurobehavioral Conference Workgroup realized 
that the clinical reality was yet more complicated. 
Some patients showed signs of voluntary behavior, 
and were therefore no longer vegetative, but still 
remained unable to functionally communicate. 
Based on these observations, they published the 
diagnostic criteria of a new clinical entity, the 
minimally conscious state (MCS) (Giacino, et al., 
2002).  
More recently, it has been recognized that part of 
the healthcare, media and lay public feels 
uncomfortable using the unintended denigrating 
“vegetable-like” connotation (seemingly intrinsic 
to the term VS). Hence, the European Task Force 
on Disorders of Consciousness proposed the 
alternative name “unresponsive wakefulness 
syndrome” (UWS), a more neutral and descriptive 
term, pertaining to patients showing a number of 
clinical signs (i.e. syndrome) of unresponsiveness 
(i.e. without response to commands or oriented 
voluntary movements) in the presence of 
wakefulness (Laureys et al., 2010). With regards to 
MCS, it has been proposed to subcategorize this 
entity into MCS+ and MCS- based on the distinct 
behavioral and neuroanatomical pattern observed 
in these patients (Bruno et al., in press). More 
particularly, MCS+ patients exhibit high-level 
behavioural responses, such as command 
following, intelligible verbalization or non-
functional communication. On the other hand, 
MCS- patients show low-level behavioural 
responses, such as visual pursuit, localization of 
noxious stimulation or contingent behaviors like 
appropriate smiling or crying to emotional stimuli 
(Bruno et al., 2011b). Finally, patients whose non-
behavioural evidence of consciousness or 
communication is only measurable via assisting 
technologies (i.e. functional MRI, positron 
emission tomography, EEG or evoked potentials) 
have been suggested to be in a functional LIS 
(Bruno, et al., 2011b). 
Brain death is death 
based on neurological 
criteria. Classically, it is 
caused by a massive 
brain lesion, (trauma, 
intracranial hemorrhage, 
anoxia). According to 
the American Academy 
of Neurology (1995) the 
diagnostic guidelines for 
brain death are:  
1. demonstration of 
coma  
2. evidence for the cause 
of coma 
3. absence of 
confounding factors 
(hypothermia, drugs, 
electrolyte, endocrine 
disturbances)  
4. absence of brainstem 
reflexes 
5. absent motor 
responses 
6. positive apnea testing  
7. a repeat evaluation in 
six hours is advised, 
but the time period is 
considered arbitrary 
and  confirmatory 
laboratory tests are 
only required when 
specific components 
of the clinical testing 
cannot be reliably 
evaluated.   
According to these 
criteria, no recovery 
from brain death has 
ever been reported over 
the last 50 years 
(Laureys, 2005b). 
Vegetative state (VS) is 
caused by diffuse grey 
and white matter lesions. 
The diagnostic criteria 
are:  
1. no evidence of 
awareness of self or 
environment; inability 
to interact with others 
 
Clinical assessment  
The objective assessment of consciousness is 
difficult due to its first-person nature. For that 
reason, clinicians need to infer awareness via the 
evaluation of motor activity and command 
following. This is extremely challenging for 
patients with disorders of consciousness and LIS 
because these patients are usually deprived of the 
capacity to make normal physical movements. In 
addition, they often show limited attentional 
capacities, aphasia, apraxia and cortical 
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deafness or blindness which are possible 
confounders in the clinical assessment. As a result, 
incorrect diagnosis in these patients is not a rare 
phenomenon. It has been estimated that around 
40% of VS/UWS patients are misdiagnosed 
(Andrews et al., 1996; Childs et al., 1993). We 
recently showed that, despite the introduction of 
the clinical criteria for the MCS, this diagnostic 
error rate has not substantially changed since the 
1990’s, which can be partially attributed to the 
scales used for clinical evaluation (Schnakers et 
al., 2009). 
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Standardized behavioral evaluation 
The most common and most widely used tool, 
mainly thanks to its short and simple 
administration, is the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) 
(Teasdale & Jennett, 1974). The GCS measures 
eye, verbal and motor responsiveness. However, 
there may be some concern as to which extent eye-
opening is sufficient evidence for assessing 
brainstem function (Laureys et al., 2002b). 
Additionally, the verbal responses are impossible 
to be measured in cases of intubation and 
tracheostomy. The scale requires the clinician to 
arrive at a certain judgment (e.g. “the patient 
follows commands”) without any formal guidance 
on how to arrive at that judgment (i.e. what and 
how many commands to use, how to assess 
confounds such as motor or sensory or 
spontaneous movements, etc.). Finally, the GCS is 
not sensitive to detect transition from VS/UWS to 
MCS (Schnakers et al., 2006). 
A recently proposed alternative to the GCS is the 
Full Outline of Unresponsiveness (FOUR) 
(Wijdicks et al., 2005). The scale is named after 
the number of subscales it contains (eye, motor, 
brainstem, and respiratory functioning) as well as 
after the maximum score that each subscale can 
take (four). The advantage of the FOUR is that it 
does not need a verbal response and, hence, can be 
employed in intubated patients. The FOUR can 
discriminate between VS/UWS and MCS patients 
2. no evidence of 
sustained, 
reproducible, 
purposeful, or 
voluntary behavioral 
responses to visual, 
auditory, tactile, or 
noxious stimuli 
3. no evidence of 
language 
comprehension or 
expression 
4. intermittent 
wakefulness 
manifested by the 
presence of sleep-
wake cycles 
5. sufficiently preserved 
hypothalamic and 
brainstem autonomic 
functions to permit 
survival with medical 
and nursing care 
6. bowel and bladder 
incontinence  
7. variably preserved 
cranial-nerve and 
spinal reflexes (The 
Multi-Society Task 
Force on PVS, 1994a).
VS can be a transition to 
further recovery, or it 
may be permanent. 
‘Permanent’ VS (>1 
year after traumatic or 3 
months after non-
traumatic injury) refers 
to patients whose 
chances for recovery are 
close to zero (The Multi-
Society Task Force on 
PVS, 1994b). 
 
 
Minimally conscious 
state (MCS) describes 
patients showing at least 
one of the following:  
1. purposeful behavior 
including movements 
or affective 
behavior contingent 
to relevant 
environment stimuli 
(i.e. visual pursuit, 
sustained fixation, 
reaching for objects, 
touching or holding 
objects, 
vocalizations) 
2. following simple 
commands 
3. gestural or verbal 
yes/no responses, 
regardless of 
accuracy 
4. intelligible 
verbalization 
(Giacino et al., 2002). 
Emergence from MCS is 
defined by the ability to 
exhibit functional 
interactive 
communication or 
functional use of objects. 
Similarly to the VS, 
traumatic etiology has a 
better prognosis than 
non-traumatic anoxic 
brain injuries (Giacino & 
Kalmar, 1997). 
 
Locked-in syndrome 
(LIS) can result from a 
bilateral ventral pontine  
or mesencephalic lesions 
(Laureys, et al., 2005). 
According to the 
American Congress of 
Rehabilitation Medicine 
(1995), LIS patients 
demonstrate: 
1. sustained eye-
opening  
2. quadriplegia or 
quadriparesis  
3. aphonia or 
hypophonia 
 
as it assesses visual pursuit, one of the first signs 
that announces emergence from VS/UWS. But it 
does not test all the behavioral criteria of MCS 
(Giacino, et al., 2002). It is also more sensitive in 
detecting LIS patients because it explicitly asks 
patients to move their eyes on command 
(Wijdicks, et al., 2005). To differentiate VS/UWS 
from MCS patients, the most appropriate scale is 
the Coma  Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) 
(Giacino, et al., 2004). The CRS-R has a similar 
structure to the GCS. It tests audition, arousal and 
communication abilities next to motor, eye and 
verbal responsiveness. Despite its longer 
administration compared to the GCS and the 
FOUR (i.e. approximately 15 minutes), it is the 
most sensitive in differentiating VS/UWS from 
MCS patients (Schnakers, et al., 2006). This is 
because it assesses every behavior according to the 
diagnostic criteria of VS/UWS and MCS, such as 
the presence of visual pursuit. 
Apart from the direct evaluation of consciousness 
levels, the evaluation of pain is another challenge 
to the clinical assessment of patients with disorders 
of consciousness. This is because these patients are 
unable to communicate their feelings and pain in 
these states needs to be inferred from observing 
their spontaneous behavior or their motor 
responses to noxious stimulation. Stereotyped 
responses (i.e. slow generalized flexion or 
extension of the upper and lower extremities), 
flexion withdrawal (i.e. withdrawal of the limb 
away from the point of the stimulation), and 
localization responses (i.e. the non-stimulated limb 
locates and makes contact with the stimulated 
body part at the point of stimulation) are linked to, 
respectively, brainstem, subcortical, or cortical 
activity (e.g., Stevens & Nyquist, 2006). 
Stereotyped responses are considered as 
“automatic”’ unconscious reflexes, whereas 
localization of noxious stimulation is usually 
considered as indicative of conscious perception 
(Posner, et al., 2007).  
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Repeated clinical examinations by trained and 
experienced examiners are paramount for the 
behavioral assessment of pain. To date, several 
scales are used for assessing pain in non-
communicative individuals such as with end-stage 
dementia, in newborns, and in sedated intensive 
care patients. Recently, we developed the 
Nociception Coma Scale (Schnakers, et al., 2010) 
a sensitive and specific tool which evaluates 
motor, verbal, visual, and facial responsiveness to 
noxious stimulation (Figure 1.3). The scale has 
high inter-rater agreement and yields significant 
differences between the total scores as a function 
of patients’ diagnosis (i.e. VS/UWS or MCS). 
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Conclusions 
 
The study and management of patients with 
disorders of consciousness offer unique 
opportunities not only to better understand the 
neural correlates of healthy consciousness 
(Laureys, 2005a) but also to gain insight about the 
brain’s plastic abilities (Demertzi et al., 2011b). 
Neuroplasticity in these patients’ population can 
be approached via neurological evidence from 
neuroimaging technologies in pathological states  
5. a primary mode of 
communication (e.g., 
via eye blinking or 
other movements) 
abilities  
6. preserved cognitive 
abilities  
With appropriate medical 
care, life expectancy is 
estimated up to several 
decades (Laureys, et al., 
2005).  
 
Neuroplasticity is the 
ability of the brain and 
nervous system to change 
structurally and 
functionally as a result of 
environmental influences. 
Neural plasticity can be 
studied at many levels, 
from observable 
behavioral changes to 
cerebral maps, synaptic 
organization, 
physiological 
organization, 
molecular structure, and 
mitosis (Kolb & 
Whishaw, 2003b). 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Iconic representation of the Nociception Coma Scale. From 
Demertzi et al. “I know what you are thinking: brain imaging and mental 
privacy” (in press); based on Schnakers et al., Pain (2010) 
 
and after recovery of consciousness. Altered 
cerebral functional connectivity, structural 
reorganization as well as behavioral amelioration 
after invasive and non-invasive treatments are 
some indices for studying plasticity changes in this 
challenging population.   
Functional connectivity 
is the temporal correlation 
of a neurophysiological 
index (hemodynamic or 
metabolic) measured in 
different remote brain 
areas (Friston, 2002) 
 Most recoveries of consciousness, with or without 
recovery of social or professional integration, take 
place within the first 3 months after non-traumatic 
and after 12 months after traumatic cerebral 
accidents. Survival beyond 10 years remains 
unusual (The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, 
1994b)– though it depends on the level of medical 
and nursing care (Monti et al., 2010a). However, 
clinical cases of both late spontaneous recoveries 
(Estraneo et al., 2010; Voss et al., 2006) or after 
invasive interventional treatments (e.g., with deep 
brain stimulation; Schiff et al., 2007) challenge the 
dogma of temporally fixed periods for possible 
neuronal plasticity. Currently, the beneficial effects 
of pharmacologic and non-pharmacologic 
approaches need evidence-based justification 
(Demertzi et al., 2008). Additionally, no unique 
hypothesis or theoretical framework can at present 
combine the temporal dynamics and 
pathophysiological mechanisms of all the 
aforementioned interventions and many questions 
remain as to the precise mechanisms differentiating 
spontaneous from therapy-induced cerebral 
plasticity (Tononi & Laureys, 2009). For example, 
the cellular mechanisms underlying recovery of 
consciousness after severe brain damage remain 
speculative. Our understanding of possible 
neurogenesis (known to occur predominantly in 
associative frontoparietal cortices in non-human 
primates; Gould et al., 1999), axonal sprouting and 
neurite outgrowth, or even apoptosis in this patient 
population remains very limited.  
 
The residual cerebral function in VS/UWS and 
MCS patients has been largely overlooked by the 
medical community and deserves further 
investigation. In light of continuing societal, 
political, legal, and ethical debates, it is imperative 
to better comprehend these challenging states. 
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Then, the formulation of appropriate frameworks 
will provide guidance for the medical management 
and treatment of non-communicating patients. 
Eventually, this lesion paradigm can/will 
contribute uniquely in understanding the nature 
and function of consciousness in healthy 
conditions.  
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 The ethics of treating patients with 
disorders of consciousness:  Attitudes 
 
“Surrendered and absolute 
Breathing is like sawing 
It cuts the time and spreads 
In immaculate silence 
Fire and snow” 
 
Thanasis Papakonstantinou  
 
“Like a child”, The minimal self (Inner Ear discography, 
2011) 
 
Based on: 
 
Demertzi, A., Schnakers, C., Ledoux, D., Chatelle, C., Bruno, M.-A., 
Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Boly, M., Moonen, G., Laureys, S., 2009. 
Different beliefs about pain perception in the vegetative and 
minimally conscious states: a European survey of medical and 
paramedical professionals. Prog Brain Res. 177, 329-38.  
 
Demertzi, A., Ledoux, D., Bruno, M.-A., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., 
Gosseries, O., Soddu, A., Schnakers, C., Moonen, G., Laureys, S., 
2011. Attitudes towards end-of-life issues in disorders of 
consciousness: a European survey. J Neurol. 258, 1058-65. 
Demertzi, A., Laureys, S., Bruno, M.-A., 2011. The ethics in 
disorders of consciousness. In: Annual update in intensive care and 
emergency medicine. Vol., J.L. Vincent (ed.), Springer-Verlag, 
Berlin, pp. 675-682. 
 
Demertzi, A., Racine, E., Bruno, M.A., Ledoux, D., Gosseries, O., 
Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Thonnard, M., Soddu, A., Moonen, G., 
Laureys, S., 2012. Pain perception in disorders of consciousness: 
neuroscience, clinical care, and ethics in dialogue. Neuroethics. 1-14. 
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2.1 The ethical significance of studying attitudes  
 
Thanks to the invention of the positive mechanical 
ventilator and progress in the intensive care, 
patients can survive their injuries but can remain in 
unconscious conditions (see Chapter 1, this thesis). 
As a result, various ethical and public policy 
controversies have been raised as to whether it is 
worth living in such profound states of 
unconsciousness (e.g., Thompson, 1969). Such 
medical concerns were reflected in the composition 
of the first bioethical committees discussing the 
redefinition of life and the concept of therapeutic 
obstinacy. As already mentioned in Chapter 1, in 
1968 the Ad Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical 
School published a milestone paper for the 
redefinition of death as irreversible coma and brain 
failure (Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the 
Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition 
of Brain Death, 1968). The committee was 
comprised of ten physicians, a theologian, a lawyer 
and a historian of science, betokening the medical, 
legal, and societal debates that were to follow.  
Controversies of these kind mainly stem from how 
different people regard indefinite survival in 
disorders of consciousness (Jennett, 2002a). As 
opinions and attitudes can affect clinical practice, 
such as non-adherence to medical guidelines 
(Cabana et al., 1999), we were interested in 
assessing healthcare workers’ views on ethical 
issues related to the medical management of 
patients with disorders of consciousness, such as 
pain perception and end-of-life decision-making. 
 
2.2 Pain perception in disorders of 
consciousness? 
  
Definition of pain and related notions 
The International Association for the Study of Pain 
defines pain “an unpleasant sensory and emotional 
experience associated with real or potential tissue 
damage” (IASP; 1994; Loeser & Treede, 2008).  As 
also stressed by the IASP, the inability to 
communicate verbally does not negate the 
possibility that an individual is experiencing pain 
and is in need of appropriate pain-relieving 
treatment. Pain may also be reported in the absence 
of tissue damage or any likely pathophysiological 
cause, such as in patients with thalamic pain 
(Loeser & Treede, 2008). Pain should be 
differentiated from activity induced in the 
nociceptor and nociceptive pathways by a noxious 
stimulus. Nociception is at the core of many 
painful states, but pain may occur without 
(peripheral) nociception and vice versa. Therefore, 
pain is considered a subjective phenomenon, 
whereas nociception is the object of sensory 
physiology (Loeser & Treede, 2008). 
Nociceptor is a sensory 
receptor that is capable 
of transduction and 
encoding noxious  
stimuli (Loeser & 
Treede, 2008). 
 
Noxious stimulus is an 
actually or potentially 
tissue-damaging event 
(Loeser & Treede, 
2008). 
 
Nociception is the 
neural processes of 
encoding and processing 
noxious stimuli 
 (Loeser & Treede, 
2008). 
 
Suffering is the 
emotional response 
triggered by nociception 
or other aversive events 
associated with it (e.g., 
fear, anxiety, loss of 
loved objects, stress and 
other psychological 
states) (Gatchel et al., 
2007; Loeser & 
Melzack, 1999). 
 
 
Pain and suffering are not interchangeable 
constructs either. A person might experience 
significant pain-related suffering from a relatively 
low-level noxious stimulation if she or he believes 
the implications are ominous, interminable, and 
beyond their control (Turk & Wilson, 2009). 
Cassell (1982) also defines suffering as occurring 
when the physical or psychological integrity of the 
person is threatened. Although not all suffering is 
caused by pain, in the medicalized culture suffering 
is often described in the language of pain (Loeser 
& Melzack, 1999). 
 
Pain is in the brain: differential cerebral activity in 
patients with disorders of consciousness 
At the patient’s bedside, we are limited to evaluate 
pain as the behavioral responsiveness to noxious 
stimuli. If patients never show any sign of 
voluntary movement in response to noxious 
stimulation, it will be concluded they do not 
experience pain (Schnakers & Zasler, 2007). They 
may, however, be aroused by noxious stimuli by 
opening their eyes if they are closed, quickening 
their breathing, increasing heart rate and blood 
pressure, and occasionally show grimace-like or 
crying-like behavior. As all these abilities are also 
seen in infants with anencephaly  
20 
 
(Payne & Taylor, 1997; The Medical Task Force on 
Anencephaly, 1990) they are considered to be of 
subcortical origin and do not necessarily reflect 
conscious perception of pain. Additionally, patients 
can show extreme motor impairment or with 
fluctuating levels of vigilance (e.g., Majerus et al., 
2005) and, hence, obtaining a motor response can 
be limited. Considering that the absence of a 
behavioral output cannot be taken as an absolute 
proof of the absence of consciousness (McQuillen, 
1991), inferring pain and suffering solely by 
observing behavioral responses may be misleading. 
Then, how can we know if these patients 
experience pain and/or suffering?  
Since brain responses are the final common 
pathway in behavioral responses to pain, we believe 
that the application of functional neuroimaging will 
allow us to study pain in an objective manner and to 
propose evidence-based guidelines on the use of 
analgesia and symptom management in patients 
with disorders of consciousness (e.g., Laureys & 
Boly, 2008; Tracey & Mantyh, 2007). In healthy 
controls, studies with positron emission 
tomography (PET) and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) have revealed that pain 
cannot be localized in an isolated “pain centre” but 
rather encompasses a neural circuitry, the pain 
neuromatrix (Melzack, 1999). More specifically, 
two distinct cerebral networks have been identified 
to be involved in pain perception: (i) a lateral pain 
system or sensory network, encompassing lateral 
thalamic nuclei, primary and secondary 
somatosensory, as well as posterior parietal 
cortices; and (ii) a medial pain system or affective 
network, which involves the medial thalamus, 
anterior cingulate, and prefrontal cortices with the 
insular cortices playing an intermediate role 
(Hofbauer et al., 2001).  
Neuroimaging studies have shown that patients with 
disorders of consciousness are characterized by 
distinct cerebral patterns in response to sensory 
stimulation (Giacino et al., 2006; Laureys et al., 
2004; Owen & Coleman, 2008; Schiff, 2007). In 15 
studied VS/UWS patients there was no evidence of 
Positron emission 
tomography (PET) 
measures different 
aspects of physiological 
brain function based on 
the type of radioactive 
tracer used (e.g.,  
[18F]fluorodeoxyglucos
e –FDG, H215O). Blood 
flow, glucose 
metabolism, blood 
volume, and oxygen 
consumption are 
examples of 
physiological functions 
studied by PET in the 
context of 
hemodynamic changes 
associated to neuronal 
activity. 
 
Functional magnetic 
resonance imaging 
(fMRI) is a 
neuroimaging technique 
which measures brain 
activity by detecting 
associated changes in 
blood flow over time. 
 
The body-self 
neuromatrix 
comprises a widely 
distributed neural 
network that includes 
parallel somatosensory, 
limbic and 
thalamocortical 
components which 
subserve the sensory-
discriminative, 
affective-motivational, 
and evaluative-
cognitive dimensions of 
pain experience 
(Melzack, 1999). 
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noxious stimulation-related downstream activation 
beyond primary somatosensory cortex (Laureys et 
al., 2002a). More importantly, functional 
connectivity assessment showed that the observed 
cortical activation subsided as an island, dissociated 
from the pain matrix and the higher-order cortices 
(Figure 2.1). Indeed, higher-order cortico-cortical 
and thalamo-cortical processing is currently thought 
to be necessary for conscious awareness, as shown 
by studies on conscious perception in healthy 
controls and on loss of consciousness in sleep and 
anesthesia (e.g., Baars et al., 2003; Dehaene et al., 
2003; Laureys, 2005a).  
In striking contrast to what we observed in 
VS/UWS, MCS patients showed pain-related 
activation in not only midbrain, thalamus, and 
primary somatosensory cortex but also in secondary 
somatosensory, insular, posterior parietal and 
anterior cingulate cortices (Figure 2.1). The spatial 
extent of the activation in MCS patients was 
comparable to controls and no brain region showed 
less activation in MCS compared to healthy 
individuals. A functional connectivity assessment 
of insular cortex demonstrated its preserved 
connections with a large set of associative areas 
encompassing posterior parietal, motor and 
supplementary motor, striatum, and dorsolateral 
prefrontal and temporal associative cortices as 
observed in controls (Boly et al., 2008).  
These neuroimaging studies show large differences 
in brain activation to pain between VS/UWS and 
MCS patients, despite a similar bedside clinical 
evaluation. Also, they strongly indicate preserved 
capacities of MCS patient to experience pain and 
potentially suffering, highlighting the need of 
analgesic treatment in this patients’ population. As 
healthcare workers are in charge of the patients’ 
medical management of pain, we were interested in 
their opinions on how they consider pain 
perception in patients with disorders of 
consciousness.   
 
2.3 Attitudes towards pain perception  
 
Between June 2007 and April 2009 we conducted a 
questionnaire survey of attitudes of healthcare 
professionals towards pain perception in patients 
with disorders of consciousness during lectures at 
medical and scientific conferences and meetings 
(n=48) within Europe. The study sample included 
2059 medical and paramedical professionals 
coming from 32 European countries (see Methods 
box for details).  
As a whole, the sampled participants replied more 
often that MCS patients could feel pain compared to 
VS/UWS patients (p<.001). Participants’ opinions 
were much more consistent for pain perception in 
MCS (96% of the total sample considered that these 
patients can feel pain), while responses were much 
more discordant for VS/UWS (59% considered that 
unresponsive patients could feel pain). Paramedical 
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Figure 2.1 Cerebral activation to noxious stimulation in healthy 
volunteers, in minimally conscious state patients (from Boly, et al., 2008 
with permission), in vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome 
(from Laureys, et al., 2002a with permission) and in brain death (adapted 
from Laureys, 2005b with permission). Note (i) the absence of activation in 
brain death; (ii) the preserved but low-level subcortical and primary 
cortical activation in the vegetative state (the primary cortical activation 
was disconnected from the rest of the brain), and (iii) the near-normal 
activation in the minimally conscious state. From Demertzi et al. Prog 
Brain Res (2009c) 
caregivers (n=538) replied more often that patients 
in a VS/UWS could feel pain than did medical 
doctors (n=1166) (68% versus 56%; p<.001; 
Figure 2.2). Following professional background, 
religion was the strongest predictor of caregivers’ 
opinion: 64% of religious (n= 1009; 94% 
Christians) versus 52% of non-religious 
respondents (n= 830) answered positively. Logistic 
regression analysis on opinions for pain perception 
in MCS showed that women and religious 
respondents reported more often that MCS patients 
may experience pain compared to men and non-
religious respondents. Logistic regression analysis 
on opinions for pain perception in VS/UWS 
showed that paramedical professionals, religious, 
and older respondents reported more often that 
VS/UWS patients may experience pain compared 
to medical doctors, non-religious and younger 
respondents.  
 
Discussion 
According to our survey, healthcare workers have 
different beliefs about possible pain perception in 
MCS compared to VS/UWS patients. This finding 
implies that, despite the recent introduction of  
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Attitudes toward pain perception in the vegetative and the 
minimally conscious as expressed by European medical and paramedical 
professionals. Adapted from Demertzi et al. (2009c) 
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MCS (Giacino, et al., 2002), the medical 
community regards MCS and VS/UWS as two 
separate clinical entities characterized by different 
pain perception profiles. The major differences in 
physicians’ beliefs about pain in VS/UWS 
compared to MCS are supported by results from the 
functional neuroimaging data discussed above 
(Boly, et al., 2008; Laureys, et al., 2002a). 
Nevertheless, our survey indicates that a high 
proportion of medical doctors (56%) and 
paramedical professionals (68%) considered that 
VS/UWS patients can feel pain. The observed 
differences in viewpoint depending on professional 
background might be related to many factors 
including differences in proximity to the patient, 
time spent at the bedside, and education.  
In light of such controversies around pain in 
VS/UWS and MCS patients, an increase in 
scientific evidence is essential to enhance our 
understanding of pain perception in patients with 
disorders of consciousness. Apart from the clinical 
and scientific interest around pain perception, 
ethical issues also raise as to whether it is justifiable 
to continue treating non-communicating patients for 
whom pain perception is suspected (e.g., Wilkinson 
et al., 2009). In order to better comprehend end-of-
life issues in terms of possible pain perception, we 
will first discuss separately how clinicians think 
about withdrawing life-sustaining treatments in 
non-communicating patients. 
 
2.4 Attitudes towards end-of-life options 
 
In intensive care settings, medical doctors and 
assisting staff are confronted daily with clinical 
situations requiring critical decisions, such as 
continuing or withdrawing life sustaining treatment. 
Treatment limitation can be viewed as a refusal of 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) or as a 
decision to withdraw treatment, such as the 
artificial respirator or artificial nutrition and 
hydration (ANH) (Bernat, 2004). 
CPR is almost automatically performed as an 
emergency therapy in order to restore heartbeat 
and ceased breathing (unless the patient or the 
legal representative has refused it in advance in a 
form of a do-not-resuscitate order). ANH 
limitation is usually discussed after an intervention 
and when the clinical condition of a patient has 
been stabilized and denoted as irreversible. In the 
intensive care, the majority of deaths are the result 
of a medical decision to withhold or withdraw 
treatment (Laureys, 2005b). 
Despite the controversy as to whether ANH 
constitutes a medical treatment (Bernat & 
Beresford, 2006) and thus should never be 
withdrawn from patients (Rosner, 1993), most of 
the medical community (especially Anglo-Saxon) 
would consider it a medical therapy which can be 
refused by patients and surrogate decision makers 
(Steinbrook & Lo, 1988). Such decisions in 
VS/UWS patients are only justified when a case is 
denoted as irreversible (Royal College of 
Physicians, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 2.3 End-of-life attitudes towards vegetative/unresponsive state (VS) 
and minimally conscious state (MCS) as expressed by 2475 medical and 
paramedical professionals (**p<.001). From Demertzi et al. (2011a) 
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Guidelines with regards to temporal determination 
of a definitive outcome in VS/UWS currently state 
that if no recovery is observed within 3 months 
after a non-traumatic or 12 months after a traumatic 
accident, the condition of the patient can be denoted 
as permanent (The Multi-Society Task Force on 
PVS, 1994a).We here surveyed end-of-life attitudes 
of European medical and paramedical professionals 
(n = 2475) towards VS/UWS and determined, for 
the first time, attitudes towards MCS. In the 
sample, 66% agreed with treatment withdrawal for 
VS/UWS and 28% agreed so for MCS patients 
(p<.001). A dissociation was found between what 
can be generally applied to patients and what is 
wished for oneself: the majority (82%) of 
participants wished not to be kept alive if they 
imagined themselves in a chronic VS/UWS or 
chronic MCS (67%); and this dissociation was 
more important for MCS (interaction analysis; 
p<.001, Figure 2.3). Chronic MCS was also 
considered worse than VS/UWS more so from the 
perspective of the patient (54%) compared to that of 
the family (42%; p<.001). Inversely, respondents 
found that chronic VS/UWS was worse than death 
more so from the perspective of the family (80%) 
compared to that of the patient (55%; p<.001).  
Multiple logistic regression analysis showed that 
agreement with end-of-life questions was mainly 
associated with geographic region and respondents’ 
religiosity. 
 
Discussion 
Our attempt to open a discussion on treatment 
withdrawal from patients with chronic disorders of 
consciousness is not an easy one. Concerning 
VS/UWS patients, two-thirds of the surveyed 
participants reported that it was acceptable to 
withdraw ANH from these patients and most (82%) 
preferred not to be kept alive if they imagined 
themselves in this condition. These results are in 
line with surveys from previous decades, where the 
majority of physicians, despite different cultural 
backgrounds, would generally support ANH 
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withdrawal from these patients and would not wish 
life-sustaining treatments for themselves. Although 
agreement with withdrawal of treatment was 
somewhat less compared to historical data, 
possibly due to different adopted research 
methodologies, the surveyed sample expressed 
similar end-of-life attitudes towards permanent 
VS/UWS despite the recent introduction of the 
diagnostic criteria for MCS, the recent 
confirmation of potential diagnostic error in 
VS/UWS patients (Schnakers, et al., 2009), the 
apparent evidence for residual cognitive 
processing coming from functional neuroimaging 
technologies (Monti et al., 2010b; Owen et al., 
2006) and the potential prognostic value of the 
latter (Di et al., 2007).  
Concerning MCS patients, although almost 70% 
would not wish to be kept alive in this state 
(considering it worse than VS/UWS), less than 
one-third of our respondents supported treatment 
withdrawal from these patients. Such differences 
in attitudes between the two clinical entities are 
comparable to a previous survey, where 92% of 
British physicians considered it appropriate to 
withdraw ANH from patients for whom the 
predicted outcome was VS and only 22% would 
think so for patients who were able to 
communicate simple needs without the capacity 
for speech production (thought to reflect similar 
cognitive processes as in MCS patients) (Grubb et 
al., 1997) [16].  
We here illustrate that most healthcare 
professionals hold different views on end-of-life 
issues for VS/UWS compared to MCS. 
Additionally, the distinction between personal 
preferences with private consequences (i.e. “I 
would like to be kept alive if I were…”) and more 
objective statements of societal significance (i.e. 
“It is acceptable to stop treatment in…”) are in 
accordance with previous findings which show that 
the majority of surveyed physicians and nurses 
would refuse treatment for themselves more than 
for patients (Gillick et al., 1993). The legal 
ambiguity which exists around MCS may have 
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 influenced the audience to draw a virtual line 
between expressing preferences for self versus 
others, by implicitly recognizing that the latter 
could be a step on the slippery slope to legalize 
euthanasia (Rosner, 1993). We also show that end-
of-life decisions are not always governed by 
clinical circumstances and patients’ preferences; 
rather, physicians’ characteristics (i.e. age, religion 
and geographic region) seem to play a critical role 
for picking such options. Considering these 
different attitudes inside and outside of Europe, for 
example, it has been suggested that an international 
consensus regarding standards of care needs to be 
reached (Yaguchi et al., 2005).  
In principle, we are unable to account with certainty 
for the sample’s responses, especially in the case of 
MCS where opinions appeared more dissociated. 
Such results may be due to the different outcome 
which characterizes VS/UWS and MCS (Ledoux et 
al., 2008), or the distinct brain activation patterns of 
these two clinical entities (Laureys, et al., 2004) or 
the potential pain perception that the sample 
ascribes to MCS (Demertzi, et al., 2009c). 
Importantly for the issue of pain perception, several 
ethically salient questions arise. For example, it has 
been argued that patients can be left without 
administration of opioids or other analgesic drugs 
during their dying process on the grounds that they 
are deprived from experiencing suffering due to 
hunger or thirst (Ahronheim & Gasner, 1990; 
Laureys, 2005b). Next we illustrate whether and 
how opinions on pain perception can influence 
attitudes towards end-of-life in non-communicating 
patients. 
 
2.5 Attitudes on pain perception mediate end-of-
life views 
 
Here, with a further aim to add to the ethical 
discussion on end-of-life options with regards to 
pain perception in patients with disorders of 
consciousness, we reanalyzed the European survey 
data on healthcare professionals. We assessed 
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whether opinions (n=2259) on end-of-life options 
associate with beliefs regarding pain perception in 
these patients and identified variables explaining 
this association.  
For chronic VS/UWS, agreement with treatment 
withdrawal was negatively correlated with opinions 
on pain perception in this state. In other words, the 
more respondents found it appropriate to withdraw 
treatment from VS/UWS patients, the less they 
recognized that these patients feel pain. For chronic 
MCS, end-of-life attitudes were not mediated by 
opinions on pain perception (Figure 2.4). With 
respect to professional background, for chronic 
VS/UWS more paramedical workers than medical 
doctors supported treatment limitation when they 
thought that VS/UWS patients feel pain. For 
chronic MCS, medical doctors and paramedical 
professionals’ opinions did not differ in terms of 
pain perception in these patients. With respect to 
religious beliefs, for chronic VS/UWS, less 
religious than non-religious respondents supported 
treatment limitation both when they considered pain 
perception and not in VS/UWS patients. For chronic 
MCS, less religious than non-religious respondents 
agreed with treatment withdrawal when they 
considered that MCS patients feel pain. 
 
Discussion 
These data show a connection between beliefs about 
perception of pain and attitudes toward end-of-life 
decision-making in VS/UWS. Generally, the more a 
patient is able to feel pain, the less favorable a 
clinician is to withdrawal of life support. The high 
number of participants supporting treatment 
withdrawal in VS/UWS when considering that pain 
perception is absent is in line with existing 
guidelines on pain perception in these patients (The 
Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, 1994b). 
However, the overall data suggest conflicting or 
complex ethical reasoning made by respondents 
regarding the relationship between pain perception 
and acceptability of withdrawal of life support.  
 
 
At first glance, the relationship observed could be 
justified in as much as a patient with more 
sentience, and therefore more awareness, could be 
judged to be apt to be kept alive. Likewise, a patient 
who does not feel pain could be exhibiting lack of 
awareness and be allowed to die. With a similar 
rationale, pain as a subjective conscious experience 
corresponds to a form of conscious awareness. And 
such evidence, according to some, may give a 
strong reason to preserve life (Stumpf, 1986). For 
the sake of our discussion we can retain this 
hypothesis as one possible explanation of the 
relationship observed in the data, also an approach 
put forth by some commentators (Ropper, 2010) 
while criticized by others ( Kahane & Savulescu, 
2009).  
The implicit connection between greater pain 
sentience, greater awareness and therefore greater 
reticence to withdrawal of life support resonates 
with a heavy trend in bioethics exploring the  
 
 
Figure 2.4 Attitudes towards treatment withdrawal in VS/UWS are 
mediated by opinions on pain perception in patients in vegetative 
state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) but not in minimally 
conscious state (MCS). 
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principle of respect for persons in terms of 
personhood or moral status of the person. This line 
of argument usually assumes that we respect 
persons or other moral agents because of their 
capacity as moral agents or persons. The capacities 
of persons usually refer to things like sentience and 
interests (Singer, 2011) or cognitive abilities 
(Veatch, 2005). An enormous literature has 
examined and discussed if and what conditions or 
criteria a person or a moral agent must fulfill (e.g., 
Fletcher, 1979), hoping thereby to shed light on 
debates related to the beginning or the end of life 
(Macklin, 1983). In this scheme, evidence of 
sentience could very well be understood as a proof 
of being a moral agent. As suggested, if 
neuroimaging research shows residual cognitive 
function or pain perception, it could easily be 
interpreted by family members as an indication that 
treatments should be maintained (Ropper, 2010). 
Underlying this view is the assumption that some 
ontological status can be correlated to being a 
person and, once this state established, respect for 
that person or moral agent is called for.  
Generally, equating persons with their brains or 
neurological status has been described in other areas 
of neuroethics as neuro-essentialism (Racine et al., 
2005) and carries wide-ranging philosophical and 
practical problems (Glannon, 2009). A closer 
examination of the ontological understanding of 
respect for persons reveals specific problems of two 
different natures. First at a more practical level, 
greater sentience or pain perception in MCS could 
mean greater ability to feel pleasurable states or 
well-being, which would call for specific 
therapeutic approaches (Kahane & Savulescu, 2009) 
and an argument in favor of maintaining treatments. 
But greater sentience could very well mean a 
greater ability to feel both pain and suffering, i.e. 
the effects of being in a severely compromised 
state. In this sense, pain perception does not relate 
directly or clearly to a specific stance in favor of (or 
against) maintaining life support. Second and more 
fundamentally, respect for persons entails other 
aspects which are not captured in a canonical 
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 ontological understanding of respect for persons. 
On the one hand, the preferences and interests of 
the person to be maintained in a state of pain 
sentience could still be argued to depend largely on 
preferences and interests as defined by the patient 
herself/himself previously (or as voiced or 
articulated by a proxy decision-maker). In this 
sense, the close attention to what the patient would 
have wanted is crucial and the establishment of pain 
sentience is not by any standards surrogate for this. 
On the other hand, still, the ontological view causes 
problems because it does not capture stricto sensu 
non-ontological aspects of the principle of respect 
for persons. Respect for persons partly relies on the 
fact that the respected entities are considered to 
have a moral status or moral agency but also 
because they have worth and value for others. 
Consider the scenario of a loved one (e.g., child, 
parent, spouse) being in a neurologically severely 
compromised state and even in a state of disordered 
consciousness. To treat such a compromised loved 
one without respect would stir in most (if not all) 
strong feelings of disapproval, even if one agrees 
that cognitive capacities have diminished or maybe 
vanished. This urge for respecting the person is not 
because the person has certain capacities; on the 
contrary (s)he may have lost them. It is rather a 
mixture of obligations towards others, respect for 
human relationship or respect for what a person was 
before the injury that support this principle. This is 
a more relational (or contextual) understanding of 
respect for persons and such an understanding is ill-
captured by common arguments, which equate the 
person to a neurological status as found at the basis 
of the ontological view.  
Consequently, the implicit connection between 
sentience and attitudes favoring life should be 
examined critically. This link is debatable because 
it may rely on a dubious understanding of respect 
for persons which does not capture the preferences 
or wishes of the patients as defined by themselves, 
overly objectifies persons and ontologizies the 
principle of respect for persons. The ontological 
view may carry forth a broader reductionist 
framework which, by strongly linking personhood 
to some ontological status, does not grasp the 
relational aspects captured in the principle of 
respect for persons. By extension, implicit or 
explicit uses of the ontological understanding in 
interpretations of recent neuroimaging research 
should be carefully identified and considered to 
ensure clarity about the reasons underlying respect 
for persons. This is reinforced by different studies 
showing strong appeal of neuroimaging data in the 
public eye (McCabe & Castel, 2008; O'Connell et 
al., 2011; Racine et al., 2010; Weisberg et al., 
2008), which could easily lead to neuro-
essentialism.  
 
 
Recorded demographic data included age, gender, nationality, profession, and 
religious beliefs. Nationalities were categorized into three geographical regions based 
on previous classification criteria (Sprung et al., 2003): Northern (Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, United 
Kingdom), Central (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Moldavia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland), and 
Southern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, FYROM, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Turkey).  
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS v.16.0 software packages. Multiple 
logistic regression (stepwise backward; i.e. independent variables are removed from 
the equation at consecutive steps; entry, p=.05 and removal, p=0.1) was used to 
assess associations between obtained answers to the two questions and age, gender, 
profession, region, and religiosity. Chi-square tests assessed differences within 
categorical variables. Results were considered significant at p<.05 (two-sided). 
Participation to the survey was voluntary and anonymous. 
Methods 
Participants were first introduced to the clinical definitions of consciousness and 
were then asked to provide “yes” or “no” answers to 16 questions related to 
consciousness, VS/UWS, MCS, and LIS. We here report the replies obtained in 
European medical and paramedical professionals to the questions ‘‘Do you think that 
patients in a vegetative state can feel pain?’’ and ‘‘Do you think that patients in a 
minimally conscious state can feel pain?’(Demertzi et al., 2009c). Additionally, 
“Being in a chronic VS is worse than death for the patient/for the family”, “Being in 
a chronic MCS is worse than being in a VS for the patient/for the family”, “Do you 
think that it is acceptable to stop treatment (i.e. artificial nutrition and hydration) in 
patients in chronic VS?”, “Do you think that treatment can be stopped in patients in 
chronic MCS?”, “Would you like to be kept alive if you were in a chronic VS?”, 
“Would you like to be kept alive if you were in a chronic MCS?”.  
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Conclusions 
 
In healthy controls, pleasure and well-being 
depends on the positive affect (hedonia) and on the 
sense of purposefulness or engagement in life 
(eudemonia) (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2011). 
Despite the general view that quality of well-being 
is diminished in disease as a result of limited 
capacities to functionally engage in everyday living, 
these attitudes are formulated from a third-person 
perspective and may underestimate patients’ 
subjective well-being (Demertzi et al., in press). 
Indeed, we recently showed that a majority of 
patients in a chronic LIS, despite self-reporting 
severe restrictions in community reintegration, 
professed good subjective well-being (Bruno et al., 
2011a). In patients with disorders of consciousness, 
self-ratings are impossible to acquire and only 
estimates about what it is like to be in this situation 
can be made (Laureys & Boly, 2007). For example, 
an analysis of public media reports on Terri Schiavo 
(a patient in a VS/UWS) showed that in some cases 
the patient was described as feeling discomfort 
which was incompatible with her state (Racine et 
al., 2008). In another study, ratings from family 
members, who are more acquainted with VS/UWS, 
showed that 90% of families reported, among 
others, that the patients perceived pain (Tresch et 
al., 1991). These figures are incompatible with what 
has been proposed by formal clinical guidelines 
concerning pain perception in patients with 
disorders of consciousness (e.g., The Multi-Society 
Task Force on PVS, 1994b). 
As shown by our surveys, there are inconsistencies 
among healthcare professionals as to whether 
unresponsive patients feel pain. Two possible non-
mutually exclusive interpretations of this gap 
between guidelines and clinicians merit our 
attention. On one hand, perhaps clinicians are 
blatantly wrong, or are what we could call in 
disagreement of knowledge with guidelines, i.e. 
they were wrong because they did not know. In 
support of this interpretation, research on diagnostic 
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 accuracy  has shown that clinicians have trouble 
distinguishing the VS/UWS from MCS (Andrews, et 
al., 1996; Childs, et al., 1993; Schnakers, et al., 
2009) and even confuse the VS/UWS with more 
remote states, like brain death (Youngner et al., 
1989). On the other hand, perhaps a disagreement of 
apprehension or perspective could also be at work. 
This hypothesis entails that clinicians are or were 
observing pain perception in some patients which 
was not reflected fully in guidelines offered to them. 
Following this interpretation, clinicians who may 
have or have not been in agreement of knowledge 
with guidelines may have nonetheless been at odds 
with them, deliberately or not, because of a 
difference in apprehension of pain perception.  
Our analyses further suggest discrepancies between 
healthcare providers, which merit close attention. 
For example, respondents’ opinions for chronic 
VS/UWS patients were mediated by professional 
background as showed above. The observed 
differences based on professional background might 
be related to many factors (i.e. differences in 
proximity to the patient, time spent at the bedside, 
sensibilities, and education) as mentioned above 
(Asch et al., 1997; Festic et al., 2011). Nonetheless, 
this variability is concerning especially if one 
considers that family members may be exposed to 
various messages about pain perception based on 
who they talk to (Racine et al., 2009). Other 
research, similarly shows that physicians (Racine, et 
al., 2009) and family members’ characteristics 
(Kuehlmeyer et al., 2012) can shape attitudes 
toward end-of-life care, judgments about quality of 
life, and prognosis for post-coma recovery. 
Religiosity was also found as an important factor 
correlating with clinicians’ attitudes. We have 
previously shown that religious beliefs influence 
personal philosophical convictions towards dualistic 
views on the relationship between consciousness 
and the brain (Demertzi, et al., 2009b). Such 
personal beliefs have also been shown to weigh on 
physicians’ clinical decisions  (e.g., Jennett, 2002b). 
Similarly, other studies on, for example, end-of-life 
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 decisions in intensive care patients have shown that 
older and more experienced doctors and doctors 
with religious convictions (i.e. Christians) more 
often refused to opt for treatment limitations 
(Christakis & Asch, 1995; Sprung, et al., 2003).   
Our surveys on pain and end-of-life highlight that 
the ethical issues accrued from the study and 
management of patients with disorders of 
consciousness are variant and multi-faceted. 
Medical, legal and public controversies are shaped 
by how different people think about these issues 
and in many cases are country-dependent. It is, 
therefore, necessary that a uniform ethical 
framework is shaped to guide clinicians and 
caregivers in terms of clinical outcome, prognosis, 
and medical management. For that reason, bedside 
research and clinical investigations by means of 
neuroimaging/electrophysiological technologies are 
expected to provide valid means to a better 
comprehension of such severely compromised 
states. 
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 Functional neuroimaging in resting 
state 
 
 
 
“The fact that the body is lying down is no reason for 
supposing that the mind is at peace.  
Rest is…far from restful”  
 
Seneca (~ 60 A.D.) 
 
 
 
 
Based on: 
 
Vanhaudenhuyse*, A., Demertzi*, A., Schabus, M., Noirhomme, Q., 
Bredart, S., Boly, M., Phillips, C., Soddu, A., Luxen, A., Moonen, G., 
Laureys, S., 2011. Two distinct neuronal networks mediate the 
awareness of environment and of self. J Cogn Neurosci. 23, 570-8.  
(*equal contribution) 
Demertzi, A., Soddu, A., Faymonville, M.E., Bahri, M., A., 
Gosseries, O., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Phillips, C., Maquet, P., 
Noirhomme, Q., Luxen, A., Laureys, S., 2011. Hypnotic modulation 
of resting state fMRI default mode and extrinsic network 
connectivity. Prog Brain Res. 193, 309-22. 
Demertzi, A., Soddu, A., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Faymonville, M. E., 
& Laureys, S. (submitted). Functional connectivity changes in 
hypnotic state measured by fMRI. 
Demertzi, A., Soddu, A., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Gómez, F., Chatelle, 
C., Tshibanda, L., Boly, M., et al. (submitted). Global breakdown of 
fMRI resting state network connectivity in patients with disorders of 
consciousness. 
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3.1 The resting state paradigm 
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Growing neuroscientific evidence supports the idea 
that, in the absence of an external input, the brain is 
characterized by intrinsic activity. This notion was 
initially stressed by two meta-analyses of PET 
activation protocols with healthy subjects. These 
studies illustrated that a network of mesiofrontal, 
posterior cingulate/precuneual cortices and lateral 
parietal areas was more active at rest and showed 
activation decreases when compared to cognitive 
tasks (Mazoyer et al., 2001; Shulman et al., 1997). 
Such task-induced activity decreases led to the 
assumption that the brain at rest is not silent. On the 
contrary, the brain’s resting state activity is 
characterized by spontaneous low-frequency 
fluctuations (in the range of 0.01– 0.1 Hz), which 
can be detected in the BOLD signal of fMRI 
measurements and organize the brain in a “default 
mode network” (Gusnard et al., 2001). Such 
spontaneous BOLD fluctuations cannot be 
attributed to peripheral noise, such as cardiac and 
respiratory fluctuations, motion of the subject etc. 
Rather, there is synchronized activity with other 
functionally-related brain regions (Cordes, et al., 
2000; Fox & Raichle, 2007). Hence, these 
“deactivations” were considered to be as deviations 
from an ongoing metabolic/physiologic baseline 
which characterizes the function not only of the 
areas of the default mode network, but also of most 
areas of the brain (Gusnard & Raichle, 2001; 
Raichle & Snyder, 2007). Data-driven statistical 
analyses indeed show that the brain exhibits various 
large-scale “resting state” networks of functional 
significance (e.g., Beckmann, et al., 2005; 
Damoiseaux, et al., 2006; De Luca et al., 2006; 
Laird, et al., 2011; Smith, et al., 2009). Among the 
most commonly studied networks are the default 
mode and its anticorrelated regions, left and right 
frontoparietal, salience, sensorimotor, auditory, 
and visual networks (Figure 3.1). 
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anterior cingulate 
cortices (ACC).  These 
mmonly 
bserved in conflict 
onitoring, information 
tegration and response 
selection (Cole & 
chneider, 2007; 
all, 2008Roberts & H
a
i
r
2010
 
Sensorimotor netw
supplem
area/ m
). 
The salience network is 
lso involved in 
nteroception and pain-
elated processes (Ploner 
et al., 2010; Wiech et al., 
).  
Importantly for non-communicating patients with 
disorders of consciousness, resting state acquisitions 
are a suitable means to study residual cognition. 
(
C
ork 
encompasses 
entary motor 
idcingulate 
cortex, and bilateral 
primary, premotor and 
somatosensory cortices 
Biswal et al., 1995; 
ordes et al., 2000; 
Greicius et al., 2008; 
Mannfolk et al., 2011). 
 
Auditory network 
mainly encompasses 
bilateral superior 
temporal gyri/insular 
cortices, left pars 
opercularis, left superior 
temporal gyrus, and 
midcingulate cortex 
(e.g., Cordes, et al., 
2000). Connectivity in 
this network has been 
associated with  audition 
(tone and pitch 
discrimination), music, 
speech, phonological 
and oddball 
discrimination (Laird, et 
al., 2011). 
 
Visual networks 
Medial: encompasses 
primary and extrastriate 
visual cortices (Lowe et 
al., 1998). It is involved 
in “low-level” visual 
processing, such  as 
checkerboard viewing 
(Laird, et al., 2011). 
Lateral: encompasses 
inferior temporal gyri, 
including the middle 
temporal visual 
association area (MT, 
MST, V5) at the 
temporo-occipital 
junction.  It is involved 
in viewing complex, 
often emotional, stimuli 
(e.g., faces, films) 
(Laird, et al., 2011). 
Occipital: is involved 
higher-level visual 
processing associated 
with orthography and 
covert reading (Laird, et 
al., 2011). 
 
 
This is because resting state protocols do not 
require sophisticated experimental setup and 
surpass the need for patients‘ subjective 
contribution, either verbal or motor or both (Soddu 
et al., 2011). With the intention to ultimately use 
the resting state paradigm in patients, we first 
aimed to validate it in healthy controls. 
3.2 Resting state in conscious wakefulness 
 
Since the early studies of resting state it was 
suggested that the brain’s baseline activity can be 
organized in two widespread brain networks of 
anticorrelated activity: an “extrinsic” and an 
“intrinsic” (Fox et al., 2005; Fransson, 2005; 
Golland et al., 2007; Tian et al., 2007). The 
extrinsic system encompasses lateral frontoparietal 
areas, resembling the brain activations during goal-
directed behavior, and it has been linked to 
cognitive processes of external sensory input, such 
as somatosensory (e.g., Boly et al., 2007), visual 
(e.g., Dehaene & Changeux, 2005) and auditory 
(e.g., Brunetti et al., 2008). 
The intrinsic system (or default mode network) 
encompasses medial and lateral parietal areas and 
has been associated with self-related cognitive 
processes, such as mind-wandering (Mason et al., 
2007), task-unrelated thoughts(McKiernan et al., 
2006; Stawarczyk et al., 2011), introspection 
(Goldberg et al., 2006), monitoring of the “mental 
self” (Lou et al., 2004), and temporal perspective of 
the “self” (D'Argembeau et al., 2010).With no a 
priori assumptions, we here aimed to better 
characterize the subjective cognitive processes 
inherent to these “external” and “internal” networks 
by bridging behavioral and neuroimaging data from 
healthy volunteers.  
 
Behavioral “resting state” experiment 
This experiment aimed to determine the relationship 
between external and internal awareness scores in 31 
controls. During an eyes-closed resting condition, 
subjects were asked to evaluate and score their 
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 external and internal awareness levels by button 
presses after hearing an auditory prompt 
(randomized interstimulus interval= 11.3-26.8 sec, 
mean = 19s; see Methods box for details). External 
awareness was defined as the perception 
environmental sensory stimuli (e.g., auditory, 
visual, olfactory, or somesthetic). Internal 
awareness referred to all environmental stimuli-
independent thoughts (e.g., inner speech, 
autobiographical memories, or wandering thoughts). 
Upon completion of the experiment, the content of 
awareness was assessed using a semi-structured 
interview. External thoughts reported were auditory 
in 65% of subjects, somesthetic in 58%, olfactory in 
13%, and visual in 1%.  
 
  
Figure 3.1 Resting state networks identified in healthy controls. From 
Heine et al, Front Psychol (submitted) 
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Internal thoughts were experiment-related in 52%, 
autobiographical in 42%, and inner speech in 13% 
of subjects. The contents of external and internal 
awareness are summarized in Table 3.1. 
At the group level, we observed a significant 
negative correlation between external and internal 
awareness behavioral scores (Spearmanʼs r=−.44, 
p<.02, two-tailed). At the subject level, 24 (80%) 
participants showed significant negative 
correlations between internal and external 
awareness, one showed a positive correlation, and 
six participants showed non-significant 
correlations. The switching between external and 
internal awareness was calculated to occur with a 
mean frequency of 0.05 ± 0.03Hz (range: .01–.1; 
Figure 3.2). Interestingly, this frequency is similar 
to BOLD fMRI slow oscillations suggesting a 
close link between behavioral and neuronal 
activity. 
 
Neuroimaging fMRI “resting state” experiment 
This experiment aimed to bridge behavioral and 
neuroimaging “resting state” data. After having 
established the relationship between external and 
internal 
 
 
Figure 3.2 The temporal dynamics of the two components of awareness in a 
representative subject. The figure illustrates that external and internal 
awareness scores anticorrelate at the behavioral level. Adapted from 
Vanhaudenhuyse & Demertzi et al., J Cogn Neurosci (2011) 
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Table 3.1. The contents of the two components of awareness based on 
semi-structured interview after completion of the behavioral experiment. 
From Vanhaudenhuyse & Demertzi et al., J Cogn Neurosci (2011) 
 
  Content #subjects Examples 
External 
awareness  
Auditory 20 Hearing sounds from outside the 
room 
Somesthetic 18 Felt itchiness, uncomfortable body 
posture 
Olfactory 4 Smelling perfume 
Visual 2 Visual perceptions through closed 
eyelids 
Internal 
awareness 
Experiment-related 16 Thoughts related to the length of the 
study 
Autobiographical 
(future, past) 
13 Vacation, plans for weekend 
Inner speech 4 Instruction to oneself to stay vigilant 
    
awareness with the behavioral experiment (using 
responses from both hands), the fMRI study was 
performed in 22 healthy volunteers. Subjects were 
presented an auditory beep (interstimulus interval= 
3–30s, mean=20 sec). After each sound, they were 
asked to evaluate and score by a button press their 
state of awareness. In order to reduce the 
interference with resting state brain function and to 
reduce motor responses and artifacts to the 
maximum, behavioral responses were obtained on a 
single scale reflecting intensity from “more 
external” to “more internal” (using the left hand for 
all subjects; see Methods box for more details). 
Statistical analyses looked for brain areas where 
BOLD activity correlated with “internal” and 
“external” awareness behavioral scores. We found 
that the intensity of external awareness scores 
correlated linearly with activity in the bilateral 
inferior frontal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule 
(small-volume correction; Figure 3.3 red areas). 
Additionally, the intensity of internal awareness 
correlated linearly with activity in posterior 
cingulate/precuneal, anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal, 
and bilateral parahippocampal cortices (whole-brain 
false discovery rate p<0.05; Figure 3.3 blue areas). 
The switching between external and internal 
awareness was calculated to occur with a mean 
frequency of 0.03Hz± 0.004 (range = 0.03–0.4 
Hz). We here showed a link between extrinsic and 
intrinsic brain networks and spontaneous 
subjective mentation. Our data are in line with 
previous studies showing a competing character of 
the two systems in the sense that these two systems 
can disturb or even interrupt one another (Tian, et 
al., 2007; Weissman et al., 2006). This functional 
pattern is also illustrated by studies on motor 
performance (Fox et al., 2007), perceptual 
discrimination (Sapir et al., 2005),attention lapses 
(Weissman, et al., 2006) and somatosensory 
perception of stimuli close to sensory threshold 
(Boly, et al., 2007) including noxious stimuli 
(Ploner, et al., 2010). These studies show that high 
prestimulus baseline activity in the intrinsic system 
is associated with a tendency to ignore 
environmental stimuli, whereas perceived external 
stimuli were associated with an increased activity 
in the extrinsic system. Similar findings are 
suggested by psychology literature where 
engagement to demanding self-oriented tasks 
makes us less receptive to environmental stimuli 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Brain regions showing a correlation between BOLD signal and 
the intensity of internal and external awareness scores in 22 healthy 
volunteers. Stronger internal awareness scores correlate with increased 
activity in anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal, posterior cingulate/precuneal, 
and parahippocampal cortices (areas in blue). External awareness scores 
correlate with increased activity in bilateral inferior parietal lobule and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (in red). Adapted from Vanhaudenhuyse & 
Demertzi et al., J Cogn Neurosci (2011) 
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and this switch in attention can happen without 
conscious recognition (e.g., Smallwood & Schooler, 
2006). In fact, we here showed results concerning 
the cognitive counterpart of “resting state”. The 
amount and the precise function of unconscious 
processes pervading resting state mentation remains 
to be further elucidated.  
 
Discussion 
Our data imply that this anticorrelated pattern 
between the extrinsic and intrinsic system is of 
functional significance to conscious awareness. 
Results from studies in slow-wave sleep (Samann et 
al., 2011) and under propofol anesthesia (Boveroux, 
et al., 2010) indeed show a decreased level in 
connectivity in these two systems. One limitation of 
such studies, however, is that they do not permit 
collection of subjective reports, merely because 
subjects are responsive under these states.  With an 
aim to further characterize the anticorrelated 
relationship of the extrinsic and intrinsic systems 
and their contribution to unresponsive states, we 
opted to measure their behavioral and neuroimaging 
properties under a minimally responsive condition, 
such as hypnosis. 
 
 
Methods  
Behavioral Experiment: Subjects placed four fingers of both hands (not the thumb) 
on the keyboard. For half of the subjects, the left hand corresponded to external 
awareness (for the other half, the left hand corresponded to internal awareness; 
randomized order). All subjects were instructed to start responding by using button 
presses of their left hand on a 4-point scale (0 = absent; 1 = mild; 2 = moderate; 3 = 
maximal). The subjects’ task was to rate both external and internal awareness 
(prompted by a 60-dB beep presented via headphones). Only when the two scores 
were given could the next beep be elicited. A familiarization session (11 responses) 
preceded the main experiment (66 responses). Statistical analysis: The relationship 
between ratings of external and internal awareness was estimated by calculating 
Spearmanʼs r correlation coefficients (two-tailed) for every subject and then 
estimating the mean correlation within the sample. In terms of temporal dynamics, 
the frequency of switching between internal and external awareness scores was 
estimated by first subtracting the external from internal ratings in order to get a 
unique curve for every subject. The frequency spectrum of these obtained scores was 
estimated using the Lomb periodogram method for unevenly sampled awareness 
scores (Lomb, 1976; Press et al., 1992). 
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 Imaging Experiment: For the fMRI experiment, awareness scores were recorded with 
the left hand for all subjects (1=strongly external, 2=moderately external, 
3=moderately internal, and 4=strongly internal). The fMRI study was terminated 
when on-line analysis showed 15 responses in each state of awareness. Statistical 
analysis: Functional data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM5. For each 
subject, a first-level intra-individual fixed effects analysis aimed at modeling the 
observed neurophysiological responses into components of interest, confounds, and 
errors by using GLM. We created a design matrix using a block design (lasting 3–30 
sec) for every individual subject incorporating answers of subjects (“strongly 
external,” “moderately external,” “moderately internal,” and “strongly internal”) and 
time of beeps as regressors of interest; reaction times and movement parameters were 
included as covariates of no interest. A first analysis identified stimulus-induced 
brain activation in periods rated as “strongly external”, “moderately external”, 
“moderately internal” and “strongly internal.” The effects of interest were tested 
through linear contrasts, generating statistical parametric maps in each subject. 
Contrasts images were computed, identifying a linear positive correlation with 
external thoughts (1.5 0.5 −0.5 −1.5) and a linear positive correlation with internal 
thoughts (−1.5 −0.5 0.5 1.5). The resulting set of voxel values for each contrast 
constituted a map of t statistic thresholded at p< 0.001. These contrast images were 
entered in a second-level GLM. Correction for multiple comparisons was done at 
false discovery error rate p<0.05 (whole head volume) for areas previously reported 
to be involved in internal awareness and using a small volume (8 mm radius sphere) 
at p <0.05 for areas previously reported to be involved in external awareness. 
Methods (continued)  
 
3.3 Resting state in hypnosis 
 
Hypnosis was here considered an appropriate means 
to transiently modulate conscious cognition in 
controls because it does not lead to general 
unconsciousness (compared to pharmacological 
anesthesia or sleep) and does not have long-term 
effects on neuroplasticity (compared to meditation 
techniques, e.g., Holzel et al., 2008). Hypnosis is 
well documented to induce an altered conscious 
state of distinct cerebral pattern (Oakley & Halligan, 
2009). At the phenomenological level, hypnosis is 
characterized by increased degrees of private 
processes, such as absorption (i.e. the capacity to 
remain implicated in a mental state), dissociation 
(i.e. the mental separation from the environment), 
disorientation in time, space and person, diminished 
tendency to judge and censor whereas it reduces 
spontaneous thoughts and gives the feeling of one's 
own response as automatic or extravolitional 
Hypnosis is a procedure  
during which a health 
professional or 
researcher suggests that 
a patient or subject 
experiences changes in 
sensations, perceptions, 
thoughts, or behavior 
(The Executive 
Committee of the 
American Psychological 
Association - Division 
of Psychological 
Hypnosis, 1994) 
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(Rainville & Price, 2003; Terhune & Cardena, 
2010). The experimental manipulation of these 
basic dimensions of experience is thought to 
provide leverage to investigate not only the contents 
of consciousness but also the neural correlates of its 
background states (Chalmers, 2000).  
Here, we first aimed to characterize the functional 
relationship between the extrinsic and intrinsic 
anticorrelated networks. Then, we sought to explore 
functional connectivity changes in several “resting 
state” sensory-sensorimotor and “higher-order” 
networks. 
 
The experiment 
Twelve healthy subjects (4 women; Mage=21y±3) 
with no previous neurological or psychiatric history 
underwent three resting state scanning runs: during 
normal wakefulness, under hypnotic state, and 
during a controlled condition of mental imagery of 
autobiographical memories (i.e. the same memories 
used in hypnotic session but here without the 
hypnotic induction). For subjects to be included in 
the study, they had to report an absorption and 
dissociation level >6/10 during a familiarization 
session with hypnosis which preceded the main 
experiment. During this session, detailed 
information about past pleasant life experiences, 
which the subject wanted to use during hypnotic 
induction, was obtained through a semi-structured 
interview. 
The hypnotic state was induced in the same way as 
in patients during surgery  (Faymonville et al., 
1995; Faymonville et al., 1997; Faymonville et al., 
1999) and as in previous functional neuroimaging 
studies with healthy volunteers (Faymonville et al., 
2003; Maquet et al., 1999; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 
2009a). The hypnotic induction encompassed a 3-
min instruction procedure involving progressive 
eye fixation and muscle relaxation. Subjects were 
then invited to re-experience their pleasant 
autobiographical memories. As in clinical 
conditions, permissive and indirect suggestions 
were used to develop and deepen the hypnotic 
state. Subjects were continuously given cues for 
maintaining a hypnotic state. The exact words and 
details of the  
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Figure 3.4 Behavioral self-ratings on various subjective experiences in 
normal wakefulness, the control condition of autobiographical mental 
imagery and under hypnotic state. Panel A: For the numeric rating scale, 
boxplots represent medians with interquartile range (whiskers signify top 
and bottom quartiles). Panel B: For the dichotomous scale, bars represent 
the number of subjects consenting on having the putative experience 
(*p<.05, two-sided). Adapted from Demertzi et al., Prog Brain Res (2011c) 
and Demertzi et al. (submitted-a) 
 
induction technique and specific suggestions and 
details during the course of the induction varied 
depending upon the experimenter's observation of 
subject behavior, and on her judgment of subjects’ 
needs. During the experimental session, the 
experimenter remained silent. After each run, 
subjective experience was debriefed on a 10-point 
numericrating scale concerning absorption, 
dissociation, intensity of external thoughts, and 
emotion levels; additional subjective reports were 
acquired using dichotomous (yes-no) scales 
measuring body sense modification (e.g., one arm 
felt longer than the other), partial amnesia and time 
sense modification (i.e. the session felt 
longer/shorter). 
 
Behavioral changes under hypnotic state 
At the behavioral level, participants reported 
similar arousal scores during normal wakefulness 
(6.4±2.0; range 2–10), mental imagery 6.1±1.8  
 
 
Figure 3.8 Increased crossmodal interaction between auditory network 
(seed) and identified visual network (shown in yellow) in hypnotic state 
(compared to the control condition). For display purposes, data are 
thresholded at uncorrected p<0.001 superimposed on a structural T1 
magnetic resonance template. Effect sizes (expressed as group mean and 
90% CI) are shown in the right panel, reflecting for connectivity between 
auditory and visual cortices during the three conditions. From Demertzi et 
al. (submitted-a) 
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(range 3–8), and hypnotic state (5.3±2.3). 
Dissociation, absorption and intensity of internal 
thoughts were higher in hypnosis compared to 
autobiographical mental imagery and normal 
wakefulness. Self-reported intensity scores of 
external thoughts were lower in hypnotic state 
compared to mental imagery and normal 
wakefulness. Emotional state ratings were not 
different under hypnosis compared to the control 
condition of autobiographical mental imagery 
(Figure 3.4A). Under hypnosis, more subjects 
reported body sense modification (n=7), partial 
amnesia (n=10) and time sense modification (n=9) 
compared to the control condition (Figure 3.4B). 
 
Resting state extrinsic-intrinsic system 
anticorrelations diminish under hypnotic state 
In normal wakefulness, the identified default mode 
network encompassed posterior cingulate and 
adjacent precuneal cortices, anterior cingulate and 
adjacent medial prefrontal cortices, bilateral angular, 
middle and inferior temporal, and parahippocampal 
gyri. The anticorrelated “extrinsic” system 
encompassed bilateral inferior frontal and 
supramarginal gyri. In autobiographical mental 
imagery, the identified default network and the 
anticorrelated extrinsic networks encompassed 
similar areas as described above albeit less 
widespread. In hypnotic state, a further decrease in 
default mode and “extrinsic” network functional 
connectivity was observed, as illustrated in Figure 
3.5. 
The comparison between hypnosis and 
autobiographical mental imagery showed an 
increased connectivity in part of the default network 
encompassing the middle frontal and bilateral 
angular gyri whereas the restrosplenial/posterior 
cingulate and bilateral parahippocampal areas 
showed a decreased connectivity. The “extrinsic” 
network did not show any increased connectivity but 
we identified a decreased connectivity in the right 
supramarginal and left superior temporal areas in 
hypnosis compared to autobiographical mental 
imagery (Figure 3.6).  
 
 
Figure 3.5 The intrinsic (default mode network, in blue) and its 
anticorrelated “extrinsic” system (in red) under normal wakefulness, 
autobiographical mental imagery, and hypnotic state. Note the reduction of 
the extrinsic system anticorrelations in hypnosis compared to the other two 
conditions, possibly reflecting altered sensory awareness. Results are 
thresholded at whole brain false discovery rate p<0.05.Adapted from 
Demertzi et al., Prog Brain Res (2011c) 
 
Discussion 
The decreased functional connectivity observed in 
the lateral frontoparietal extrinsic” system, along 
with the subjective reports of diminished external 
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awareness, might reflect a blockage of the sensory 
systems to receive external stimuli. Hypnotic 
suggestions have been previously shown to have 
such effects on sensory perception by inducing 
(Derbyshire et al., 2004) or altering somatosensory 
awareness (Cojan et al., 2009). 
 
The observed reduction in connectivity of the 
posterior midline parts of the default mode network 
during hypnosis might reflect a decreased degree of 
continuous information gathering from the external 
world with relation to oneself (Gusnard & Raichle, 
2001). Additionally, these posterior retrosplenial, 
cingulate, and precuneal areas of the default mode 
network were previously shown to support 
functions concerning both orientation within, and 
interpretation of the environment (Vogt & Laureys, 
2005). Together, the neuroimaging findings on the 
connectivity of the extrinsic and intrinsic system 
under hypnosis are respectively in line with the self- 
scores on an elevated sense of dissociation and 
diminished intensity of external thoughts on the one 
hand, and the increased intensity of internal scores, 
on the other. The functional contribution of the 
anticorrelated activity between default mode 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Compared to the control condition of autobiographical mental 
imagery, for the intrinsic system (default mode network) in hypnotic state 
there was increased functional connectivity in the medial prefrontal cortex, 
bilateral angular gyri and decreased connectivity in the parahippocampal 
gyrus/posterior cingulate cortex. For the anticorrelated extrinsic system, 
there were only decreases in functional connectivity encompassing 
temporoparietal cortices (supramarginal gyrus and superior temporal 
gyrus). Adapted from Demertzi et al., Prog Brain Res (2011c)  
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and the extrinsic systems has been modulation of 
consciousness also supported by studies under 
physiological (i.e., slow wave sleep; Samann, et al., 
2011) and pharmacological (i.e., propofol 
anesthesia; Boveroux, et al., 2010) modulation of 
consciousness. 
 
 
fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed with “Brain Voyager” software package 
(Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands). ICA was performed using 30 
components (Ylipaavalniemi & Vigario, 2008). Self-organizing ICA (Esposito et al., 
2005) permitted a spatial similarity test on single subjects’ independent components 
and an averaged template obtained in seven independent controls (mean age= 48 
years±13, range: 25–65, 3 females). At a first-level, the component of interest was 
transformed into a statistical parametric map (SPM) for each individual subject: the 
time courses of all components but that of interest (i.e. which contained the z values 
of the two systems) were used to regress out the initial BOLD signal; the saved 
residuals represented the BOLD activity of the default mode and the “extrinsic” 
system. Then, by using the time course of the component of interest as a predictor of 
this residual BOLD activity, the t-maps were obtained. At a second-level, the beta 
values extracted from the previous step were entered in repeated-measures multiple 
subjects GLM (random effects) with three levels (normal wakefulness, hypnotic state, 
mental imagery). One-sample ANOVAs (FDR corrected p<0.05) were ordered to 
calculate the mean effects of each level. The contrast between hypnotic state versus 
mental imagery was ordered. Statistical parametric maps resulting from the voxel 
wise analysis were considered significant for statistical values that survived a cluster-
based correction for multiple comparisons using the “cluster-level statistical 
threshold estimator” plug-in implemented in Brain Voyager.  
Behavioral data were analyzed with SPSS v.16. Wilcoxon’s sign rank tests was used 
to test differences between conditions for the numerical rating scale. Chi-square tests 
were used to test differences between conditions for the dichotomous scale. Results 
were considered significant at p<0.05. 
Methods 
 
 
Resting state multiple network functional 
connectivity increases under hypnotic state  
Compared to the control condition of pleasant 
autobiographical memories, we here mainly 
identified increased within-network functional 
connectivity for the default mode, left and right 
frontoparietal, salience, sensorimotor, and auditory 
networks. The visual network only showed 
decreases in functional connectivity in both within 
and between-network areas (i.e. hippocampus) 
(Figure 3.7).  We further observed an increased 
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crossmodal interaction between the primary 
auditory and primary visual cortex during hypnosis 
(Figure 3.8). 
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Discussion 
The decreases in functional connectivity observed in 
the visual network under hypnosis possibly reflect a 
free revivification of hypnotic suggestions and not 
mere memory retrieval. Similar occipital decreases 
under hypnosis have been observed in hypnosis-
induced analgesia with pleasant autobiographical 
suggestions as studied by PET(Faymonville, et al., 
2003). A previous fMRI study with posthypnotic 
suggestion to forget autobiographical long-term 
memories (i.e. scenes of a previously watched 
movie) also showed pronounced diminished activity 
in the extrastriate occipital lobes in the subjects who 
underwent the posthypnotic amnesia suggestion 
compared to those who did not (Mendelsohn et al., 
2008). In combination with observed decreases in 
connectivity in the hippocampus, a structure 
classically related to the encoding and retrieval of 
long-term memories (Kolb & Whishaw, 2003a), it 
can hence be hypothesized that subjects in hypnosis 
do not merely retrieve stored memories, but rather 
revive them by following the experimenters 
instruction. This pattern corroborates the observed 
significantly higher number of subjects reporting 
post-hypnotic amnesia that was observed in the 
hypnotic state.  
Crossmodal interaction 
allows the characteristics 
of one sensory modality 
to be transformed into 
stimuli for another 
sensory modality. In 
resting state, a visual-
auditory crossmodal 
interaction has been 
observed (Eckert et al., 
2008).  Anatomical 
tracer studies in 
nonhuman primates 
confirm this interaction  
(Falchier et al., 2010) 
and suggest that audio-
visual cortical coupling 
might be relevant to 
multisensory integration 
which subsequently 
enhances visual 
awareness (Clavagnier et 
al., 2004). 
 
The increased functional connectivity observed in 
the other resting state networks potentially reflects 
lack of inhibitory cortico-cortical mechanisms. This 
is further supported by an increased crossmodal 
interaction between the primary auditory and visual 
cortices, thought to reflect decreased inhibition 
processes between brain areas (Cohen Kadosh et 
al., 2009).  
The assumption of a less inhibited brain function is 
also based on similar findings coming from studies 
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Figure 3.7 Identified functional connectivity during normal wakefulness 
(green areas) in large-scale resting state networks. Compared to control 
condition, resting state networks mainly exhibit hypnosis-related increases 
in functional connectivity (red areas) with some areas showing decreased 
functional connectivity (blue areas). Of note is the visual network which 
exhibits only within-network hypnosis-related functional connectivity 
decreases. Normal wakefulness results are thresholded at family wise error 
rate corrected p<0.05 (whole brain) and, for display purposes, functional 
connectivity increases/decreases in hypnosis are shown at uncorrected 
p<.001. From Demertzi et al. (submitted-a) 
59 
 
in light sleep (Larson-Prior et al., 2009), 
generalized tonic-clonic seizures (Blumenfeld, 
2008) and ketamine-induced anesthesia (Seamans, 
2008). In these states altered sense of consciousness 
results from organized aberrant brain activity 
thought to impede the normal communication 
necessary to maintain arousal and cognition. Here, 
increased functional connectivity could be 
considered to reflect higher temporal coherence 
between cerebral areas (i.e. time series of a certain 
seed area correlates with more brain regions in 
hypnosis). It has been previously suggested (in 
terms of neuronal  firing) that excessively high 
levels of firing in a system typically result in a 
dramatic decrease of “integrated information”; in 
other words, a system is either not informative 
enough (i.e. cannot discriminate among a large 
repertoire of alternative experiences) or it does not 
integrate this information in a way leading to a 
unified experience  (Tononi, 2008). Concerning 
hypnosis, this could be a potential explanatory 
mechanism to account for both subjective and 
neuroimaging data. We need to consider, however, 
that fMRI is characterized by low temporal 
resolution. This limits the measurement of 
integrated information thought to be measurable at 
the temporal scale of milliseconds, at least for 
biological systems (Tononi, 2008). Additionally, 
we here measured fMRI functional connectivity 
during resting state. Therefore, in order to measure 
the potential repertoire of a system, one would have 
to observe for an infinite time. Perturbational 
approaches, on the other hand, can help to better 
characterize the informational capacities of a 
system in hypnotic state. Such approaches (e.g., 
transcranial magnetic stimulation) induce changes 
in the system dynamics and, due to neuronal causal 
interactions, one can record the system reactions to 
such perturbation (e.g., by EEG).  We believe that 
similar fMRI “resting state” in pathological 
consciousness states (e.g., coma or related states) 
will further improve our understanding of the 
neural correlates of subjective awareness.  
 
 Methods 
fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed with SPM8. The identification of resting 
state networks was done in three steps. First, the six motion parameters were used to 
regress in the initial signal in order to create a “dummy” BOLD signal, from which 
the regions of interest (ROIs) would be extracted. A high-pass filter of 128s was used 
to remove very low frequency fluctuations (.008 Hz). Second, time courses of 
interest were computed as the first principal component of the BOLD signal in 8-mm 
spherical ROIs centered on a priori coordinates from published studies: DMN [6 -42 
32], left frontoparietal network [-44 36 20], right frontoparietal network [44 36 20], 
auditory network [-40 -22 8], visual network [-4 -84 8] (Boveroux et al., 2010), 
salience network [38 26 -10] (Seeley et al., 2007), and sensorimotor network [-2 -12 
44] (Greicius, et al., 2008). Similar time course extractions were performed for 
voxels located in white matter [-22 16 32] and lateral ventricles [-6 20 10]. Third, a 
design matrix (per subject, per network, per condition (normal waking, control 
condition of autobiographical mental imagery, hypnotic state) was created with the 
ROI’s time course and 12 nuisance covariates (time courses in white matter, lateral 
ventricles, global signal and their derivatives, and the six movement parameters).  
The effects of interest were tested by linear contrasts, generating statistical 
parametric T maps for each subject. A contrast image was computed for each 
subject, for each network and for each condition, identifying regions correlating with 
the selected seed-region after removal of sources of spurious variance. For each 
network, individual summary statistical images were entered in a second-level 
analysis, corresponding to a random effects model which estimates the error variance 
across subjects. These second-level analyses consisted of repeated measures analyses 
of variance (ANOVA) with 3 regressors representing the three experimental 
conditions (normal wakefulness, control condition, and hypnotic state) and 12 extra 
regressors modeling the subject-effects for each condition.  
The error covariance was not assumed to be independent between regressors, and a 
correction for nonsphericity was applied. One-sided T contrasts tested for 
connectivity effects in all analyses. After model estimation, a first T contrast 
searched for areas correlated with each selected seed region during normal 
wakefulness.   
Increased connectivity in hypnotic state was estimated by a conjunction analysis 
between normal wakefulness and the mental imagery<hypnotic state contrast. 
Decreased connectivity in hypnotic state was estimated by a conjunction analysis 
between normal wakefulness and the mental imagery>hypnotic state contrast. 
Results were corrected for multiple comparisons at the whole brain level using 
family wise corrections or cluster level corrections thresholded for significance at 
p<0.05. Small volume corrections for multiple comparisons were only accepted in 
previously identified networks in the normal waking condition (i.e. identifying 
within network hypnosis-induced connectivity changes using an 8 mm sphere 
radius). 
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3.4 Resting state in disorders of consciousness 
 
The aim of the present study was to assess resting 
state functional connectivity in distinct fMRI 
resting state networks (default mode and its 
anticorrelated regions, left and right frontoparietal, 
salience, sensorimotor, auditory, and visual 
networks) networks as a function of the level of 
consciousness, ranging from controls and LIS, to 
MCS, VS/UWS and coma patients. Of particular 
interest for the study of coma and related states is 
the issue of pain and potential suffering because it 
raises scientific, clinical and ethical concerns (see 
Chapter 2 this Thesis). Hence, we further aimed to 
correlate the functional integrity of the salience 
network with clinical “pain” scales (i.e., 
Nociception Coma Scale,  Schnakers, et al., 2010) 
given that previous studies have correlated  salience 
network connectivity with pain-related processes 
(Ploner, et al., 2010; Seeley et al., 2007; Wiech, et 
al., 2010). 
Twenty-eight patients (11 MCS, 12 VS/UWS, 5 
coma) were included in analysis (11 women; mean 
age 52±17 years (range 20-87); 6 traumatic, 22 
non-traumatic of which 7 anoxic). Data from 2 LIS 
patients (one brainstem stroke, one post-traumatic) 
were used for visual comparison with controls’ 
values. Data were compared with an age-matched 
healthy volunteer group (n=22; 8 women; mean age 
46±17 years; range 20-75). 
We identified that global resting state fMRI 
connectivity (as reflected by multiple cerebral 
networks) correlates with the level of 
consciousness. More specifically, group-level 
comparisons showed decreased functional 
connectivity strength in all resting state networks 
when comparing healthy controls, MCS, VS/UWS 
and coma patients. Data from the two LIS patients 
fell in the range of healthy controls. Additional 
decreases in functional connectivity were observed 
between visual-auditory networks as a function of 
the level of consciousness (Figure 3.9). The 
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 regression analysis showed that Nociception Coma 
Scale total scores correlated positively with the 
functional connectivity of the salience network, in 
the anterior cingulate cortex (z = 3.26, p=0.001; 
stereotactic coordinates x=0, y=20, z=37), left insula 
(z = 3.10, p=.001 SVC; x=-48, y=-7, z=7), and right 
insula (z = 2.99, p=.001; x=36, y=5, z=-2; Figure 
3.10). 
 
Discussion  
Although resting state data in patients with disorders 
of consciousness are technically relatively easier to 
obtain, compared to auditory (Schiff et al., 2005) or 
visual activation protocols  (Monti et al., 2012) or 
“active” mental imagery tasks (Bardin et al., 2011; 
Monti, et al., 2010b), in the present cohort 79% (115 
out of 145 initially included in the study) of patients’ 
fMRI data could not be analyzed: 8% showed major 
structural brain damage making spatial 
normalization needed for group analyses unreliable 
(Shen et al., 2007); 45% showed head motion 
contaminating the fMRI signal and, therefore, had to 
undergo sedation (Soddu, et al., 2011; Van Dijk et 
al., 2012) and 23% were excluded because of 
changing or unclear diagnosis. It is important to 
stress that when validating a novel assessment tool, 
the validation should only be based on clear-cut 
cases in order to avoid circular reasoning. Here, 28 
patients with disorders of consciousness (11 MCS, 
12 VS/UWS, 5 coma) of unambiguous diagnosis 
(i.e. same CRS-R diagnosis on repetitive 
assessments) were compared to 22 healthy controls 
in terms of functional connectivity. Data from two 
LIS patients were used for visualization purposes 
because the small number of patients did not permit 
their inclusion as a separate group in the design 
matrix.  We here report a consciousness-level 
dependent breakdown of resting state fMRI 
(rsfMRI) connectivity in “lower-level” sensory 
(auditory and visual) and sensorimotor and in 
“higher-order” associative networks (default mode 
and its anticorrelations, right and left fronto- parietal 
and salience) when comparing controls, LIS, MCS, 
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VS/UWS and coma patients. Taken together, our 
results could account for the patients impaired 
capacities for conscious awareness. Indeed, it was 
previously proposed that in order for humans to be 
conscious of something, incoming information (via 
sensory networks) needs to be made globally 
available to multiple brain systems via long-range 
neurons (associative networks) (Dehaene & 
Changeux, 2011). Additionally, we show a 
consciousness-level dependent impairment of 
crossmodal interaction between visual-auditory 
networks. Such crossmodal function was previously 
described in normal conscious conditions (Eckert, 
et al., 2008) and is considered relevant to 
multisensory integration which subsequently 
enhances visual awareness (Clavagnier, et al., 
2004). Our findings corroborate data from propofol 
anesthesia in healthy volunteers also showing 
decreased crossmodal relationship as a function of 
pharmacologically-induced unconsciousness 
(Boveroux, et al., 2010). Finally, the salience 
network correlated with Nociception Coma Scale 
scores reflecting nociception-related processes in 
these patients measured in the absence of an 
external stimulus. In healthy conditions, activation 
of the insula and anterior cingulate cortex are 
commonly observed in conflict monitoring, 
information integration, response selection (Cole & 
Schneider, 2007; Roberts & Hall, 2008) and pain 
(Tracey & Mantyh, 2007). During resting state, the 
salience network is thought to be involved in 
emotional, interoception and pain-related processes 
(Laird, et al., 2011; Seeley, et al., 2007; Smith, et 
al., 2009). For example, subjective reports of 
painfulness were shown to be associated with 
increased fMRI baseline prestimulus activity in the 
left anterior insula (Ploner, et al., 2010). 
Additionally, rsfMRI studies have shown that the 
insula and anterior cingulate connectivity was 
higher during anticipation of a threatening stimulus, 
which was subsequent classified as painful 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Large-scale resting state functional connectivity is identified in 
“higher-order” networks and sensory-sensorimotor networks in healthy 
controls (red areas). Between-group contrasts showed a connectivity 
breakdown as a function of the level of consciousness (blue areas). Note the 
decreased crossmodal interaction between visual and auditory cortices 
(indicated with an arrow) that parallels the decreases in consciousness 
level. The asterisks indicate the position of seed region. Graphs represent 
contrast estimates with 90% confidence interval for a representative area 
of each resting state network in the group of healthy controls (CON), 
minimally conscious state (MCS), vegetative/unresponsive state (VS) and 
comatose patients. The effect size for two locked-in syndrome patients is 
represented by a square and a triangle. From Demertzi et al. (submitted-b) 
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(Wiech, et al., 2010). Altogether, our findings 
might account for a decreased capacity of patients 
to respond to salient stimuli, including auditory 
(Boly et al., 2004; Laureys et al., 2000; Schiff, et 
al., 2005) and noxious. We here propose that 
salience network rsfMRI can be used as a possible 
tool to assess residual attentional resources to 
salient stimuli, including possible pain processing 
in patients with disorders of consciousness (in the 
absence of any noxious stimulation) as evidenced 
by the identified correlation between salience 
network connectivity and NCS scores. 
In summary, in the absence of external stimulation, 
our aim was to quantify the necessary conditions 
allowing for conscious cognition; the sufficiency of 
the identified intra- and inter- network functional 
connectivity patterns  to consciousness remains to 
be further determined (Churchland, 2007). Next, 
the observed connectivity impairment in resting 
state conditions does not permit to make strong 
claims about the brain’s capacity to recruit neural 
networks in response to (salient) external 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Salience network connectivity reflects nociception processing in 
patients with disorders of consciousness. The figure illustrates increased 
functional connectivity between the right anterior insula and anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) (small volume corrected p<.05) as a function of 
increased total score on the Nociception Coma Scale. The scatterplot 
summarizes regression results of the Nociception Coma Scale total scores 
on the ACC connectivity for 13 patients with disorders of consciousness. The 
statistical map is rendered on a mean structural T1 magnetic resonance of 
the patients (x indicates the Montreal National Institute coordinate of 
represented sections). From Demertzi et al. (submitted-b). 
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stimulation (Galán, 2008). It is well known from 
clinical practice that patients with disorders of 
consciousness show more behavioral 
responsiveness to emotionally meaningful and 
salient stimuli in both the auditory domain, (e.g., 
presentation of the patient’s own name; Di, et al., 
2007; Qin et al., 2010)  and visual domain (e.g., 
tracking of the own face in a mirror; 
Vanhaudenhuyse, et al., 2008). Yet, the 
determination of the qualitative counterpart  (the 
"what it is like" to be in a certain state; Laureys & 
Boly, 2007) of the observed neural activity merits 
further investigation. It is important to stress that 
the discussed results pertain to between-group 
comparisons and do not permit reliable single-
subject interpretation “Brain reading” decoding 
multivariate applications (e.g., Nishimoto et al., 
2011) permit to focus on "mental content" storage 
and hence are expected to shed light on the subject-
specific mental states under various states of 
consciousness (Haynes, 2011).   
In contrast to our findings, brain function under 
pharmacological coma differs from what we 
observed in pathological states of consciousness. 
Under propofol anesthesia, functional connectivity 
was decreased in “higher-order” networks (default 
mode network and bilateral frontoparietal) next to 
relatively preserved functional connectivity in the 
sensory systems (visual and auditory) (Boveroux, et 
al., 2010). These differences between anesthesia 
and pathological coma could be partially explained 
by the fully preserved structural connectivity shown 
in healthy subjects undergoing anesthesia. It is 
indeed well known that part of the measured 
functional connectivity in resting state EPI 
paradigms reflects structural (white matter) 
connectivity as, for example, shown by diffusion 
tensor imaging studies (Honey et al., 2009). In 
terms of the underlying mechanisms, it has been 
proposed that hypnotic agents preferentially act on 
brainstem, cortex, thalamus and basal ganglia and 
account for the distinct behavioral responses that 
subjects show under anesthesia (Brown et al., 2010; 
Mhuircheartaigh et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the 
potentially differential mechanisms mediating the 
loss of consciousness due to pathological causes 
remain to be better determined (Brown, et al., 
2010).   
 
 
Methods 
We prospectively assessed patients with severe brain damage in a university hospital 
setting, studied at least 5 days after the acute brain insult. Clinical examination was 
repeatedly performed using the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) (Giacino et 
al., 2004). Exclusion criteria were the presence of functional communication, 
uncertain clinical diagnoses, fMRI scanning under sedation, presence of 
ferromagnetic material, large focal brain damage (>50% of total brain volume) and 
the presence of head movements (i.e. >10 mm displacement). Healthy volunteers 
were free of major psychiatric and neurological history. The study was approved by 
the Ethics Committee of the Medical School of the University of Liège. Informed 
consent to participate in the study was obtained from the healthy subjects themselves 
and from the legal surrogates of the patients. 
fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed with SPM8. The identification of resting 
state networks was done in three steps as reported in the previous Methods box 
(Section 3.3). For each network, second-level analysis consisted of one-factor 
ANOVA with four levels (i.e. controls, MCS, VS/UWS and coma patients). A 
correction for non-sphericity was applied to account for potentially unequal variance 
across groups. In controls, one-sided T contrast searched for areas correlating with 
each selected seed region in each RSN. Assuming that patients with disorders of 
consciousness show similar brain activity compared to controls, we used a non-linear 
one-tailed T contrast searching for decreases in functional connectivity as a function 
of the level of consciousness (controls, MCS, VS/UW, coma) in each RSN (as in 
Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2009b). Data of the two LIS patients were not included in the 
design matrices but their contrast estimates per RSN were displayed for visual 
comparison. For salience network, a regression analysis was performed with the 
summed Nociception Coma Scale scores of 13 patients where NCS data could be 
obtained. 
For controls, results were considered significant at p<0.05 corrected for multiple 
comparisons at family wise error (FWE) rate for the whole brain volume. For the 
between-group contrasts, results were considered significant at FWE p<.05 calculated 
at the whole brain level or after small volume correction (10mm-radius sphere) 
around a priori expected coordinates taken from an independently assessed group of 
healthy individuals. For the salience network-NCS regression analysis, results were 
inclusively masked (FWE p<0.05) with the salience network connectivity identified 
in controls and considered significant at uncorrected p<0.001. 
 
Conclusions 
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To date, fMRI resting state studies show that 
connectivity in cerebral networks is altered under 
altered states of consciousness, such as sleep, 
sedation/anesthesia, hypnotic state, and clinical 
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states of disorders of consciousness (MCS, 
VS/UWS, coma and brain death). Such connectivity 
alterations can be discussed in two non-mutually 
exclusive ways. On the one hand, one can refer to 
functional connectivity reductions as reflecting 
reduced capacities for (conscious) cognitive 
processing (e.g., Vanhaudenhuyse, et al., 2009b). 
On the other hand, we can equally talk about 
persistent (albeit reduced) connectivity pattern in 
unconscious states, which transcends the level of 
consciousness, and which is considered as a 
physiologic baseline (e.g., Raichle et al., 2001).  In 
any case, it seems that the purposes and questions 
of each study will eventually determine how such 
alterations can be further discussed and interpreted. 
Both the scientific and clinical implications for 
cognition seem to be the essence of resting state 
connectivity measurements.  
At the scientific level, resting state analyses shed 
light on the necessary conditions needed for 
conscious awareness to take place. In other words, 
in the absence of external stimulation, resting state 
functional connectivity paradigms quantify the 
minimal prerequisites under which cognitive 
processes can become “conscious”. It should be 
noted here that the spectrum of consciousness is 
wide and includes various alterations in awareness. 
For example, much research has been conducted in 
neuropsychiatric disorders (e.g., dementias and 
schizophrenia; for a review see Buckner et al., 
2008), and drug-related states such as alcohol 
(Esposito et al., 2010) or amphetamine (Roberts & 
Garavan, 2010). Here, we focused on changes in 
functional connectivity as a function of various 
states of wakefulness, such as normal waking state, 
hypnotic state and coma-related conditions. Such 
investigations lay within the ultimate clinical goal 
to better document, manage and predict residual 
brain functioning of patients with disorders of 
consciousness. As these patients are incapable of 
functional communication, they might be wrongly 
diagnosed as unconscious when locked-in (Laureys, 
et al., 2005) or suffering from aphasia (Majerus et 
al., 2009). The ethical implications of erroneous 
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 diagnostics are apparent, especially when pain 
(Demertzi et al., 2012; Demertzi, et al., 2009c) and 
end-of-life issues (Demertzi, et al., 2011a) are 
discussed. Despite the intrinsic limitations of 
resting state analyses in these patients, the resting 
state paradigm to study this population is promising 
(Soddu, et al., 2011). The challenge now is twofold: 
first, to unravel the relationship (i.e. correlations, 
anticorrelations) between and among different 
resting state networks under various conscious 
conditions. And second, to move from static 
functional connectivity measurements to the 
assessment of the temporal dynamics of 
associations. At the clinical level, such 
advancements are expected to improve the clinical 
translation of this approach as a routine para-
clinical marker. We think that such evolution will 
eventually bring relevant ancillary information on 
patients' residual brain function adding to their 
medical management, including end-of-life 
decisions. 
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Our increasing understanding of brain function 
under resting conditions in health and disease 
suggests that such intrinsic activity is essential to 
the support of conscious awareness. Importantly, 
clinical reality requires reliable individual 
assessments with diagnostic and prognostic value. 
Hence, the challenge now is to move from group-
level to single-subject analyses and indentify the 
appropriate thresholds of various biomarkers 
capable of distinguishing between the different 
clinical states of consciousness.  
Especially for the issue of pain, our surveys show 
that socio-cultural factors (profession, religion, 
region of residence) influence clinicians’ attitudes 
towards pain perception (Demertzi, et al., 2009c) 
and end-of-life attitudes in terms of pain perception 
(Demertzi, et al., 2012) for patients with disorders 
of consciousness. To date, no data exist on how 
healthcare providers and family members think 
about pain diagnosis and treatment in these patients. 
Knowing their views is of crucial importance 
because they inform on the ethical-societal 
dimensions of pain management in these patients, 
especially when end-of-life options are discussed. 
For example, the death of Terri Schiavo (a patient 
diagnosed as in VS for fifteen years) was the result 
of artificial nutrition and hydration withdrawal 
without the administration of opiods or other 
analgesic drugs (Fins, 2006), leading to long-lasting 
judicial battles (Quill, 2005) and wide media 
coverage (Racine, et al., 2008). 
So far, behavioral and neuroimaging studies have 
focused on the investigation of pain from a 
psychological, biological, and socio-ethical 
perspective in isolation. Here, it is suggested that 
the subjective counterpart of pain in non-
communicating patients can be better understood by 
adopting an interdisciplinary approach, such as that 
offered by the biopsychosocial model (Engel, 1977). 
The biopsychosocial paradigm recognizes the multi-
dimensionality of pain  by differentiating between 
nociception, pain, suffering, and pain behaviors 
(Gatchel, et al., 2007): nociception involves the 
stimulation of nerves which convey information 
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about potential tissue damage to the brain; pain is 
the subjective conscious perception resulting from 
the transduction, transmission, and modulation of 
sensory information; suffering is the emotional 
response triggered by nociception or other aversive 
events associated with it (e.g., fear or depression); 
pain behaviors encompass those things that people 
say or do when they are in pain or when they suffer 
(e.g. avoidance of activities for fear of re-injury).  
Here, a biopsychosocial investigation of pain could 
be approached by obtaining from the same patient 
population simultaneously neuroimaging, clinical 
and social data. 
We believe that by bridging empirical 
interdisciplinary evidence we will eventually 
determine a pain-specific model for non-
communicating coma emergent patients.  
Eventually for clinical practice, the adoption of a 
biopsychosocial approach to illness will generally 
provide a helpful antidote to the separation of the 
care of “diseases of the mind” from those “of the 
body”. 
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Defining consciousness & picturing its 
clinical states
Consciousness is here defined as a first-person 
experience that consists of two major compo-
nents: arousal and awareness (Figure 1) [1]. Arousal 
refers to the level of alertness and is supported by 
the function of the subcortical arousal systems 
in the brainstem, midbrain and thalamus [2]. 
Clinically, it is indicated by opening of the eyes. 
Awareness refers to the content of conscious-
ness, and it is thought to be supported by the 
functional integrity of the cerebral cortex and its 
subcortical connections. Awareness can be fur-
ther reduced to awareness of environment and 
of self [3]. Clinically, awareness of environment 
is assessed by evaluating command following 
and observing nonreflex motor behavior, such 
as eye tracking and localized responses to pain. 
Awareness of self, clinically a more ill-defined 
concept, can be assessed by the patients’ response 
to autoreferential stimuli, such as the patients’ 
own face in the mirror. An illustrative example of 
the relationship between the two components of 
consciousness is the transition from full wakeful-
ness to deep sleep: the less aroused we get, the less 
aware we become of our surroundings.
This review focuses on clinical methods and 
research techniques that are currently employed 
for assessing residual consciousness in coma sur-
vivors. The disorders of consciousness (DOC) 
are described below.
Brain death
The concept of brain death, as death based on neu-
rological criteria, has been widely accepted world-
wide [4]. Irreversible coma and absence of brain 
stem reflexes are the major clinical criteria that are 
followed by most US hospitals, but these criteria 
are apparently not practised in the same way by 
all institutions [5]. This implies that brain death 
may be determined in various ways, a fact that may 
have consequences in after death practices, such as 
organ transplantation [6]. In 1995, the American 
Academy of Neurology published the diagnostic 
guidelines for brain death [7], which are: 
Demonstration of coma;•	
Evidence for the cause of coma;•	
Absence of confounding factors, including •	
hypothermia, drugs, electrolyte and endocrine 
disturbances;
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The bedside detection of awareness in disorders of consciousness (DOC) caused by acquired 
brain injury is not an easy task. For this reason, differential diagnosis using neuroimaging and 
electrophysiological tools in search for objective markers of consciousness is being employed. 
However, such tools cannot be considered as diagnostic per se, but as assistants to the clinical 
evaluation, which, at present, remains the gold standard. Regarding therapeutic management 
in DOC, no evidence-based recommendations can be made in favor of a specific treatment. The 
present review summarizes clinical and paraclinical studies that have been conducted with 
neuroimaging and electrophysiological techniques in search of residual awareness in DOC. We 
discuss the medical, scientific and ethical implications that derive from these studies and we 
argue that, in the future, the role of neuroimaging and electrophysiology will be important not 
only for the diagnosis and prognosis of DOC but also in establishing communication with these 
challenging patients.
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Absence of brainstem reflexes;•	
Absent motor responses;•	
Positive apnea testing;•	
A repeat evaluation in 6 h is advised, but the time period is •	
considered arbitrary;
Confirmatory laboratory tests are only required when specific •	
components of the clinical testing cannot be reliably evaluated. 
Classically, brain death is caused by a massive brain lesion, 
such as trauma, intracranial hemorrhage or anoxia. No recovery 
from brain death has ever been reported over the last 50 years in 
a patient fulfilling the above mentioned clinical criteria [8].
Coma
After severe brain damage, patients may spend a couple of days or 
weeks in coma. Coma is a time-limited condition leading either to 
death, to recovery of consciousness or to transition to vegetative state 
(VS) [9]. It can result from bihemispheric diffuse cortical or white 
matter damage or brainstem lesions bilaterally, affecting the sub-
cortical reticular arousing systems. Many factors, such as etiology, 
the patient’s general medical condition, age, clinical signs and com-
plimentary examinations influence the management and prognosis 
of coma. In terms of clinical signs, after 3 days of observation, bad 
outcome is heralded by the absence of pupillary or corneal reflexes, 
stereotyped or absent motor response to noxious stimulation, bilat-
eral absent cortical responses of somatosensory evoked potentials 
(SEPs) and, for anoxic coma, biochemical markers (i.e., high levels 
of serum neuron-specific enolase) [10].
Vegetative state
The VS is a ‘state of arousal without 
awareness’ (Figur e 1) . These patients 
regain sleep–wake cycles. However, their 
motor, auditory and visual functions 
are restricted to mere reflexes and they 
show no adapted emotional responses 
[11]. According to the 1994 Multi-Society 
Task Force, the criteria for the diagnosis 
of VS are the following [12]: 
No evidence of awareness of self or envi-•		
ronment and an inability to interact with 
others;
No evidence of sustained, reproducible, •		
purposeful, or voluntary behavioral 
responses to visual, auditory, tactile or 
noxious stimuli;
No evidence of language comprehension •		
or expression;
Intermittent wakefulness manifested by •		
the presence of sleep–wake cycles;
Sufficiently preserved hypothalamic •		
and brainstem autonomic functions to 
permit survival with medical and nursing 
care; 
Bowel and bladder incontinence;•	
Variably preserved cranial nerve and spinal reflexes.•	  
The VS is usually caused by diffuse lesions on gray and white 
matter. It can be a transition to further recovery, or it may be 
permanent. ‘Permanent’ VS refers to patients whose chances for 
recovery are close to zero. This is the case for VS that lasts more 
than 1 year after traumatic injury or 3 months after nontrau-
matic injury. The VS is characterized as ‘persistent’ when the 
patient is in this state for more than 1 month [12]. As both terms 
are abbreviated as ‘PVS’ (persistent vegetative state), it has been 
suggested to avoid this abbreviation and, instead, mention the 
etiology and the time spent in VS [201]. At present, there are no 
validated paraclinical prognostic markers for individual patients 
except that the chances of recovery depend on the patient’s age, 
etiology and length of time spent in the VS [13]. 
Minimally conscious state
The minimally conscious state (MCS) was defined as a DOC 
in 2002 by the Aspen Workgroup. Patients in MCS manifest at 
least one of the following: 
Purposeful behavior, including movements or affective •	
behavior contingent to relevant environment stimuli which 
are not due to reflexive activity, such as: visual pursuit or 
sustained fixation occurring in direct response to moving or 
salient stimuli, smiling or crying in response to verbal or 
visual emotional but not neutral stimuli, reaching for objects 
demonstrating a relationship between object location and 
direction of reach, touching or holding objects in a manner 
Figure 1. Spectrum of disorders of consciousness as defined by the 
relationship between arousal and awareness. Comatose patients cannot be 
aroused and, hence, are not aware of the environment or of themselves [3]. In the 
vegetative state, there is a dissociation between arousal, which recovers, and 
awareness, which remains absent [12]. The minimally conscious state characterizes 
patients who demonstrate inconsistent but reproducible behavioral evidence of 
awareness of self or environment, but are unable to communicate their thoughts and 
feelings [15]. The locked-in syndrome describes patients who are awake and conscious, 
but can only communicate by using small eye movements [18]. The locked-in syndrome 
is not a disorder of consciousness but it is included here as it can be misdiagnosed 
as one.  
Adapted from [58].
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that accommodates the size and shape of the object, and 
vocalizations or gestures occurring in direct response to the 
linguistic content of questions;
Following simple commands:•	
Gestural or verbal yes/no response, regardless of accuracy;   –  
Intelligible verbalization    –  [14].
Like the VS, MCS may be chronic and sometimes permanent. 
Emergence from MCS is defined by the ability to exhibit func-
tional interactive communication or functional use of objects. It 
should be kept in mind that the boundary between MCS and 
higher states of consciousness is arbitrary and merely set for con-
vention (i.e., allowing clear communication and enrollment in 
research studies) as opposed to the boundary between VS and 
MCS which is, at least in principle, absolute (i.e., any evidence of 
awareness suffices to define MCS). Similarly to the VS, traumatic 
etiology has a better prognosis than nontraumatic anoxic brain 
injuries [15]. Additional data from the Belgian Federal Project 
on PVS suggest that overall outcome in MCS is better than for 
VS [16].
Locked-in syndrome
In the locked-in syndrome (LIS) there is no dissociation between 
arousal and awareness. According to the 1995 American Congress 
of Rehabilitation Medicine criteria, LIS patients demonstrate [17]:
Sustained eye opening (bilateral ptosis should be ruled out as •	
a complicating factor);
Quadriplegia or quadriparesis;•	
Aphonia or hypophonia;•	
A primary mode of communication via vertical or lateral eye •	
movements, or blinking of the upper eyelid to signal yes/no 
responses;
Preserved cognitive abilities. •	
Based on motor capacities, LIS can be divided into three 
categories: 
Classic LIS, which is characterized by quadriplegia and anarthria •	
with eye-coded communication;
Incomplete LIS, which is characterized by remnants of voluntary •	
responsiveness other than eye movements;
Total LIS, which is characterized by complete immobility •	
including all eye movements, combined with preserved 
consciousness [18]. 
The LIS can result from a bilateral ventral pontine lesion [3] 
but mesencephalic lesions have also been reported [19]. Once 
a LIS patient becomes medically stable and is given appro-
priate medical care, life expectancy is estimated up to several 
decades [19]. Even if the chances of good motor recovery are very 
limited, existing eye-controlled computer-based communica-
tion technology currently allows these patients to control their 
environment [20]. Neuropsychological testing batteries adapted 
and validated for eye-response communication have shown pre-
served intellectual capacities, at least in LIS patients whose 
lesions are restricted to brainstem pathology [21]. Recent surveys 
seem to show that chronic LIS patients self-report meaningful 
quality of life and the demand for euthanasia, albeit existing, 
is infrequent [19,22]. 
Clinical assessment
The objective assessment of consciousness is difficult due to its 
first-person nature. For that reason, clinicians need to infer aware-
ness via the evaluation of motor activity and command following. 
This is extremely challenging for DOC and LIS, as these patients 
are usually deprived of the capacity to make normal physical 
movements and they often show limited attentional capacities. 
Aphasia, apraxia and cortical deafness or blindness are other pos-
sible confounders in the assessment of DOC. We will next discuss 
the clinical consciousness scales that are mostly used in clinical 
settings [23].
Consciousness scales
The most common and most widely used tool, mainly thanks 
to its short and simple administration, is the Glasgow Coma 
Scale (GCS) [24]. The GCS measures eye, verbal and motor 
responsiveness. However, there may be some concern as to what 
extent eye opening is sufficient evidence for assessing brainstem 
function [25]. Additionally, the verbal responses are impossible 
to measure in cases of intubation and tracheostomy. The scale 
requires the clinician to arrive at a certain judgment (e.g., ‘the 
patient follows commands’) without any formal guidance on 
how to arrive at that judgment (i.e., what and how many com-
mands to use and how to assess confounds such as motor or 
sensory or spontaneous movements). Finally, the GCS is not 
sensitive to detect transition from VS to MCS [26].
A recently proposed alternative to the GCS is the Full Outline 
of Unresponsiveness (FOUR) [27]. The scale is named after the 
number of subscales it contains (eye, motor, brainstem and respi-
ratory functioning) as well as after the maximum score that each 
subscale can take (four). The advantage of the FOUR is that it 
does not need a verbal response and, hence, can be employed in 
intubated patients. The FOUR can discriminate between VS and 
MCS patients as it assesses visual pursuit, one of the first signs 
that announces emergence from VS, but it does not test all the 
behavioral criteria of MCS [14]. It is also more sensitive in detect-
ing LIS patients because, in contrast to the GCS, it explicitly asks 
patients to move their eyes to command [27].
To differentiate VS from MCS patients, the most appropriate 
scale is the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) [28]. The 
CRS-R has a similar structure to the GCS, testing, in addition to 
motor, eye and verbal responsiveness, audition, arousal and com-
munication abilities. Despite its longer administration compared 
with the GCS and the FOUR (i.e., approximately 15 min), it is 
the most sensitive at differentiating VS from MCS patients [26]. 
This is because it assesses every behavior according to the diag-
nostic criteria of VS and MCS, such as the presence of visual 
Expert Rev. Neurother. 8(11), (2008)1722
Review Demertzi, Vanhaudenhuyse, Bruno et al.
pursuit and visual fixation [14]. Importantly, the way we assess 
these behavioral signs needs to be standardized and uniform, 
permitting between-center comparisons. For example, for the 
assessment of visual pursuit, the CRS-R [28] and the Western 
Neuro-Sensory Stimulation Profile (WNSSP) [29] employ a 
moving mirror; the Coma/Near Coma Scale [30], the Wessex 
Head Injury Matrix (WHIM) [31] and the Sensory Modalities 
Assessment and Rehabilitation Technique (SMART) [32] use 
a moving person; and the WNSSP, the SMART, the WHIM 
and the FOUR [27] use a moving object or finger. We recently 
demonstrated that the use of a mirror is the most sensitive in 
detecting eye tracking. These findings stress that self-referential 
stimuli have attention grabbing properties and are preferred in 
the assessment of DOC [33]. 
The clinical assessment via behavioral scales can be biased by 
several limitations: first, by intrinsic limitations in the measures’ 
precision and validity, which can be overcome by selecting the 
‘best’ measure each time; and second, by intrinsic behavioral 
fluctuations of the patients which can be corrected by repeated 
sessions of evaluation. Despite their pros and cons, each scale 
contributes differently in establishing the diagnosis and prog-
nosis of DOC. The administration and interpretation of the 
results should be decided and discussed in terms of the person 
who uses the scale, the place where it is administered (e.g., 
intensive care vs chronic rehabilitation settings) and the rea-
sons for their administration (e.g., clinical routine vs research 
purposes) [34]. 
Misdiagnosis
Incorrect diagnosis of DOC is not a rare phenomenon and it 
has been estimated that approximately 40% of VS patients are 
misdiagnosed [35,36]. It was recently found that of 29 patients 
that were initially diagnosed as VS using the GCS, four of them 
were in a MCS according to the FOUR scale and seven more 
patients were identified as MCS using the CRS-R scale [26]. 
These results imply that even though the diagnostic criteria 
for VS and MCS have been clearly established, the rate of mis-
diagnosis has not changed since the 1990s [35,36]. This may be 
attributed partially to the fact that, although the criteria may 
have been defined, they still remain not operationalized in the 
sense that there is not an exact procedure as to how to identify 
evidence of conscious behavior [37,38]. 
In LIS, diagnostic error is also frequent. Unless the physicians 
are familiar with the syndrome, it may be up to a couple of 
years before LIS it is diagnosed and, in many cases, it is a family 
member who realizes that the patient is conscious [39]. 
The high diagnostic error rate can be explained by the fact 
that physical function in these patients, which is the main way 
to exhibit their awareness, is limited. Additionally, it is difficult 
to differentiate between voluntary and reflexive behavior, as 
there is inconsistency in responses and lack of sensitivity of the 
personnel to accurately observe signs of consciousness [23]. An 
objective way that has been proposed to overcome such obstacles 
is to follow single-case experimental designs, adapting the assess-
ment procedure on the patient’s particular case, in the form of 
an individualized quantitative behavioral assessment [40]. This 
method identifies a particular behavior that is tested for consis-
tency in response to command and it further checks whether this 
behavior changes over time, either in response to treatment or 
spontaneously. It has been proposed that the rate for the incorrect 
diagnostic evaluation of the VS will be minimized by combining 
behavioral, electrophysiological and functional neuroimaging 
procedures [41,42].
Paraclinical assessment
Electrophysiological and functional neuroimaging methods per-
mit the identification of objective markers of consciousness and 
quantify residual brain function in DOC. The EEG is infor-
mative of the general vigilance level of patients and can detect 
functional abnormalities, such as seizures. However, evoked 
responses to environmental stimuli, such as evoked potentials 
(EPs), may be more informative about the cognitive state of 
a patient. EPs derive statistically from the EEG and they are 
comprised of different components which can be classified into 
two main categories: short latency or exogenous, and cognitive 
or endogenous [43]. Exogenous components are elicited within 
a time range between 0 and 100 ms after the presentation of 
a stimulus; they correspond to the activation of the ascend-
ing pathways to the primary cortex and are thought to reflect 
the physical properties of the stimulus. Examples of exogenous 
components are the SEPs, the brainstem auditory EPs (BAEPs) 
and middle-latency auditory EPs (MLAEPs). Endogenous 
components are obtained after 100 ms of the presentation of a 
stimulus, reflecting the activity of both cortical and subcortical 
structures including associative areas, and are thought to depend 
on the psychological significance of the stimulus. Examples of 
endogenous components are the mismatch negativity (MMN; 
a response to an oddball situation in an inattentive subject) and 
the P300 (a response to an unpredictable target stimulus) [44]. 
Evoked electrophysiological responses, as is mentioned later, are 
signatures of neural activity that may differentiate conscious 
from unconscious processing and are easy to employ at the 
patient’s bedside. 
Functional neuroimaging permits objective measurement of 
the brain’s activity at rest and during various states of external 
stimulation [45]. The main principle behind this methodology is 
that performance on a sensorimotor or a cognitive task increases 
the brain’s need for extra energy. One form of energy is glucose, 
the metabolic levels of which are measured by the fluoro-deoxy-
d-glucose PET (FDG-PET) technique. Another form of energy 
is oxygen, the excessive levels of which in certain brain areas are 
measured by the functional MRI (fMRI) technique. 
Diagnostic value
The EEG is the most employed test to confirm the diagnosis of 
brain death. This is done by showing absence of electrocorti-
cal activity (i.e., isoelectric EEG), which diagnoses brain death 
with a sensitivity and specificity of approximately 90% [46]. In 
the VS, the EEG most often shows continuous diffuse slowed 
electrical activity in the theta (4–7.5 Hz) and/or delta (1–3.5 Hz) 
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frequency ranges. In the MCS, bilateral, but predominantly 
ipsilesional polymorphic theta activity may be the most promi-
nent abnormality [47]. In LIS, the EEG pattern differs across 
patients and, thus, cannot be used as a reliable measure for 
detecting consciousness and to discriminate LIS from DOC 
[48]. However, when a close-to-normal EEG pattern is observed, 
the possibility of LIS should be taken into consideration [19]. 
The patients’ underlying background EEG was also shown to 
influence the evoked electrophysiological responses to stimuli 
of different complexity [49].
Certain types of P300, such as the P3a and P3b, are a func-
tion of attention and memory, respectively [50]. It was shown 
that VS and MCS patients elicit a P300 response more fre-
quently when ecological stimuli were used as compared with 
meaningless tones [51]. The patient’s own name, a salient atten-
tion-grabbing stimulus, was found to elicit a P300 response 
in VS and MCS [52]. However, as P300 can also be elicited 
during subliminal perception [53] and during sleep [54], it can 
be considered as a purely conditioned response to one’s own 
name, and therefore may not imply consciousness [55]. Recently, 
the P300 as a response to a patient’s own name and to other 
target names was employed to document command following 
in DOC. Schnakers and colleagues studied 22 severely brain 
damaged patients employing an ‘active’ auditory paradigm [56]. 
Subjects were instructed to count the number of times they 
heard either their own name or an unfamiliar target name. In 
controls, this increase of attention to a target leads to an increase 
of the P300 response. Similar results were obtained in low-level 
MCS patients (i.e., those only showing visual fixation tracking 
but no behavioral command following). None of the studied 
VS patients demonstrated such responses. 
In terms of neuroimaging methodology, PET scans in brain 
death show absence of neuronal metabolism in the whole 
brain, that is, an ‘empty-skull sign’ [8]. Cortical metabolism in 
coma and in VS is reduced by up to 40–50% of normal values. 
Recovery from the VS, however, is not always associated with a 
return to near normal global cerebral metabolic levels; rather, 
metabolic changes are observed regionally [57]. PET studies on 
pain perception in the VS have demonstrated restricted brain 
activation to primary somatosensory cortices, isolated and dis-
connected from the rest of the brain [58]. However, in absence 
of a full understanding of the neural correlates of conscious 
perception, it remains difficult to interpret functional imaging 
data in brain damaged patients as proof or disproof of their 
conscious experience [59]. LIS patients demonstrate higher global 
brain metabolic levels compared with the VS [60]. The absence 
of metabolic signs of reduced function in any area of the gray 
matter highlights the fact that these patients suffer from a pure 
motor de-efferentation and recover an entirely intact intellectual 
capacity [19]. 
Functional MRI data collected by Owen and colleagues 
from Cambridge University in collaboration with our group 
suggested that a patient, behaviorally diagnosed as vegetative, 
showed indistinguishable brain activity from that observed 
in healthy people when asked to imagine playing tennis and 
mentally visit rooms of her house [61]. This implies that this 
patient, despite the clinical diagnosis of VS, understood the 
tasks and, hence, must have been conscious. Of note is the fact 
that, a few months later, the patient evolved into a MCS. The 
most likely explanation of these results is that the patient was 
no longer in a VS at the time of the experiment. 
Prognostic value 
Some clinical studies have suggested that ventricular dilata-
tion, the motor score on the GCS, spontaneous eye movements 
[62] and blinking to threat herald favorable outcome in the VS 
[63]. Recent evidence, however, have suggested that presence of 
blinking to threat does not reliably predict recovery in the VS 
as its positive predictive value (i.e., patients showing preserved 
blinking to treat response who subsequently recovered) was 
estimated at 30% [64].
Electrophysiological data in coma support the suggestion that 
a burst suppression EEG heralds bad outcome [3]. The presence 
or absence of exogenous and endogenous EPs plays an important 
role in the prognosis of DOC. Although the absence of cortical 
SEPs herald poor outcome, their presence does not necessarily 
imply recovery [65]. Given the low positive predictive values 
of exogenous EPs, it has been suggested that clinical routine 
tests should also include the assessment of higher order corti-
cal activity via endogenous EPs. The presence of MMN, for 
example, has been found to be of high positive prognostic value 
notably in anoxic coma [66]. In summary, it can be concluded 
that absent exogenous EPs are well established prognosticators 
of poor outcome, whereas the presence of endogenous compo-
nents, notably the MMN and P300, appear to predict favorable 
outcome [67]. 
In the postacute phase, structural MRI findings have dem-
onstrated that lesions of the corpus callosum, corona radiata 
and dorsolateral brainstem are predictors of bad outcome in 
VS patients [68]. A recent review of fMRI activation studies has 
shown that activation of higher-level brain regions also seem 
to predict recovery [69]. Compared with seven VS patients who 
exhibited a more frequently encountered low-level primary cor-
tical activation when the patient’s own name paradigm was 
employed, Di and colleagues identified two VS patients who 
demonstrated a more widespread activation, beyond the primary 
auditory cortices. Only these two VS patients showing close-
to-normal brain activation functionally improved to MCS at 
3 months follow-up. In that sense, the fMRI precedes the results 
of the clinical recovery.
Treatment
To date, there are no ‘standards of care’ for therapeutic manage-
ment in DOC. Studies were conducted under suboptimal or 
uncontrolled settings and, for that reason, no evidence-based 
recommendations can be made. However, pilot data demon-
strate that DOC patients and, more particularly, MCS patients, 
can benefit from some rehabilitative interventions [70]. These 
interventions can be separated between pharmacologic and 
nonpharmacologic. 
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Pharmacologic treatment
Generally speaking, the response of DOC patients to pharmaco-
logic treatment remains unsatisfactory [71]. However, pharmacologic 
studies have shown that amantadine, mainly a dopaminergic agent, 
was linked to better outcome in traumatic DOC [72,73]. In addi-
tion to behavioral amelioration, a recent PET study with a chronic 
anoxic MCS patient showed a drug-related increase in frontopari-
etal metabolism after the administration of amantadine (Figure 2) 
[74]. Nevertheless, cohort placebo-controlled randomized trials or 
blinded within-subject crossover designs are needed before making 
any assertive conclusions for the effectiveness of the drug. 
Other pharmacologic agents that have been reported to lead 
to favorable functional outcome are levodopa and bromo-
criptine (also dopaminergic agents) [75], baclofen [76] (GABA 
agonist administered mainly against spasticity) and zolpidem 
(nonbenzodiazepine sedative drug that is used against insom-
nia in healthy people). Table 1 summarizes recent pharmacologic 
studies in DOC (after the year 2000), estimating their quality 
of evidence based on the criteria proposed by the Oxford Centre 
of Evidence-Based Medicine [202]. As can be shown from Table 1, 
no level-1a studies have been conducted yet.
Nonpharmacologic treatment
Despite some sparse evidence that deep brain stimulation (DBS) 
may have some ameliorating effects on arousal in VS [77], gen-
erally speaking, its effectiveness to this population is limited. 
This can be attributed to the uncontrolled settings of these 
studies in combination with the underlying neuropathology of 
VS patients. More particularly, VS patients exhibit widespread 
thalamic and cortical neuronal damage [78], whose stimulation 
is difficult to lead to functional reintegration [79]. Schiff and 
colleagues recently proposed a protocol for the application of 
DBS, which mainly focuses on patients’ selection based on the 
neuropathological and behavioral profile. According to this 
protocol, patients eligible for DBS application will be those 
who manifest preserved states of arousal, fluctuating behavioral 
performance and for whom there is specific information about 
the connections between the central thalamus (coming from 
functional neuroimaging evidence), cerebral cortex, basal gan-
glia and other subcortical structures [79]. The first application 
of their protocol took place in a recent study of a 38-year-old, 
severe traumatic brain-injured patient, who was in a MCS for 
6 years [80]. The patient’s condition did not ameliorate despite 
a 2-year rehabilitation program and 4 years in a nursing home. 
However, after applying DBS in the central thalamus, the 
patient exhibited improved levels of arousal, motor control and 
interactive behavior. It should be noted that the fMRI of this 
patient demonstrated a preserved large-scale bihemispheric lan-
guage network, which implied that there was at least a preserved 
substrate for a neural recovery to take place [81]. 
Other nonpharmacologic interventions for DOC are sensory 
stimulation techniques, physical and occupational therapy. 
These techniques are mainly conducted 
for two purposes: to prevent complications 
and/or to enhance recovery. It should be 
noted that, in terms of efficacy, prevent-
ing complications in a patient (e.g., con-
tracture or pressure sore prevention) does 
not necessarily imply effects on recovery. 
Sensory stimulation refers to two types 
of approaches: the multisensory stimula-
tion approach and the sensory regulation 
approach [82]. The former embraces the 
principles of behaviorism and states that 
enhanced environmental stimulation of 
the sensory systems is hoped to enhance 
synaptic reinnervations and eventually 
improve outcome. Sensory regulation is 
based on the principles of information pro-
cessing and focuses on the enhancement of 
selective attention by regulating the envi-
ronment. At present, the beneficial effects 
of all approaches described above remain 
debated and not evidence-based [83]. 
Physical therapy aims to improve motor 
and physical disturbances via techniques 
that include protocols of postural changes, 
management and prevention of joint 
contractures as well as hygienic manage-
ment. There is evidence that early [84] and 
increased intervention [85] leads to better 
Figure 2. Amantadine-related changes in cerebral metabolism in an anoxic 
minimally conscious patient. The metabolic activity of bilateral fronto–temporo–
parietal associative and right sensory–motor cortices is decreased at baseline, increases 
after 5 weeks of amantadine treatment, decreases during washout and returns to 
near-normal levels after re-administration.  
Adapted from [75].
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outcomes. VS patients, however, are often denied the oppor-
tunity of early intervention either because, due to their slow 
progress, physicians estimate that they have already achieved the 
final level of responsiveness or because they need to be on the 
waiting list for a specialized rehabilitation center [86].
Occupational therapy supports the view that being engaged 
in a creative and productive activity will enhance the physical 
and emotional rehabilitation of patients [87]. Occupations dif-
fer between patients based on their needs, roles and interests, 
and concern three different areas of function: self-maintenance 
(e.g., personal care), productivity (e.g., work) and leisure [88]. 
Nevertheless, occupational therapy interventions in DOC are 
not frequent and, when employed, the aim is to enhance motor 
function, sensory/cognitive skills and interpersonal/intraper-
sonal performance components [88]. The effectiveness of this 
treatment is also limited [89]. 
Expert commentary
The diagnosis of DOC is difficult due to its subjective character. 
Clinicians need to infer the presence of awareness in these patients 
based on motor responses to external stimulation. Distinguishing 
between voluntary and reflexive behavior will eventually dis-
entangle VS from MCS patients. To date, however, there is no 
consensus as to what ‘reflexive’ and ‘voluntary’ means [90], similar 
to the debate about what consciousness means. Additionally, 
DOC patients can manifest muscular spasticity or paralysis. 
In that perspective, high diagnostic error in DOC is common. 
Therefore, the need for standardized, validated behavioral scales 
is emphasized. 
From the previous discussion it is clear that there is a need for 
an alternative nonmotor-dependent means for the assessment of 
DOC. Such opportunity is offered by functional neuroimag-
ing and electrophysiological tools. The fMRI study of mental 
imagery to command by Owen and colleagues [61] challenge the 
present status of clinical bedside diagnosis and encourage the 
application of sophisticated neuroimaging techniques in clini-
cal practice. Similarly, subclinical electromyography (EMG) 
was shown to detect preserved awareness (i.e., command fol-
lowing) in one of ten VS and in both tested MCS patients [91]. 
In that perspective, the gray zone that lies between these two 
distinct clinical entities of consciousness is expected to be more 
clearly defined. However, the evidence of such studies should be 
interpreted carefully as it concerns case reports or small cohort 
groups, and it is characterized by physiological and behavioral 
variability. This means that the employed paraclinical methods 
to study DOC do not solve the problem of confounding impair-
ments in sensory processing. Additionally, if the paraclinical 
examination of the patient measures a ‘trait’ (i.e., an enduring 
Table 1. The efficacy of pharmacologic treatment in disorders of consciousness.
Drugs Study 
(first author, year)
Number of 
patients and 
etiology
Diagnosis Placebo 
control
Reported 
functional 
outcome 
Level of 
evidence
Ref.
Dopaminergic agents
Amantadine Schnakers (2008) 1 anoxic MCS No Positive 3b [74]
Patrick (2006) 10 TBI Low responsive 
level
No No effect 1b [99]
Hughes (2005) 123 TBI Coma NA No effect 2b [100]
Saniova (2004) 41 TBI ‘Persistent 
unconsciousness’
NA Positive 2b [101]
Meythaler (2002) 35 TBI MCS Yes Positive 1b [102]
Bromocriptine Brahmi (2004) 4 intoxication Coma No Positive 4 [103]
Levodopa Matsuda (2003) 3 TBI VS No Positive 4 [104]
Nonbenzodiazepine sedative
Zolpidem Cohen (2008) 1 anoxic Lethargic No Positive 4 [105]
Shames (2008) 1 anoxic MCS No Positive 4 [106]
Singh (2008) 1 TBI MCS No No effect 4 [107]
Brefel-Courbon (2007) 1 hypoxic Akinetic mutism Yes Positive 3b [94]
Clauss (2006) 2 TBI, 1 anoxic VS No Positive 4 [108]
Clauss (2000) 1 TBI Semi-comatose No Positive 4 [109]
GABA agonist
Baclofen Sarà (2007) 1 non-TBI VS No Positive 4 [110]
Medline search included studies conducted between January 2000 and June 2008. 
MCS: Minimally conscious state; NA: Not applicable; TBI: Traumatic brain injury; VS: Vegetative state. 
Level of evidence data from [202].
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pattern characteristic of the patient), a single examination may 
prove useful, but if it targets at a patient’s ‘state’ (i.e., a psy-
chological or physiological pattern that may fluctuate), then 
multiple measures are needed. 
Another critical point to the study of awareness in DOC 
is the subsequent ethical considerations. According to some 
authors, it is ethically controversial whether noncommunicative 
patients can be included in clinical trials since they are unable 
to provide informed consent and, thus, cannot protect them-
selves from potential dangers. However, excluding such patients 
from research studies under the argument of nonmaleficence, 
they are also excluded from the opportunity to potentially ben-
efit from these studies. For that reason, an ethical framework 
that balances between clear protections for patients with DOC 
and access to research and medical progress is preferred [92,93]. 
Based on this framework, better end-of-life decisions can be 
made by allowing severely brain-injured patients, who have 
been misdiagnosed based on bedside evaluation but who have 
relatively preserved cognitive capacity, decide on the course of 
their own lives. 
Five-year view
The clinical and subclinical detection of awareness in DOC, 
with the aid of functional neuroimaging and electrophysiologi-
cal tools, is expected to flourish in the next 5 years. Clinical 
diagnosis will be facilitated by moving from isolated case reports 
toward large-scale multicenter cohort studies. The derivates of 
such studies are expected to become more widely applicable in 
clinical routine. In this way, prognosis and outcome prediction 
will be further validated. In terms of treatment, nowadays no 
evidence-based recommendations can be made in favor of this or 
the other therapeutic option. Preliminary evidence of the efficacy 
of some pharmacologic (e.g., amantadine [74] and zolpidem [94]) 
and nonpharmacologic interventions (e.g., DBS [80]) in DOC 
patients will be further supported by functional neuroimaging 
studies, which are expected to reveal the physiological modi-
fications of these interventions. Advances in communication 
technology are also expected in the coming years [42]. To date, 
facilitation in communication is beginning to be achieved for LIS 
patients. Salivary pH changes, for example, have been reported as 
an alternative paradigm to communicate with a LIS patient who 
was providing ‘yes’ answers by imagining lemon and ‘no’ answers 
by imagining milk [95,96]. A recent impressive breakthrough, 
however, is the use of brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) [20], a 
technique which allows electrical brain signals to control external 
devices that do not require muscular activity. In the future, BCI 
devices are expected to be applicable also in DOC, by provid-
ing these patients with a ‘voice’ of their own [97,98]. It would be 
thrilling to view the use of these powerful technologies in the 
assessment and possible treatment of DOC. 
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Information resources
Coma Science Website •	
www.comascience.org
American Academy of Neurology (AAN) clinical practice •	
guidelines 
www.aan.com/go/practice/guidelines
Key issues
Incorrect diagnosis of disorders of consciousness (DOC) is still very common in clinical practice, despite the introduction of clear-cut • 
diagnostic criteria.
Standardized validated behavioral tools should be employed in the assessment of DOC. • 
The Glasgow Coma Scale remains the gold standard in the behavioral assessment of comatose patients, but the Coma Recovery • 
Scale–Revised is probably the most validated scale to disentangle vegetative from minimally conscious state patients.
The bedside diagnosis of the vegetative state is difficult, and requires repeated examination by trained experts. The interest of • 
paraclinical markers is currently being studied. 
The vegetative state is not brain death.• 
The therapeutic management of DOC currently lacks large-scale randomized controlled trials permitting conclusive answers to propose • 
or reject specific pharmacologic or nonpharmacologic interventions.
Pharmacologic treatment with amantadine and zolpidem show behavioral amelioration in some DOC patients but still no conclusive • 
recommendations for the efficacy of these drugs can be made.
Functional neuroimaging is expected to show the putative therapeutic efficacy in smaller cohort studies and be quicker and cheaper.• 
Functional neuroimaging and electrophysiological tools offer an objective way to measure the brain’s activity in DOC. Despite their • 
great promise, at present no evidence-based recommendations for their diagnostic and prognostic use in clinical routine can 
be proposed.
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DISORDERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Dualism Persists in the Science of Mind
Athena Demertzi,a Charlene Liew,b Didier Ledoux,a
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aComa Science Group, Cyclotron Research Centre, University of Lie`ge, Lie`ge, Belgium
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The relationship between mind and brain has philosophical, scientific, and practical
implications. Two separate but related surveys from the University of Edinburgh (Uni-
versity students, n = 250) and the University of Lie`ge (health-care workers, lay public,
n = 1858) were performed to probe attitudes toward the mind–brain relationship and
the variables that account for differences in views. Four statements were included, each
relating to an aspect of the mind–brain relationship. The Edinburgh survey revealed a
predominance of dualistic attitudes emphasizing the separateness of mind and brain.
In the Lie`ge survey, younger participants, women, and those with religious beliefs were
more likely to agree that the mind and brain are separate, that some spiritual part of
us survives death, that each of us has a soul that is separate from the body, and to deny
the physicality of mind. Religious belief was found to be the best predictor for dualistic
attitudes. Although the majority of health-care workers denied the distinction between
consciousness and the soma, more than one-third of medical and paramedical profes-
sionals regarded mind and brain as separate entities. The findings of the study are in
line with previous studies in developmental psychology and with surveys of scientists’
attitudes toward the relationship between mind and brain. We suggest that the results
are relevant to clinical practice, to the formulation of scientific questions about the
nature of consciousness, and to the reception of scientific theories of consciousness by
the general public.
Key words: consciousness; survey; dualism; materialism; religiosity; health-care pro-
fessionals; neuroscience
Introduction
The scientific study of consciousness indi-
cates that there is an intimate relationship be-
tween mind and brain.1 However, surveys of
highly educated samples have suggested that
“dualistic” attitudes toward the mind–brain re-
lationship remain very common.2 These are
revealed, for example, by religious beliefs that
the mind or soul is separable from the body, or
Address for correspondence: Steven Laureys, Coma Science Group,
Cyclotron Research Centre and Neurology Department, Sart Tilman
B30, University of Lie`ge, Lie`ge, Belgium. steven.laureys@ulg.ac.be
by the conviction that some spiritual part of us
can survive after death. Although some might
expect that nowadays the existence of the su-
pernatural would be denied by scientists, it has
been reported that about 40% of this popula-
tion believe in a personal God or in life after
death, a similar figure to that obtained almost
a hundred years ago.3 The clinical and theo-
retical implications of such figures have been
stressed in a recent questionnaire survey: stu-
dents from various disciplines reported that dif-
ferent perspectives on the mind–brain problem
were likely to influence doctors’ and psychol-
ogists’ choice of research methods, treatment
options, and their behavior toward patients.4
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Given the relevance of philosophical positions
on the mind–brain relationship to practice and
theory, we shall briefly review the most repre-
sentative philosophies of mind. In the present
chapter we use the terms mind and conscious-
ness interchangeably to refer to the first-person
perspective that we enjoy in our everyday
experience.5
The “–isms” of Consciousness
Dualism
Rene Descartes developed the view that
mind andmatter involve different kinds of “sub-
stance,” a view now known as “substance” or
“Cartesian” dualism. In this view, the brain be-
longs to the physical world, the mind to the
nonphysical, yet they are closely related to each
other.6 Physical events can cause mental events
and vice versa. Dualism, however, notoriously
fails to explain how physical andmental entities
can interact.
Functionalism
This view, one of the varieties of physicalism,
denies the “separateness” of mental and phys-
ical phenomena. Instead, mental phenomena
are considered as states of the brain (beliefs,
desires, feelings of pain, etc.) with a functional
role. In this view, mind is analogous to the oper-
ation of a software package in the hardware in
the brain. The key feature of mind, according
to functionalism, is the algorithmic transfor-
mation of inputs into outputs.7 If so, computers
and robots may one day be conscious.
Reductive Materialism (or “Identity
Theory”)
This position holds that there are no “hard
questions” to be answered and no “gaps” to
be explained. The mind cannot be separated
from the brain. It is the brain. Experience can
be explained simply by revealing what happens
within the brain, just as heat is explained by
the motion of atoms. The difficulty for this per-
spective is that it seems to give no account of
the subjective qualities of experience,5 why it
should be “like something” to undergo expe-
rience. This view, albeit convenient for neuro-
science, has been accused of “leaving out the
mind.”8
In the present chapter, we survey attitudes
toward the mind–brain relationship sampled
from two related surveys, the first conducted by
the University of Edinburgh, UK, the second
by the University of Lie`ge, Belgium. The aim
was to identify attitudes toward themind–brain
relationship and the variables that account for
differences of views. The two surveys shared
four key statements on which participants were
asked to state their views.
Methods
Material and Procedure
The statements presented to participants
were: (1) the mind and brain are two separate
things; (2) the mind is fundamentally physical;
(3) some spiritual part of us survives after death;
and (4) each of us has a soul that is separate from
the body.
In the Edinburgh survey, n = 250 partic-
ipants were included. The sample was com-
prised of students from the University of
Edinburgh, who came from eight academic dis-
ciplines: anthropology (33), astrophysics (19),
civil engineering (32), computer science (30),
divinity (36), medicine (30), mechanical engi-
neering (34), and physics (36). The students
were addressed as a class after their lectures
and then asked to complete and return the
questionnaire within the next 15 minutes. Par-
ticipants’ views were expressed on a four-point
Likert scale (Agree- Somewhat agree- Some-
what disagree- Disagree), which was collapsed
into two categories (“agree” vs. “disagree”) for
further analysis. The participants were also
asked to provide information about possible be-
lief in the existence of a God or Gods.
The Lie`ge survey included n = 1858 par-
ticipants, who were attending public or scien-
tific meetings on consciousness. The majority
were European (n = 1293) and U.S. (n = 125)
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Figure 1. The attitudes toward mind and brain of the Edinburgh (n = 250) and the Lie`ge
survey sample (n = 1858).
citizens, as well as citizens from other countries
around theworld (n= 86) (n= 354,missing data
on nationality). The sample was comprised of
medical professionals (782/1858); paramedical
health-care workers, such as nurses, psychol-
ogists, physiotherapists (290/1858); and other
professional backgrounds (455/1858; 331miss-
ing data on profession). The administrationwas
oral and it took approximately 15 minutes for
the completion of the questionnaire. The an-
swers were expressed dichotomously (“agree–
disagree”). Information about belief in a per-
sonal God was also collected.
The data were analyzed using SPSS 14.0
for Windows (SPSS, Inc., Chicago, IL, USA).
Internal consistency was assessed by calculat-
ing interitem correlations. Chi-square tests for
categorical data were used to test the differ-
ences in responses between groups. Logistic Re-
gression analyses (method: backward stepwise)
were ordered to describe the relationship be-
tween agreement on the four statements and
a set of explanatory variables (i.e., age, gender,
profession, and religiosity, tests thresholded at
P = .05).
Results
The histogram of Figure 1 summarizes the
initial results of the two surveys. The un-
dergraduate students were generally more in-
clined to dualistic views about the mind–
brain relationship than the second sample (i.e.,
health-care workers, lay public). Internal con-
sistency was satisfactory for both surveys (see
Table 1).
Edinburgh Survey
Two hundred fifty participants, 144 (56%)
men and 106 (44%) women, completed their
questionnaires. The average age of the students
was 20 years (SD: 5; range: 17–57), and 98% of
them were doing their first degree. The results
were: 168/250 (67%) of responders agreed that
“mind andbrain are two separate things,”while
158/248 (64%) disputed the statement that
“themind is fundamentally physical”; 161/246
(65%) agreed that “each of us has a soul that
is separate from the body,” and 174/248 (70%)
agreed that some spiritual part of us survives
after death; and 150/239 (63%) believed in the
existence of God or Gods.
Women were more likely than men to
subscribe to the existence of the soul (χ2(1,
246) = 8.277, P = .004) and to deny that
the mind is physical (χ2(1, 248) = 8.810,
P = .003). Belief in God was strongly associ-
ated with belief in the soul and spiritual survival
(χ2(1, 237) = 101.310, P < .001), and with
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TABLE 1. Correlations between Responses to the Four Statements
Each of
Mind Some us has a
and brain Mind spiritual soul that
are two is funda- part of us is separate
separate mentally survives from the
Statements things physical after death body
Edinburgh survey Mind and brain are two separate things 1
Mind is fundamentally physical −.345a 1
Some spiritual part of us survives after death .186a −.248a 1
Each of us has a soul that is separate from the body .292a −.252a .773a 1
Lie`ge survey Mind and brain are two separate things 1
Mind is fundamentally physical −.162a 1
Some spiritual part of us survives after death .235a −.196a 1
Each of us has a soul that is separate from the body .326a −.173a .518a 1
NOTE: Statements 1, 3 and, 4 showed high positive correlation with one other, whereas all three were significantly
anticorrelated with statement 2.
aCorrelations are significant at the P = .01 level (two-tailed).
disagreement with the view that the mind is
fundamentally physical (χ2(1, 246) = 14.124,
P < .001). The differences between students
of different disciplines were less striking on
the whole, although students in the humani-
ties were more likely than those in the sciences
to believe that the mind is nonphysical (χ2(1,
148) = 8.195, P = .0042).
Lie`ge Survey
In the Lie`ge Survey, 1858 participants, 908
(49%) women and 840 (45%) men (n = 110,
6% missing data on gender), were included in
the analysis. The average age of the partici-
pants was 41 years (SD: 15, range: 16–85).
The results were: 737/1773 (42%) respon-
dents agreed that “the mind and the brain
are separate”, while 725/1766 (41%) disputed
the statement that “the mind is fundamen-
tally physical”; 686/1735 (40%) agreed that
some spiritual part of us survives after death
and 688/1741 (40%) that “each of us has a
soul which is separate from the body”. The
number of religious believers (789/1858) was
approximately the same as the number of
nonbelievers (783/1858) (286 missing data on
religiosity).
Table 2 summarizes the results of the Logistic
Regressionmodels for each philosophical state-
ment. The statement “The mind and brain are
two separate things” was supported more often
by religious than nonreligious responders and
less often by middle-aged (31–49 years) and
older (>50 years) responders as compared to
younger ones (<30 years). The statement that
“Themind is purely physical”was endorsed less
often by religious participants, and more often
by men as compared to women. Religious re-
sponders agreed significantly more often with
the statement “Some spiritual part of us sur-
vives after death” more than nonreligious ones.
The statement that “each of us has a soul that
is separate from the body” received more sup-
port from religious responders and paramedi-
cal professionals than it did from from nonre-
ligious participants and medical professionals.
The interactions age/religiosity, age/gender,
and gender/religiosity were also tested, but no
significant effects were found in the Logistic
Regression models.
Figures 2 and 3 summarize the effects of age,
gender, religiosity, and professional background
on agreement with the four statements.
A majority of medical (55%) and paramed-
ical professionals (51%) stated that they were
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TABLE 2. TheMost Significant Predictors of the Logistic Regression Models (method: backward stepwise)
on the Four Statements
Statement predictors Odds ratio 95% CI P-valuea
The mind and brain are two separate things
Religious 1.778 1.347–2.347 <.001
Middle age (31–49 yr) .490 .336–.716 <.001
Older (>40 yr) .535 .361–.795 .002
The mind is fundamentally physical
Religious .519 .395–.681 <.001
Men 2.186 1.664–2.871 <.001
Some spiritual part of us survives after death
Religious 7.892 5.694–10.938 <.001
Each of us has a soul that is separate from the body
Religious 5.456 3.987–7.465 <.001
Paramedical professionals 1.633 1.161–2.297 <.001
NOTE: An odds ratio greater than one implies that agreement is more likely in the predictor. An odds ratio less
than one implies that agreement is less likely in the predictor.
aP significant at α = 0.05.
Figure 2. The effect of age and gender on attitudes toward mind–brain relationship (Lie`ge
survey, n = 1858).
religious. A substantial number of medical
professionals (39.5%) (n = 304) endorsed the
statement distinguishing mind and brain as
separate entities as compared to 38.2% (n =
92) of the paramedical professionals. The phy-
sicality of mind was denied by 55.4% (n =
425) medical and 63.5% (n = 153) of paramed-
ical professionals. The continuation of the
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Figure 3. The effect of professional background and religiosity on attitudes toward mind–
brain relationship (Lie`ge survey, n = 1858).
spirit after death found support from 37.9%
(n = 285) of medical and 38.5% (n = 92) of
paramedical professionals. Finally, the view that
that we have a soul that is separate from the
body was supported by 36% (n = 272) of
the group of medical workers and by 44.1%
(n = 105) of paramedical professionals.
Discussion
The present article provides data from
two separate but related surveys on attitudes
on mind and brain, based in Scotland and
Belgium. A majority of undergraduates, sam-
pled in the Edinburgh survey, held a dualis-
tic view of the relationship between mind and
brain (i.e., mind and brain are separate). The
majority disagreed that the mind is a purely
physical entity and endorsed the existence of a
soul that is separate from the body and survives
death. The views of a wider group (health-care
professionals, lay public, students), sampled in
the Lie`ge survey, were less dualistic (Fig. 1), but
nevertheless, over a third of health-careworkers
expressed dualistic opinions and half reported
religious belief. Younger participants, women,
and those with religious beliefs weremore likely
to endorse dualism (Figs. 2 and 3). However,
the tendency for women to endorse dualism
more often than men was not explained by an
association between female sex and religious
belief.
Our findings must be considered in the con-
text of the groups we have surveyed and the
approach we have taken. A larger survey, in-
cluding participants from a broader range of
educational and cultural backgrounds, would
shed more light on such attitudes. Additionally,
the closed “agree-disagree” statements used in
the survey forced participants to endorse atti-
tudes that they might have wished to qualify
had they been given an opportunity to do so.
For example, amajority of the Lie`ge survey sup-
ported the view that mind is not fundamentally
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physical. Yet the group’s perspective was not
consistently dualistic, as a majority also en-
dorsed the statement that the mind is not sepa-
rable from the brain. This may reflect the com-
plexities of the concept of mind, or understand-
able confusion about its nature, which remains
controversial among philosophers.
Dualism in Development
Dualism expresses itself in religious beliefs
in two prominent ways: in the idea of the soul
existing independently of the body, and in the
idea of an afterlife.9 Research in developmental
psychology suggests that although the precise
formulation of such beliefs is culturally deter-
mined, the idea that consciousness is different
from the body is universal. For example, when
young (4 years) and older (12 years) children
were asked whether psychological functioning
(i.e., consciousness) persisted after the death of
a mouse, four-year-olds held that both biolog-
ical functioning and consciousness survived in
the dead animal. Older children believed that
only consciousness survived death.10
Besides their tendency to regard conscious-
ness as being separable from the body, children
are inclined to “promiscuous teleology”: they
tend to attribute human-like purpose both to
living and nonliving entities. This was shown
experimentally in infants who inferred purpose
in abstract geometrical figures moving system-
atically on a monitor.11 Children are “intu-
itive theists”12 in the sense that they tend to
view nature as an artefact of design by a de-
ity. What is the advantage of such teleologi-
cal thinking? Daniel Dennett has explained its
evolutionary significance in his theory of “in-
tentional stance.”13 We adopt the intentional
stance when we explain events or behavior in
terms of the mental lives of agents. This is
appropriate and advantageous in our dealings
with one another, but our innate tendency to
adopt this stance can lead to misattribution of
mentality to processes that, arguably, do not
involve purpose of this kind.
Dualism in Science
Although one might have expected that du-
alistic attitudes would grow less common with
scientific progress, especially among scientists,
this may not be the case. At the beginning
of the twentieth century, Leuba’s survey of
religious beliefs among scientists found that
40 percent believed in a personalGod and in af-
terlife.14 Eighty years later, Larson andWitham
replicated the survey and found little change,3
in accordance with our finding that almost one-
third of health-care professionals support dual-
istic views on mind–brain relationship. In their
survey, beliefs in a personal God and in af-
terlife were found to be considerably lower, at
7% and 7.9% respectively, when the sampled
group was “leading scientists” (i.e., members of
the National Academy of Science), in contrast
to what was found in 1914.15
Being a Dualist: Clinical and Scientific
Implications
The persistence of dualistic attitudes to-
ward mind and brain has direct implications
for clinical practice. In neurological practice,
around one-third of outpatients have medi-
cally unexplained symptoms, which are asso-
ciated with high levels of psychiatric comorbid-
ity (i.e., somatoform disorders). These patients
are especially reluctant to accept psychologi-
cal explanations for their condition,16 because
psychological symptoms are often considered
shameful and associated with the social stigma
of “mental” disease. Physical symptoms, on
the other hand, are perceived as being free
from such stigma or implication of blame.
The difficulty patients with somatoform dis-
orders experience in accepting psychological
explanations for their symptoms partly flows
from, and reinforces, dualistic attitudes to-
ward the relationship between mind and body.
Similarly, a recent survey found that mental-
health workers utilized the mind–brain di-
chotomy to reason about the patients’ respon-
sibility for their condition: when a problem was
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considered of a psychological etiology, the pa-
tients were more often thought to be respon-
sible for their condition, whereas when the
problem was thought to have a neurobiolog-
ical cause, the patients were considered less
blameworthy.17
We suggest that dualism is also at work in
neuroscientific thinking about consciousness.
Thus, talk of consciousness being “generated
by” or “conjured from” the brain is remi-
niscent of the Cartesian view that our men-
tal lives interact with our physical being, but
are radically separate from it. Some contem-
porary philosophers of mind18 regard dualism
of this kind as being theoretically appropriate.
Here, we simply draw attention to the fact that
the widespread dualism revealed by our sur-
vey continues to exert an influence on scien-
tific thought. Whether or not dualistic views
are correct, their continuing influence should
be acknowledged.
Dualistic preconceptions about mind and
brain may also influence the reception of sci-
entific theories of consciousness by the general
public. If such views remain alive among scien-
tists who formulate and try to answer questions
within the science of consciousness, they are
likely to be all the more influential among the
wider public.
Conclusions
Efforts in clinical medicine, cognitive neu-
roscience, and in the wider public arena are
gradually reshaping our attitudes toward mind
and brain. In clinical practice, the adoption of
a bio–psycho–social approach to illness gener-
ally provides a helpful antidote to the separa-
tion of the care of “diseases of the mind” from
those “of the body.”19 Cognitive neuroscience
reflects a sustained attempt by scientists to re-
instate mind within nature, from which it was
exiled by Descartes at the inception of modern
science. Efforts to enhance the public under-
standing of science are creating lively dialog
between scientists and a wider public. Never-
theless, the conceptual clarification of the re-
lationship between mind and brain remains a
challenge for scientists and philosophers, as we
have inherited concepts and assumptions that
may not do justice to their intimate connection.
Acknowlegments
AD is funded by the DISCOS Marie Curie
Research Training Network. SL and MAB are
respectively Senior Research Associate and Re-
search Fellow at the Fonds de la Recherche Sci-
entifique (FRS). AZ is funded by The Health
Foundation through a Mid-career Award. This
researchwas also supported by theMindbridge,
the McDonnell Foundation, the Mind Science
Foundation, theReine ElisabethMedical Foun-
dation, and University of Lie`ge.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
References
1. Laureys, S. & G. Tononi. 2008. TheNeurology of Con-
sciousness: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuropathology. Aca-
demic Press. Oxford, UK.
2. Zeman, A. 2006.What in the world is consciousness?
In The Boundaries of Consciounsess: Neurobiology and Neu-
ropathology, Vol. 150. S. Laureys, Ed.: 1–10. Elsevier.
Amsterdam.
3. Larson, E.J. & L. Witham. 1997. Scientists are still
keeping the faith. Nature 386: 435–436.
4. Fahrenberg, J. & M. Cheetham. 2000. The mind-
body problem as seen by students of different disci-
plines. J. Consciousness Stud. 7: 47–59.
5. Zeman, A. 2001. Consciousness. Brain 124: 1263–
1289.
6. Descartes, R. 1968. Discourse on Method and the Medita-
tions. Penguin. Harmondsworth, UK.
7. Dennett, D. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Penguin.
London.
8. Searle, J. 1992. The Rediscovery of the Mind. MIT Press.
Cambridge, MA.
9. Bloom, P. 2007. Religion is natural.Dev. Sci. 10: 147–
151.
10. Bering, J.M. & D.F. Bjorklund. 2004. The natural
emergence of reasoning about the afterlife as a devel-
opmental regularity. Dev. Psychol. 40: 217–233.
Demertzi et al.: Dualism in Science of Mind 9
11. Biro, S., G. Csibra, G. Gergely, et al. 2007. The
role of behavioral cues in understanding goal-
directed actions in infancy. Prog. Brain Res. 164: 303–
322.
12. Kelemen, D. 2004. Are children “intuitive theists”?
Reasoning about purpose and design in nature. Psy-
chol. Sci. 15: 295–301.
13. Dennett, D. 1987. The Intentional Stance. MIT Press.
Cambridge, MA.
14. Leuba, J.H. 1916. The Belief in God and Immortality: A
Psychological, Anthropological and Statistical Study. Sher-
man, French & Co. Boston.
15. Larson, E.J. & L. Witham. 1998. Leading scientists
still reject God. Nature 394: 313–313.
16. Stone, J. 2006. Functional weakness. Ph.D. thesis,
University of Edinburgh, UK.
17. Miresco,M.J. &L.J.Kirmayer. 2006.The persistence
of mind-brain dualism in psychiatric reasoning about
clinical scenarios. Am. J. Psychiatry 163: 913–918.
18. Chalmers,D.J. 1996.The ConsciousMind.OxfordUni-
versity Press. Oxford.
19. Engel, G. L. 1977. The need for a new medical
model: a challenge for biomedicine. Science 196: 129–
136.
 
Coma, Persistent Vegetative States, and Diminished
 
 
 
Author's personal copyConsciousness
A Demertzi, S Laureys and M Boly, University of Lie`ge, Lie`ge, Belgium
ã 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Glossary Neuron-specific enolase – The neuronal
form of the glycolytic enzyme enolase, which
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Apnea testing – A test needed to confirm
Introduction
Defining Consciousnessbrain death by checking whether the patient
has a breathing reflex when disconnected
from the positive pressure ventilator.
Brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) – Real-
time muscular-independent systems that
permit the translation of the electrical activity
of the brain into commands, to control
devices.
Deep brain stimulation (DBS) – An invasive
surgical treatment involving the implantation
of a medical device (brain pacemaker), which
sends electrical impulses to specific parts of
the brain.
Default mode network – A set of brain
areas, encompassing the posterior cingulate
cortex/precuneus, the medial prefrontal
cortex, and bilateral temporoparietal
junctions, which seem to be activated in the
absence of any external stimulation, and
show decreased activity during cognitive
processing.
Event-related potentials (ERPs) –
Averaged EEG signals that detect time-
locked responses to sensory, motor, or
cognitive activities. Short-latency or
exogenous ERPs, ranging from 0 to 100ms
after the presentation of a stimulus,
correspond to the activation of the ascending
pathways to the primary cortex. Cognitive or
endogenous ERPs are obtained after 100ms
of the presentation of a stimulus, and reflect
both subcortical and cortical structures,
including associative areas.
Functional connectivity – The temporal
correlation of a neurophysiological index
(i.e., cerebral metabolic rates of glucose,
regional cerebral blood flow) measured in
different remote brain areas.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Encyclopedia of Consciousnis found almost exclusively in neurons and
cells of neuroendocrine origin and is used as
a marker of ischemic brain damage.The management of coma and related disorders of
consciousness (DOC) is a major clinical challenge.
Patients in a vegetative state and minimally con-
scious state continue to pose problems in terms of
their diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment. Bedside
assessment remains the gold standard. Neuroimag-
ing and electrophysiological measures can now
identify signs of awareness inaccessible to clinical
examination, which permit a better understanding
of the mechanisms of human consciousness and
improve our care of DOC patients.Consciousness is a first-person experience, which
consists of two major components, wakefulness and
awareness. Wakefulness refers to the level of con-
sciousness and it is supported by the function of
the subcortical arousal systems in the brainstem,
the midbrain, and the thalamus. Clinically, it is
indicated by opening of the eyes. Awareness refers
to the contents of consciousness and it is thought
to be supported by the functional integrity of the
cerebral cortex and its subcortical connections.
Awareness can be further reduced to awareness of
the environment and of self. Clinically, awareness
of the environment is assessed by evaluating com-
mand following and observing nonreflex motor
behavior, such as eye tracking and oriented
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responses to pain. Awareness of self, clinically a As a consequence, medicine was forced to redefine
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Author's personal copymore ill-defined concept, can be assessed by the
patients’ response to autoreferential stimuli, such
as the patients’ own face in the mirror. An illustra-
tive example of the relationship between the two
components of consciousness is the transition from
full wakefulness to deep sleep: the less aroused we
get, the less aware we become of our surroundings
and ourselves (see Figure 1).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A Short History of Disorders of
Defining the Clinical Entities of
 
 Consciousness
About 50 years ago, before the era of neurocritical
care, things were relatively simple. After a severe
brain damage, comatose patients either died or,
more rarely, recovered with more or less cognitive
deficits. The invention of the positive pressure
mechanical ventilator by Bjorn Ibsen in the
1950s, and the widespread use of intensive care in
the 1960s, in the industrialized world, changed the
picture. They stated that severely brain damaged
patients could now have their heartbeat and sys-
temic circulation sustained by artificial respiratory
support. Such profound unconscious states had
never been encountered before as, until that time,
all these patients had died instantly from apnea.
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Figure 1 Simplified illustration of the two major
components of consciousness and the way they
correlate within the different physiological,
pharmacological and pathological modulations of
consciousness. Reproduced from Laureys S (2005)
The neural correlate of (un)awareness: Lessons from
the vegetative state. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9:
556–559.
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 death, using a neurological definition, that of brain
death.
In the 1960s, Fred Plum and Jerome Posner
described for the first time the locked-in syndrome
(LIS), to refer to fully conscious coma survivors who
are unable to communicate due to physical paraly-
sis. In 1972, Bryan Jennet and Fred Plum published
the clinical criteria of another artifact of modern
intensive care, the vegetative state (VS), a state of
‘wakefulness without awareness.’ In 2002, the Aspen
Neurobehavioral Conference Workgroup realized
that clinical reality was yet more complicated.
Some patients showed signs of voluntary behavior,
and therefore they were no longer vegetative, but
still remained unable to functionally communicate.
Based on these observations, they published the
diagnostic criteria of a new clinical entity, the mini-
mally conscious state (MCS).Consciousness
Brain Death
Brain death means human death determined by
neurological criteria. The current definition of
death is the permanent cessation of the critical
functions of the organism as a whole, such as,
neuroendocrine and homeostatic regulation, cir-
culation, respiration, and consciousness. Most
countries, including the United States, require
death of the whole brain including the brainstem.
Some other countries, like the United Kingdom
and India, rely on the death of the brainstem only,
arguing that the brainstem is at once the through-
station for nearly all hemispheric input and output,
the center generating wakefulness (an essential
condition for conscious awareness), and the center
of respiration. Classically, brain death is caused by
a massive brain lesion, such as trauma, intracranial
hemorrhage, or anoxia. Using the brainstem for-
mulation of death, however, unusual but existing
cases of catastrophic brainstem lesions, usually of
hemorrhagic origin, sparing the thalami and cere-
bral cortex, can be declared brain dead in the
absence of clinical brainstem function, despite
intact intracranial circulation. Hence, a patient
with a primary brainstem lesion who did not
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develop raised intracranial pressure might theoret- (see Figure 1). These patients regain sleep–wake
Minimally Conscious State
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Author's personal copyically be declared dead by the UK doctrine, but not
by the US doctrine.
In 1995, the American Academy of Neurology
published the criteria for brain death, which have
been used to model many institutional policies. The
criteria are (1) demonstration of coma; (2) evidence
for the cause of coma; (3) absence of confounding
factors, including hypothermia, drugs, electrolyte,
and endorcrine disturbances; (4) absence of brain-
stem reflexes; (5) absent motor responses; (6) posi-
tive apnea testing (see ‘Glossary’); (7) a repeat
evaluation in 6 h is advised, but the time period
is considered arbitrary; and (8) confirmatory labora-
tory tests are only required when specific com-
ponents of the clinical testing cannot be reliably
evaluated. At present, no recovery from brain death
has been reported.
Coma
Patients that sustain severe brain damage may
spend some time in coma, which lasts for a couple
of days or weeks. Patients in coma cannot be awak-
ened even when intensively stimulated and, hence,
are not aware of the environment and of them-
selves (see Figure 1). Coma is distinguished from
syncope or concussion in terms of its duration,
which is at least 1 h. Coma can result from bihemi-
spheric diffuse cortical or white matter damage or
brainstem lesions bilaterally, affecting the subcor-
tical reticular arousing systems. Many factors such
as etiology, the patient’s general medical condi-
tion, age, clinical signs, and complementary exam-
inations influence the management and prognosis
of coma. Traumatic etiology is known to have a
better outcome than nontraumatic anoxic cases. In
terms of clinical signs, after 3 days of observation, a
bad outcome is heralded by the absence of pupil-
lary or corneal reflexes, stereotyped or absent
motor response to noxious stimulation, bilateral
absent cortical responses of somatosensory-evoked
potentials (SEPs) (see ‘Glossary’), and (for anoxic
coma) biochemical markers, such as high levels of
serum neuron-specific enolase (see ‘Glossary’).
Vegetative State
In the VS there is dissociation between wakefulness,
which is preserved, and awareness, which is absent
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Encyclopedia of Consciousncycles. However, their motor, auditory, and visual
functions are restricted tomere reflexes and show no
adapted emotional responses. The VS is usually
caused by diffuse lesions on the gray and white
matter. According to the 1994 Multi-Society Task
Force on persistent vegetative state (PVS), the cri-
teria for the diagnosis of VS are the following: (1) no
evidence of awareness of self or environment and an
inability to interact with others; (2) no evidence of
sustained, reproducible, purposeful, or voluntary
behavioral responses to visual, auditory, tactile, or
noxious stimuli; (3) no evidence of language com-
prehension or expression; (4) intermittent wakeful-
ness manifested by the presence of sleep–wake
cycles; (5) sufficiently preserved hypothalamic and
brainstem autonomic functions to permit survival
with medical and nursing care; (6) bowel and blad-
der incontinence; and (7) variably preserved cranial
nerve and spinal reflexes.
The VS may be a transition to further recovery,
or may be permanent. ‘Permanent’ VS refers to
patients whose chances for recovery are close to
zero. This is the case for VS that lasts more than
1 year after traumatic, or 3 months after nontrau-
matic (anoxic) injury. The VS is characterized as
‘persistent,’ when a patient is in this state for more
than 1month. As both terms are abbreviated as
‘PVS,’ it has been suggested to avoid these terms
and, instead, mention the etiology and the time
spent in VS. At present, there are no validated
prognostic markers for individual patients except
that the chances for recovery depend on patient’s
age, etiology, and time spent in the VS.The MCS has been defined in 2002 by the Aspen
Workgroup as a DOC in order to describe non-
communicating patients that show inconsistent,
but discernible signs of behavioral activity that is
more than reflexive in at least one of the following
behavioral signs: (1) purposeful behavior, includ-
ing movements or affective behavior that occurs in
contingent relation to relevant environment sti-
muli and is not due to reflexive activity, such as:
pursuit eye movement or sustained fixation occur-
ring in direct response to moving or salient stimuli,
smiling or crying in response to verbal or visual
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emotional but not neutral stimuli, reaching for Once an LIS patient becomes medically stable,
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Author's personal copyobjects, demonstrating a relationship between
object location and direction of reach, touching
or holding objects in a manner that accommodates
the size and shape of the object, and vocalizations
or gestures occurring in direct response to the
linguistic content of questions, (2) following sim-
ple commands; (3) gestural or verbal yes/no
response, regardless of accuracy; and (4) intelligi-
ble verbalization.
Like the VS, the MCS may be chronic and
sometimes permanent. Emergence from the MCS
is defined by the ability to exhibit functional inter-
active communication or functional use of objects.
Given that the criteria for the MCS have only
recently been introduced, there are few clinical
studies of patients in this condition. Similar to
the VS, traumatic etiology has a better prognosis
than nontraumatic anoxic brain injuries. Prelimi-
nary data show that the overall outcome in the
MCS is more favorable than in the VS.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Locked-In Syndrome
Behavioral Evaluation
 
 The LIS describes patients who are awake and
conscious, but have no means of producing speech,
limb, or facial movements, resembling patients in a
VS. LIS most commonly results from lesions to the
brainstem. According to the 1995 American Con-
gress of Rehabilitation Medicine criteria, LIS
patients demonstrate: (1) sustained eye-opening
(bilateral ptosis should be ruled out as a compli-
cating factor), (2) quadriplegia or quadriparesis,
(3) aphonia or hypophonia, (4) a primary mode
of communication that uses vertical or lateral eye
movement or blinking of the upper eyelid to signal
yes/no responses, and (5) preserved cognitive abil-
ities. Since there is only motor output problem,
LIS is not a DOC, but it is included here as
it can be misdiagnosed as one. Based on motor
capacities, LIS can be divided into three cate-
gories: (1) classic LIS, which is characterized by
quadriplegia and anarthria with eye-coded com-
munication; (2) incomplete LIS, which is chara-
cterized by remnants of voluntary responsiveness
other than eye movement; and (3) total LIS, which
is characterized by complete immobility includ-
ing all eye movements, combined with preserved
consciousness.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Encyclopedia of Consciousneand given appropriate medical care, life expec-
tancy now is for several decades. Even if the
chances of good motor recovery are very limited,
existing eye-controlled, computer-based commu-
nication technology (i.e., BCI, see ‘Glossary’) cur-
rently allows these patient to control their
environment. Neuropsychological testing batteries
adapted and validated for eye-response communi-
cation, have shown preserved intellectual capaci-
ties in LIS patients, whose lesions are restricted to
brainstem pathology. Recent surveys show that
chronic LIS patients self-report a meaningful
quality of life and the demand for euthanasia,
albeit existing, is infrequent.Consciousness
Good medical management starts with good diag-
nosis. However, as awareness is a first-person per-
spective, its objective assessment is difficult. For
that reason, at the bedside, clinicians need to infer
it via the evaluation ofmotor activity and command
following. Diagnosing DOC correctly is extremely
challenging. This is mainly because these patients
are usually deprived of the capacity to make nor-
mal physical movements and may show limited
attentional capacities. Aphasia, apraxia, and corti-
cal deafness or blindness are other possible con-
founders in the assessment of DOC. This, in
combination with the difficulty to define uncertain
behavioral signs as voluntary or reflexive, can par-
tially explain the high rate of incorrect diagnosis of
DOC, which has been estimated to be around 40%
of the cases. Besides these difficulties, one should
also consider that some of the diagnostic criteria for
VS and MCS do not share international consensus,
such as, visual fixation, eye tracking, blinking
to visual threat, and oriented motor responses to
noxious stimuli.In 1974, Teasdale and Jennett’s Glasgow coma scale
(GCS) was published in ‘The Lancet.’ This stan-
dardized bedside tool to quantify consciousness
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became a medical classic, thanks mainly to its short In Search for Objective Markers of
Resting cerebral metabolism
Coma, Persistent Vegetative States, and Diminished Consciousness 151
 
 
 
Author's personal copyand simple administration. The GCS measures eye,
verbal, and motor responsiveness. There may be
some concern as to what extent eye-opening
is sufficient evidence for assessing brainstem func-
tion. Additionally, the verbal responses are impossi-
ble to be measured in cases of intubation and
tracheotomy. Most importantly, the GCS is not
sensitive enough to detect transition from the VS
toward the MCS.
To differentiate VS patients from MCS
patients, the most appropriate scale is the coma
recovery scale-revised (CRS-R). The CRS-R has a
similar structure to the GCS, containing, in addi-
tion to motor, eye, and verbal subscales, also audi-
tory, arousal, and communication subscales.
Despite its longer administration (i.e., c. 20min)
as compared to the GCS and the full outline of
unresponsiveness (FOUR), it is the most sensitive
in differentiating VS patients from MCS patients.
This is because it assesses every behavior accord-
ing to the diagnostic criteria of the VS and the
MCS, such as, the presence of visual pursuit and
visual fixation. Importantly, the way we assess
these behavioral signs need to be standardized
and uniform, permitting between-centers com-
parisons. For example, for the assessment of visual
pursuit, some scales use an object or finger
(FOUR), some use a mirror, a person, an object,
and a picture (Western Neuro-Sensory Stimula-
tion Profile), some use an object and a person
(Wessex Head Injury Matrix; Sensory Modalities
Assessment and Rehabilitation Technique), and
some a moving person (Coma/Near Coma Scale).
We have shown that the use of a mirror is more
sensitive in detecting eye tracking and, hence,
identify MCS patients. These findings stress that
self-referential stimuli have attention-grabbing
properties and are important in the assessment
of DOC.
Despite their pros and cons, each scale contri-
butes differently in establishing the diagnosis and
prognosis of DOC. The administration and inter-
pretation of findings should be decided and dis-
cussed in terms of the person who uses the scale,
the place where it is administered (e.g., intensive
care vs. chronic rehabilitation settings), and the
reasons for administration (e.g., clinical routine
vs. research purposes).
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Electrophysiology
The EEG allows recording of the spontaneous
electrical brain activity, permitting the identifica-
tion of the level of vigilance and the detection of
functional cerebral anomalies, such as seizures or
encephalopathy. In brain death, the EEG shows
absent electrocortical activity with a sensitivity
and specificity of around 90%. In coma, a burst
suppression in the EEG heralds a bad outcome. In
the VS, the EEG often shows a diffuse slowing and
it is only sporadically isoelectric. Similarly, in
MCS there is a general slowing on the EEG. In
LIS, the EEG does not reliably distinguish these
patients from VS patients. However, a close-to-
normal EEG should have the physician consider
the possibility of LIS.
The use of ERPs (see ‘Glossary’) is useful to
predict the outcome in DOC. Bilateral absence of
cortical potentials (i.e., N20) or SEPs heralds a bad
outcome in coma. The presence of ‘mismatch neg-
ativity’ (MMN), a late cognitive ERP component
that is elicited in auditory ‘oddball’ paradigms, is
predictive of recovery of consciousness. In VS,
SEPs may show preserved primary somatosensory
cortical potentials (SEPs), and brainstem auditory-
evoked potentials (BAEPs) often show preserved
brainstem potentials. Endogenous-evoked poten-
tials, measuring the brain’s response to complex
auditory stimuli, such as the patient’s own name
(as compared to other names) permits to record a
P300 response, which delayed in DOC patients
when compared to controls. However, a P300 is
not a reliable marker of consciousness as it can also
be detected during deep sleep and anesthesia.Cortical metabolism in coma survivors is reduced
on an average to 50%–70% of the normal values.
A global depression of cerebral metabolism is not
unique to coma. When anesthetic drugs are
titrated to the point of unresponsiveness, the
resulting reduction in brain metabolism is similar
to that observed in pathological coma. Another
example of transient metabolic depression can be
observed during slow-wave sleep. In this daily
physiological condition, the cortical cerebral
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metabolism can drop to nearly 40% of the normal identified a dysfunction in a wide frontoparietal
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Author's personal copyvalues – while in REM-sleep, the metabolism
returns to normal waking values (see Figure 2).
In brain death the so-called ‘empty-skull sign’ is
observed, denoting functional decapitation. VS
patients show substantially reduced, but not absent,
overall cortical metabolism, up to 40%–50% of
the normal values. In some VS patients who subse-
quently recovered, global metabolic rates for glu-
cose metabolism did not show substantial changes.
Hence, the relationship between the global levels
of brain function and the presence or absence of
awareness is not absolute. It rather seems that some
areas in the brain are more important than others
for its emergence. Statistical analyses of metabolic
positron emission tomography (PET) data have
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
G
lo
ba
l m
et
ab
ol
ism
 (%
)
Normal
consciousness
Brain
death
Deep
sleep
REM
sleep
Figure 2 Global cerebral metabolism in healthy, pharmacolo
Laureys S, Owen AM, and Schiff ND (2004) Brain function in
Neurology 3: 537–546.
Figure 3 The frontoparietal ‘‘awareness network’’ (orange) i
vegetative state. The blue arrows represent the functional dis
the thalami. The green area represents the relatively spared ac
Laureys, et al. (1999), NeuroImage.
Encyclopedia of Consciousne
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 network encompassing the polymodal associative
cortices: bilateral lateral frontal regions, parieto-
temporal and posterior parietal areas, mesiofrontal,
posterior cingulate, and precuneal cortices (see
Figure 3). However, awareness seems not to be
exclusively related to the activity in this ‘global
workspace’ cortical network, but, as importantly,
to the functional connectivity within this system
and with the thalami. Long-range, frontoparietal,
and thalamocortical ‘functional disconnections,’
with nonspecific intralaminar thalamic nuclei,
have been identified in the VS. Moreover, recovery
is paralleled by a functional restoration of this
frontoparietal network and part of its thalamocor-
tical connections.General
anesthesia
Recovery 
from
anesthesia
Vegetative
state
Recovery 
from vegetative
state
gical and disorders of consciousness. Adapted from
coma, vegetative state, and related disorders. Lancet
s systematically the most impaired region in the
connections within this ‘‘awareness network’’ and with
tivity in the brainstem and hypothalamus. Adapted from
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Author's personal copystimulation
In brain death, external stimulation does not lead to
any neural activation. In coma and VS patients, nox-
ious stimulation was shown to activate only low-
level primary cortices. Hierarchically higher-order
areas of the pain matrix, encompassing the anterior
cingulate cortex, failed to activate. Importantly, the
activated cortex was shown to be isolated and func-
tionally disconnected from the frontoparietal net-
work, considered critical for conscious perception.
Similarly, auditory stimulation in VS was found
to activate primary auditory cortices, but not
higher-order, multimodal areas, from which they
were disconnected (see Figure 4). In MCS, the
activation was more widespread and there was an
integrate functional connectivity between primary
auditory cortices and the posterior temporal/tem-
poroparietal and prefrontal associative areas.
Emotionally complex auditory stimuli, such as
stories told by a familiar voice, lead to more wide-
spread brain activation as compared to meaning-
less noise. Such context-dependent, higher-order
auditory processing in MCS, often not assessable
at the patient’s bedside, indicate that content does
matter when talking to these patients.
However, given the absence of a thorough under-
standing of the neural correlates of consciousness,
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 caution as proof or disproof of awareness in severely
brain-damaged patients. Recently, Adrian Owen
from Cambridge University in collaboration with
our laboratory proposed a more powerful approach
to identify ‘volition without action’ in noncommu-
nicative brain-damaged patients. Rather than using
passive external stimulation paradigms, patients
were being scanned while asked to perform a mental
imagery task. In one exceptional VS patient, task-
specific activation was observed, unequivocally
demonstrating consciousness in the absence of
behavioral signs of consciousness. Interestingly, the
patient subsequently recovered. Other studies also
showed that VS patients with atypical brain activa-
tion patterns, after functional neuroimaging, showed
clinical signs of recovery of consciousness – albeit
sometimes many months later.To date, there are no ‘standards of care’ for thera-
peutic management in DOC. Many studies have
been conducted under suboptimal or uncontrolled
settings, and for that reason, no evidence-based
recommendations can be made. MCS patients,
however, were shown to benefit more than VSe Minimally conscious
(n = 15)
onnected Connected
ry sensory areas in vegetative patients. In the minimally
to multimodal associative areas. Functional
he primary cortex is isolated and disconnected from the
the left inset). In the minimally conscious state, we
nal connectivity between low-level sensory areas and
emergence of conscious perception (blue areas in the
rology.
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after invasive treatment with DBS (see ‘Glossary’). is senior research associate at the Belgian Fonds
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Author's personal copyMore particularly, bilateral thalamic stimulation,
implanted over 6 years after acute trauma, has just
been shown to cognitively improve an MCS
patient, resulting in stimulation-related recovery
of functional object use and intelligible verbaliza-
tion. In the VS, despite some sparse evidence that
DBS may benefit these patients, its effectiveness to
this population is limited, mainly due to uncon-
trolled experimental settings. In any case, the tech-
nique awaits confirmation from studies on larger
cohorts of patients, but illustrates that DBS in
well-chosen patients, selected on the basis of func-
tional neuroimaging results, can offer a real thera-
peutic option, at least in chronic MCS patients.
Pharmaceutical interventions with amantadine,
mainly a dopaminergic agent, was shown to
increase metabolic activity in a chronic MCS
patient. Similarly, zolpidem, a nonbenzodiazepine
sedative drug, may improve arousal and cognition
in some brain-injured patients. However, placebo
controlled randomized trials are needed before we
making assertive conclusions about the effective-
ness of the drug in DOC patients.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Conclusion
 
 Currently, it is an exciting time for the study of
DOC. The gray zone transitions between them, in
the clinical spectrum following coma, are beginning
to be better defined by adding powerful imaging
methodology to bedside behavioral assessment.
However, it should be stressed that these exciting
developments are not yet a reality. The first obstacle
to be overcome relates to the engendered ethical
problems. An ethical framework that emphasizes
balancing clear protections for patients with DOC
alongwith access to research andmedical progress is
preferred. Moreover, most of the discussed areas of
advances in coma science regard single case studies.
Only large scale multicentric clinical trials will
enable these research tools to find their way to a
better evidence-based care for coma survivors.
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CHAPTER 22 
Different beliefs about pain perception
in the vegetative and minimally conscious
states: a European survey of medical and
paramedical professionals$
A. Demertzi1, C. Schnakers2, D. Ledoux3, C. Chatelle1, M.-A. Bruno1, 
A. Vanhaudenhuyse1, M. Boly1, G. Moonen4 and S. Laureys1,�
1Coma Science Group, Cyclotron Research Center and Neurology Department, University of Lie`ge, Lie`ge, Belgium
2Coma Science Group, Cyclotron Research Center and Neuropsychology Department,
University of Lie`ge, Lie`ge, Belgium
3Coma Science Group, Cyclotron Research Center and Intensive Care Department, University of Lie`ge, Lie`ge, Belgium
4Department of Neurology, CHU University Hospital, Lie`ge, Belgium
Abstract: Pain management in severely brain-damaged patients constitutes a clinical and ethical stake. At 
the bedside, assessing the presence of pain and suffering is challenging due to both patients’ physical 
condition and inherent limitations of clinical assessment. Neuroimaging studies support the existence of 
distinct cerebral responses to noxious stimulation in brain death, vegetative state, and minimally conscious 
state. We here provide results from a European survey on 2059 medical and paramedical professionals’ 
beliefs on possible pain perception in patients with disorders of consciousness. To the question ‘‘Do you 
think that patients in a vegetative state can feel pain?,’’ 68% of the interviewed paramedical caregivers 
(n ¼ 538) and 56% of medical doctors (n ¼ 1166) answered ‘‘yes’’ (no data on exact profession in 17% of 
total sample). Logistic regression analysis showed that paramedical professionals, religious caregivers, and 
older caregivers reported more often that vegetative patients may experience pain. Following professional 
background, religion was the highest predictor of caregivers’ opinion: 64% of religious (n ¼ 1009; 850 
Christians) versus 52% of nonreligious respondents (n ¼ 830) answered positively (missing data on 
religion in 11% of total sample). To the question ‘‘Do you think that patients in a minimally conscious 
state can feel pain?’’ nearly all interviewed caregivers answered ‘‘yes’’ (96% of the medical doctors and 
97% of the paramedical caregivers). Women and religious caregivers reported more often that minimally 
conscious patients may experience pain. These results are discussed in terms of existing deﬁnitions of pain 
and suffering, the remaining uncertainty on the clinical assessment of pain as a subjective ﬁrst-person 
experience and recent functional neuroimaging ﬁndings on nociceptive processing in disorders of 
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330 
consciousness. In our view, more research is needed to increase our understanding of residual sensation in 
vegetative and minimally conscious patients and to propose evidence-based medical guidelines for the 
management of possible pain perception and suffering in these vulnerable patient populations. 
Keywords: pain; brain injury; disorders of consciousness; survey; neuroimaging; ethics; end-of-life; 
vegetative state 
Introduction
The International Association for the Study of 
Pain (IASP, 1994) deﬁnes pain as ‘‘an unpleasant 
sensory and emotional experience associated with 
real or potential tissue damage.’’ As stressed by 
the IASP, the inability to communicate verbally 
does not negate the possibility that an individual is 
experiencing pain and is in need of appropriate 
pain-relieving treatment. Pain may also be 
reported in the absence of tissue damage or any 
likely pathophysiological cause; usually this hap­
pens for psychological reasons. Activity induced 
in the nociceptor and nociceptive pathways by a 
noxious stimulus is not pain, which is always a 
psychological state, even though pain most often 
has a proximate physical cause. Pain is a 
subjective ﬁrst-person experience with both phy­
sical and affective aspects (Kupers et al., 2005). It 
is a sensation in a part or parts of the body, which 
is, always unpleasant and, therefore, an emotional 
experience. Pain and suffering are not inter­
changeable constructs. However, the concept of 
suffering is surprisingly ill deﬁned and given 
relatively little attention in medicine. A person 
might experience signiﬁcant pain-related suffering 
from a relatively low-level noxious stimulation if 
she or he believes the implications are ominous, 
interminable, and beyond their control (Turk and 
Wilson, 2009). Cassell (1991) deﬁned suffering as 
‘‘the state of severe distress associated with events 
that threaten the intactness of the person.’’ 
Pain by itself does not seem to be sufﬁcient 
to cause suffering; rather it seems that the 
person’s interpretation of the symptoms is crucial. 
We will here consider (as expressed by the Multi-
Society Task Force on PVS, 1994) that pain and 
suffering refer to the unpleasant experiences that 
occur in response to stimulation of peripheral 
nociceptive receptors and their peripheral and 
central afferent pathways or that they may 
emanate endogenously from the depths of human 
self-perception. 
The management of pain and suffering in 
disorders of consciousness (DOCs) is challenging 
because, by deﬁnition, patients in a vegetative state 
(VS) or minimally conscious state (MCS) cannot 
verbally or nonverbally communicate their feelings 
or experiences (e.g., McQuillen, 1991; Bernat, 
2006; Laureys and Boly, 2007). The VS is a 
condition of preserved wakefulness contrasted with 
absent voluntary interaction with the environment 
(Jennett and Plum, 1972). The MCS was only 
recently deﬁned (Giacino et al., 2002) and  is  
characterized by discernible but ﬂuctuating signs 
of awareness without consistent communication 
with the environment. How can we know if 
patients in VS or in MCS feel pain or suffering? 
The perceptions of pain and suffering are con­
scious experiences: the wakeful unconsciousness of 
vegetative patients, by deﬁnition, precludes these 
experiences. Of course, there is a theoretical 
problem to evaluate the subjective experience of 
pain (and any other conscious perception or 
thought) in another person. At the patient’s 
bedside, we are limited to evaluate the behavioral 
responsiveness to pain. If patients never show any 
sign of voluntary movement in response to noxious 
stimuli it will be concluded they do not experience 
pain. They may, however, be aroused by noxious 
stimuli by opening their eyes if they are closed, 
quickening their breathing, increasing heart rate 
and blood pressure, and occasionally show gri­
mace-like or crying-like behavior. As all these 
abilities are also seen in infants with anencephaly 
(The Medical Task Force on Anencephaly, 1990; 
Payne and Taylor, 1997) they are considered to be 
of subcortical origin and not necessarily reﬂecting 
conscious perception of pain. We also know from 
studies in general anesthesia that motor or 
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autonomic responses are no reliable indicators of 
consciousness (e.g., Halliburton, 1998). 
DOC patients classically are bed- or chair-bound 
and may suffer from spasticity, contractures, 
fractures, pressure sores, soft tissue ischemia, 
peripheral nerve injuries, complex regional pain 
syndrome, central pain syndromes, and post­
surgical incisional pain (Schnakers and Zasler, 
2007). Since they cannot communicate their 
potential painful state, the existence of pain is 
clinically inferred from observing their sponta­
neous behavior or their motor responses to 
noxious stimulation. Stereotyped responses (i.e., 
slow generalized ﬂexion or extension of the upper 
and lower extremities), ﬂexion withdrawal (i.e., 
withdrawal of the limb away from the point of the 
stimulation), and localization responses (i.e., the 
nonstimulated limb locates and makes contact with 
the stimulated body part at the point of stimula­
tion) are linked to, respectively, brainstem, sub­
cortical, or cortical activity (e.g., Stevens and 
Nyquist, 2006). No response after intense noxious 
stimulation reveals a deep stage of coma; stereo­
typed responses are considered as ‘‘automatic’’ 
unconscious reﬂexes, whereas localization of nox­
ious stimulation is usually considered as indicative 
of conscious perception (Posner et al., 2007). 
Repeated clinical examinations by trained and 
experienced examiners are paramount for the 
behavioral assessment of pain. To date, several 
scales are used for assessing pain in noncommu­
nicative individuals with end-stage dementia, in 
newborns and in sedated intensive care patients, 
but no scale was developed to assess pain in 
DOCs (Schnakers et al., 2009b). We therefore 
recently proposed the Nociception Coma Scale as 
a standardized and validated tool measuring 
motor, verbal, and visual responses and facial 
expression in response to pain (Schnakers et al., 
2009a). However, the absence of a behavioral 
response cannot be taken as an absolute proof of 
the absence of consciousness (McQuillen, 1991; 
Bernat, 1992) and inferring pain and suffering 
solely by observing behavioral responses may be 
misleading, especially in patients with extreme 
motor impairment or with ﬂuctuating levels of 
vigilance (e.g., Majerus et al., 2005). Given these 
limitations of our bedside clinical assessment of 
pain in noncommunicative brain injured patients, 
inherent to the ﬁrst-person subjective dimension 
of pain, we will next review the usefulness of 
functional neuroimaging methods in the study 
of pain and suffering in VS and MCS. 
Neuroimaging of pain
Since brain responses are the ﬁnal common path­
way in behavioral responses to pain (unconscious 
and conscious), we believe that the application of 
functional imaging will allow us to study pain in an 
objective manner and to propose evidence-based 
guidelines on the use of analgesia and symptom 
management in DOCs (e.g., Borsook and Becerra, 
2006; Laureys et al., 2006; Laureys and Boly, 2008). 
In healthy controls, studies with positron emission 
tomography (PET) and functional magnetic reso­
nance imaging (fMRI) have revealed that pain 
cannot be localized in an isolated ‘‘pain centre’’ but 
rather encompasses a neural circuitry, the pain 
‘‘neuromatrix’’ (Jones et al., 1991; Peyron et al., 
2000). More speciﬁcally, two distinct cerebral 
networks have been identiﬁed to be involved in 
pain perception: (i) a lateral pain system or sensory 
network, encompassing lateral thalamic nuclei, 
primary and secondary somatosensory, as well as 
posterior parietal cortices; and (ii) a medial pain 
system or affective network, which involves the 
medial thalamus, anterior cingulate, and prefrontal 
cortices; the insular cortices playing an intermedi­
ate role (Hofbauer et al., 2001). For example, 
increased activity in the insular and anterior 
cingulate cortices prior to painful stimulation has 
been linearly associated with increased painfulness 
(Boly et al., 2007). Inversely, a hypnotic-induced 
absence of activation in these areas was associ­
ated with reduced subjective pain reports 
(Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2009). These and other 
studies are increasing our understanding of the 
neural correlates of the sensory and affective 
components of pain (e.g., see review in Kupers 
et al., 2005), but it should be noted that at present 
our understanding of suffering (i.e., distress asso­
ciated with events that threaten the intactness of 
the person; Cassell, 1991) is very limited and barely 
studied. 
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Recent neuroimaging studies have shown that 
DOCs are characterized by distinct cerebral 
patterns in response to sensory stimulation (e.g., 
Laureys et al., 2004; Laureys, 2005a; Giacino 
et al., 2006; Schiff, 2007; Owen, 2008). In 15 VS 
patients, our group found no evidence of noxious 
stimulation-related downstream activation 
beyond primary somatosensory cortex (Laureys 
et al., 2002). More importantly, functional con­
nectivity assessment showed that the observed 
cortical activation subsisted as an island, disso­
ciated from the pain matrix and the higher-order 
cortices that are currently thought to be necessary 
for conscious awareness (as shown by studies on 
conscious perception in healthy controls and on 
loss of consciousness in sleep and anesthesia; e.g., 
Baars et al., 2003; Boveroux et al., 2008; Laureys, 
2005b). However, another study reported addi­
tional activation of secondary somatosensory and 
insula cortices in VS patients (Kassubek et al., 
2003), implying the possibility of affective experi­
ences of pain. 
In striking contrast to what we observed in VS, 
MCS patients showed activation in not only 
midbrain, thalamus, and primary somatosensory 
cortex but also in secondary somatosensory, 
insular, posterior parietal, and anterior cingulate 
cortices (Fig. 1). The spatial extent of the 
activation in MCS patients was comparable to 
controls and no brain region showed less activa­
tion in MCS as compared to healthy individuals. 
A functional connectivity assessment of insular 
cortex demonstrated its preserved connections 
with a large set of associative areas encompassing 
posterior parietal, motor and supplementary 
motor, striatum, and dorsolateral prefrontal and 
temporal associative cortices as observed in 
controls (Boly et al., 2005). These neuroimaging 
data show large differences in brain activation 
between VS and MCS patients, despite a similar 
bedside behavioral evaluation. In the next section, 
we report differences in healthcare workers’ 
beliefs toward possible pain in DOCs. 
Attitudes toward pain perception
To our knowledge, no data exist on the thoughts 
of physicians and paramedical personnel toward 
pain perception in patients in VS as compared to 
MCS. We here present results from a question­
naire survey on attitudes on DOCs, which was 
distributed during lectures at medical and scien­
tiﬁc conferences and meetings (n ¼ 48) within 
Fig. 1. Cerebral activation to noxious stimulation in brain death (adapted from Laureys, 2005a with permission), the VS (Laureys 
et al., 2002 with permission), and the MCS (Boly et al., 2008 with permission) as compared to healthy volunteers. Note: (i) the 
absence of activation in brain death; (ii) the preserved but low-level subcortical and primary cortical activation in the VS (the primary 
cortical activation was disconnected from the rest of the brain), and (iii) the near-normal activation in the minimally conscious state. 
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Europe (data were collected by SL, AD, MAB, 
AV, MAB, and DL between June 2007 and April 
2009). Participation to the survey was voluntary 
and anonymous. Participants were ﬁrst introduced 
to the clinical deﬁnitions of DOCs and were then 
asked to provide ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers to 16 
questions related to consciousness, VS, MCS, and 
locked-in syndrome. We here report the replies 
obtained in European medical and paramedical 
professionals to the questions ‘‘Do you think that 
patients in a vegetative state can feel pain?’’ and 
‘‘Do you think that patients in a minimally 
conscious state can feel pain?’’ — the questions 
related to consciousness and the brain have been 
reported elsewhere (Demertzi et al., 2009). 
Recorded demographic data included age, gen­
der, nationality, profession, and religious beliefs. 
Nationalities were categorized into three geogra­
phical regions based on previous classiﬁcation 
criteria (Sprung et al., 2003): Northern (Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Russia, Sweden, United Kingdom), Central 
(Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Hungary, Luxembourg, Moldavia, Romania, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland), and 
Southern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
France, FYROM, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Turkey). Statistical analyses were performed using 
SPSS v.16.0 software packages. Multiple logistic 
regression (stepwise backward; i.e., independent 
variables are removed from the equation at 
consecutive steps; entry, p ¼ 0.05 and removal, 
p ¼ 0.1) was used to assess associations between 
obtained answers to the two questions and age, 
gender, profession, region, and religiosity. Chi-
square tests assessed differences within categorical 
variables. Results were considered signiﬁcant at 
po0.05 (two-sided). 
The study sample included 2059 medical and 
paramedical professionals coming from 32 Eur­
opean countries (see Table 1 for demographic 
data). As a whole, the sampled participants 
replied more often that MCS patients could feel 
pain than that VS patients could feel pain 
(w2(1) ¼ 7.9, po0.001). Participants’ opinions 
were much more consistent for pain perception 
in MCS (96% of the total sample considered MCS 
patients can feel pain), while responses were 
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of the study sample 
(n ¼ 2059) 
Age, mean7SD (range), years 43712 (18–83) 
Gender, no. (%) 
Women 993 (47%) 
Men 962 (48%) 
Missing 104 (5%) 
Respondents by geographical region, no. (%) 
Northern Europe 283 (13%) 
Central Europe 1011 (49%) 
Southern Europe 470 (24%) 
Missing 295 (14%) 
Profession, no. (%) 
Medical professionals 1196 (58%) 
Paramedical professionals 548 (27%) 
Missing 315 (15%) 
Religiosity, no. (%) 
Religious respondents 1033 (50%) 
Non-religious respondents 849 (41%) 
Missing 177 (9%) 
much more discordant for VS (59% considered 
vegetative patients could feel pain). Paramedical 
caregivers (n ¼ 538) replied more often that 
patients in a VS could feel pain than did medical 
doctors (n ¼ 1166) (68% versus 56%; w2(1) ¼
23.07, po0.001; Fig. 2a). Following professional 
background, religion was the highest predictor of 
caregivers’ opinion: 64% of religious (n ¼ 1009; 
94% Christians) versus 52% of nonreligious 
respondents (n ¼ 830) answered positively (see 
Fig. 3a). There was no effect of religion practice 
(317 were practicing and 664 were not practicing 
their religion) on attitudes toward pain perception 
in the VS (w2(1) ¼ 0.261, p ¼ 0.609). Logistic 
regression analysis showed that paramedical 
professionals, religious caregivers, and older 
caregivers reported more often that vegetative 
patients may experience pain (Table 2). To the 
question ‘‘Do you think that patients in a 
minimally conscious state can feel pain?’’ nearly 
all interviewed caregivers answered ‘‘yes’’ (96% 
of the medical doctors and 97% of the para­
medical caregivers; Fig. 2b). Logistic regression 
analysis showed that women and religious care­
givers reported more often that minimally con­
scious patients may experience pain. For attitudes 
on pain in MCS, the difference between medical 
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Fig. 2. Attitudes toward pain perception in the vegetative and the minimally conscious as expressed by European medical and 
paramedical professionals. 
Fig. 3. The effect of religion on attitudes toward pain perception in patients with DOCs. 
and paramedical professionals was not signiﬁcant 
(w2(1) ¼ 1.07, p ¼ 0.295). 
According to our survey, healthcare workers 
have different beliefs about possible pain percep­
tion in MCS as compared to VS patients. This 
ﬁnding implies that, despite the recent introduc­
tion of MCS (Giacino et al., 2002), the medical 
community regards MCS and VS as two separate 
clinical entities characterized by different pain 
perception proﬁles. The major differences in 
physicians’ beliefs about pain in VS as compared 
to MCS are supported by results from the 
functional neuroimaging data discussed above 
(Laureys et al., 2002; Boly et al., 2008). However, 
our survey showed that a high proportion of 
medical doctors (56%) and paramedical 
professionals (68%) considered that VS patients 
feel pain. The observed differences in viewpoint 
depending on professional background might be 
related to many factors including differences in 
proximity to the patient, time spent at the bedside, 
sensibilities, and education. Previous American 
studies reported a smaller minority of physicians 
holding these views. Payne et al. (1996) surveyed 
170 physicians from the American Academy of 
Neurology and 150 from the American Medical 
Directors Association and reported that only 30% 
believed VS patients experience pain (they 
found no differences between academic and 
non-academic physicians). Similarly, an unpub­
lished survey by the American Neurological 
Association reported that 31% of its members 
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Table 2. Logistic regression results on participants’ characteristics (age, gender, region, professional background, religiosity) and 
‘‘Yes’’ versus ‘‘No’’ answers to the questions on pain perception in VS and MCS 
Question predictors Odds ratioa 95% Conﬁdence interval p-value 
Do VS patients feel pain?b 
Age 1.01 1.00 1.02 0.05 
Women 1.25 0.99 1.58 0.06 
Northern Europe 1 
Central Europe 0.81 0.58 1.14 0.24 
Southern Europe 1.1 0.76 1.6 0.6 
Paramedical professionals 1.56 1.2 2 o0.001 
Religious respondents 1.37 1.1 1.7 0.004 
Do MCS patients feel pain?c 
Women 2.38 1.33 4.26 0.003 
Religious respondents 1.83 1.05 3.18 0.031 
aFor the continuous variables, the odds ratio equals the relative change in the odds ratio when the variable is increased by one unit.
bStepwise backward (Step 1).
cStepwise backward (Step 4).
were ‘‘uncertain’’ about whether VS patients 
could experience pain (31%) and suffering 
(26%) (Daroff, 1990). Tresch et al. (1991) found 
that only 22% of the relatives of patients in VS 
believed that their relative could experience pain 
and suffering. We can only speculate about 
possible explanations for the seemingly increased 
proportion of physicians considering that VS 
patients feel pain. It maybe that the recent 
publication of the diagnostic criteria for the MCS 
(Giacino et al., 2002) or the highly mediatized 
report of a VS patient ‘‘playing tennis in her 
head’’ (Owen et al., 2006) may have changed 
physicians opinions. In addition, cultural and 
religious differences could underlie the observed 
discrepancies between our European study and 
the older American surveys. 
Physician and caregivers’ opinions on patients’ 
pain perception was signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by 
religious beliefs. We have previously shown that 
personal philosophical convictions are of major 
inﬂuence on our views on the relationship 
between consciousness and the brain (Demertzi 
et al., 2009). Such personal beliefs have also been 
shown to weight on physicians’ clinical decisions 
(e.g., see Jennett, 2002). In line with our ﬁndings 
on the inﬂuence of religion and age on beliefs on 
pain perception in VS, other studies on, for 
example, end-of-life decisions in intensive care 
patients have shown that older and more experi­
enced doctors and doctors with religious convic­
tions (i.e., Christians) more often refused to opt 
for treatment limitations (Christakis and Asch, 
1995; Sprung et al., 2003). 
Considering our results on varying beliefs about 
pain perception in DOCs, physicians and health-
care workers’ views on pain and symptom 
management may also be affected. Since nearly 
half of the interviewed doctors express that VS 
patients do not feel pain, they could be expected 
to act accordingly by, for instance, not providing 
analgesic medication in these patients. These 
issues become even more important in cases when 
VS patients are agreed to be withdrawn from life-
supporting treatment, such as artiﬁcial nutrition 
and hydration. In these cases (e.g., Terri Schiavo) 
patients may be left without administration of 
opioids or other analgesic drugs during their dying 
process (Fins, 2006; Laureys, 2005a) on the 
grounds that they are deployed from experiencing 
suffering from hunger and thirst (Ahronheim and 
Gasner, 1990). In light of an incomplete picture 
of pain perception in VS patients, the existing 
risk for misdiagnosis (Andrews et al., 1996; 
Childs et al., 1993; Schnakers et al., 2009c), the 
inconclusive drug-related effects in DOCs 
(Demertzi et al., 2008) and the limitations in 
interpreting neuroimaging results (Poldrack, 2008; 
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Laureys and Boly, 2007), pain prophylaxis and 
treatment have been proposed for all patients 
suffering from DOCs (Schnakers and Zasler, 
2007; Schnakers et al., 2009b). 
The reported discrepancies in opinions about 
pain perception in VS patients may also be related 
to the absence of a unanimously accepted deﬁni­
tion of pain and suffering. The Multi-Society Task 
Force on PVS (1994) considered that grimace-like 
or crying-like behaviors are not likely to reﬂect 
conscious awareness of pain or suffering ‘‘unless 
they are consistent, sustained, and deﬁnitive in 
nature.’’ They differentiated between pain and 
nociception, in that the latter is merely a response 
to noxious stimulation that can be present without 
conscious awareness and stated that nociceptive 
stimulation may elicit unconscious postural 
responses, as well as other motor, autonomic, and 
endocrinologic reﬂexive responses without evok­
ing the experience of pain and suffering if the 
brain has lost its capacity for self-awareness 
(Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, 1994). The 
IASP (1994) deﬁnition of pain also refers to 
cognitive and affective properties of pain, stres­
sing the importance of subjectivity and environ­
mental inﬂuences in the experience of pain. Some 
authors support the view that pain can be 
regarded as any response to a noxious stimulus 
(e.g., see Anand and Craig, 1996) — but it is clear 
that not just any reaction to changes in the 
environment can be considered as conscious 
(e.g., brain-death-associated reﬂexes and automa­
tisms; Laureys, 2005a; Jain and DeGeorgia, 2005). 
Others have hypothesized, based on observations 
from children with hydrancephaly (Shewmon 
et al., 1999) newborns (Anand and Hickey, 
1987) and fetuses (Derbyshire, 2008), that mid­
brain structures may mediate consciousness, 
supporting the claim that cortical activity is not 
necessary for conscious perception (Merker, 
2007). 
In conclusion, our survey shows clear differ­
ences in medical professionals’ beliefs on pain 
perception in VS patients as compared to MCS 
patients. Nearly all respondents considered that 
MCS patients can feel pain and medical doctors 
and paramedical professionals largely concur. 
In contrast, the beliefs on pain perception in VS 
patients were much more divided. Paramedical 
professionals, religious participants, and older 
caregivers reported more often that VS patients 
may experience pain. In light of many controver­
sies around pain (and hence pain management) in 
VS and MCS patients, an increase in scientiﬁc 
evidence is essential to enhance our understand­
ing and to permit the development of adapted 
standards of care and improved clinical guidelines 
for these challenging and vulnerable noncommu­
nicative patients with DOCs. 
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Abstract
■ Evidence from functional neuroimaging studies on resting
state suggests that there are two distinct anticorrelated cortical
systems that mediate conscious awareness: an “extrinsic” system
that encompasses lateral fronto-parietal areas and has been linked
with processes of external input (external awareness), and an “in-
trinsic” system which encompasses mainly medial brain areas and
has been associated with internal processes (internal awareness).
The aim of our study was to explore the neural correlates of resting
state by providing behavioral and neuroimaging data from healthy
volunteers. With no a priori assumptions, we first determined be-
haviorally the relationship between external and internal awareness
in 31 subjects. We found a significant anticorrelation between ex-
ternal and internal awareness with a mean switching frequency of
0.05 Hz (range: 0.01–0.1 Hz). Interestingly, this frequency is simi-
lar to BOLD fMRI slow oscillations. We then evaluated 22 healthy
volunteers in an fMRI paradigm looking for brain areas where BOLD
activity correlated with “internal” and “external” scores. Activation of
precuneus/posterior cingulate, anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal cor-
tices, and parahippocampal areas (“intrinsic system”) was linearly
linked to intensity of internal awareness, whereas activation of lat-
eral fronto-parietal cortices (“extrinsic system”) was linearly asso-
ciated with intensity of external awareness. ■
INTRODUCTION
Consciousness has two components, arousal and aware-
ness (Zeman, 2001). Arousal refers to the levels of alert-
ness or vigilance and involves the activity of the brainstem
reticular formation, hypothalamus, and basal forebrain,
whereas awareness refers to the contents of consciousness
and is related to the activity of a widespread set of fronto-
parietal associative areas. Awareness and arousal are
linearly correlated, in the sense that the less aroused we
get the less aware of our surroundings and ourselves we
become (Laureys, 2005). Furthermore, awareness encom-
passes two components: awareness of the environment (ex-
ternal) and of self (internal) ( James, 1890). We here define
external awareness as the conscious perception of oneʼs
environment through the sensory modalities (e.g., visual,
auditory, somesthetic, or olfactory perception). Internal
awareness is defined as encompassing mental processes
that do not require the mediation of external stimuli or
sensory input (e.g., mind wandering, daydreaming, inner
speech, mental imagery; for a review, see Lieberman,
2007). Growing neuroscientific evidence supports that the
awareness brain network can be subdivided in two main
networks: a fronto-parietal network routinely exhibiting ac-
tivity increases during attention-demanding cognitive tasks,
and a “default network,” which has been involved in self-
related processes (Fox et al., 2005).
The aim of the present study is to better characterize the
subjective cognitive processes inherent to these “external”
and “internal” or “default” networks. We first performed
a behavioral experiment looking for the relationship be-
tween subjective external and internal awareness scores in
31 healthy volunteers. During an eyes-closed resting con-
dition, subjects were asked to score their external and in-
ternal awareness levels by button presses after hearing an
auditory prompt. Next, we performed an fMRI experiment
in 22 subjects looking for the neural correlates of subjective
external and internal awareness scores, correlating external
and internal awareness intensity to changes in BOLD neural
activity.
METHODS
Before each experiment, subjects received the following in-
struction: “During the next 15 minutes, we ask you to keep
your eyes closed and to avoid prolonged structured think-
ing, such as counting or singing. When you hear a beep,
please use the keyboard to communicate the intensity of
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‘external awareness’ and ‘internal awareness’ ongoing prior
to the beep. ‘External’ is here defined as the perception of
environmental sensory stimuli (e.g., auditory, visual, olfac-
tory, or somesthetic). ‘Internal’ here refers to all environ-
mental stimuli-independent thoughts (e.g., inner speech,
autobiographical memories, or wandering thoughts).”
Participants
Behavioral data were acquired from 31 healthy subjects
[21 women, mean (SD) age = 26 (3) years]. Imaging data
were acquired from 22 healthy subjects, different from the
subjects of the behavioral study [10 women, mean (SD)
age = 23 (2) years]; one participant was excluded from
further analysis due to movement artifacts. None of the par-
ticipants had any relevant medical history or used any cen-
trally acting medication. All participants gave their written
informed consent prior to inclusion in the study, which
was approved by the Ethics Committee of the University
of Liège.
Behavioral Experiment
Our experimental exploration consists of two parts. First,
a behavioral experiment was used in order to determine
the relationship between external and internal awareness.
External and internal awareness scores were recorded
using a keyboard. The experiment took place in a quiet
room where the subjects were seated comfortably in a
chair facing the keyboard. Subjects placed four fingers of
both hands (not the thumb) on the keyboard. For the first
behavioral study, for the half of the subjects, the left hand
corresponded to external awareness (for the other half, the
left hand corresponded to internal awareness; randomized
order). All subjects were instructed to start responding
by using button presses of their left hand on a 4-point scale
(0 = absent; 1 = mild; 2 = moderate; 3 = maximal). The
subjectsʼ task was to rate both external and internal aware-
ness (prompted by a 60-dB beep presented via head-
phones), as defined in the instruction mentioned above.
Only when the two scores were given could the next beep
be elicited. Interstimulus interval was randomized between
11.3 and 26.8 sec (mean = 19 ± 8 sec). A familiarization
session (11 responses) preceded the main experiment
(66 responses). Upon completion of the experiment, the
content of external and internal awareness was assessed
using a semi-structured interview.
Statistical Analysis
The relationship between ratings of external and internal
awareness was estimated by calculating Spearmanʼs r cor-
relation coefficients (two-tailed) for every subject and then
estimating themean correlation within the sample. In terms
of temporal dynamics, the frequency of switching between
internal and external awareness scores was estimated by
first subtracting the external from internal ratings in order
to get a unique curve for every subject. The frequency spec-
trum of these obtained scores was estimated using the
Lomb periodogram method for unevenly sampled aware-
ness scores (Press, Flannery, Teukolsky, & Vetterling, 1992;
Lomb, 1976).
Imaging Experiment
After having established the relationship between external
and internal awareness with the behavioral experiment
(using responses from both hands), the fMRI study was
performed. Here, in order to reduce the interference with
resting state brain function and to reduce motor responses
and artifacts to the maximum, behavioral responses were
obtained on a single scale reflecting intensity from “more
external” to “more internal” awareness. Hence, for the
fMRI experiment, awareness scores were recorded with
the left hand for all subjects (1 = strongly external, 2 =
moderately external, 3 = moderately internal, and 4 =
strongly internal). During the scanning period, subjects
were asked not to move, to keep their eyes closed, to relax,
and to avoid structured thinking (e.g., counting, singing).
Subjects were presented an auditory beep, on average,
every 20 sec (range = 3–30 sec). After each sound, sub-
jects were asked to evaluate and score by a button press
their state of awareness (“strongly external,” “moderately
external,” “moderately internal,” and “strongly internal”)
for the period preceding the beep. The fMRI study was
terminated when on-line analysis showed 15 responses in
each state of awareness.
Paired Student’s t tests assessed the differences in reac-
tion times between external and internal awareness states.
Similarly to the behavioral experiment, the frequency spec-
trum of awareness scores obtained during the fMRI data
was estimated using the Lomb method for unevenly sam-
pled data (Press et al., 1992; Lomb, 1976).
MRI Acquisition
fMRI time series were acquired on a 3-T head-only scanner
(Magnetom Allegra; Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen,
Germany) operated with the standard transmit–receive
quadrature head coil. Multislice T2*-weighted functional
images were acquired with a gradient-echo, echo-planar
imaging sequence using axial slice orientation and cover-
ing the whole brain (32 slices, FoV= 220× 220mm2, voxel
size = 3.4 × 3.4× 3mm3, 30% interslice gap, matrix size =
64 × 64 × 32, TR = 2460 msec, TE = 40 msec, FA = 90°).
The three initial volumes were discarded to avoid T1 satu-
ration effects. For anatomical reference, a high-resolution
T1-weighted image was acquired for each subject [T1-
weighted 3-D magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-echo
sequence, TR= 1960msec, TE= 4.43msec, inversion time
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(TI) = 1100 msec, FoV = 230 × 173 mm2, matrix size =
256 × 192 × 176, voxel size = 0.9 × 0.9 × 0.9 mm3].
MRI Analysis
Functional data were preprocessed and analyzed by means
of the Statistical Parametric Mapping software SPM5 (www.
fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm5/; Wellcome Depart-
ment of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK), using a two-
steps procedure (random effect analysis) that took into
account both within- and between-subject variability, as
was published elsewhere (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2009;
Boly et al., 2007). The first two fMRI volumes were removed
to allow for signal equilibration. Preprocessing steps in-
cluded realignment, spatial normalization, and smoothing
(Friston, Ashburner, et al., 1995; Friston, Holmes, et al.,
1995). The normalization was performed using a three-step
automated procedure (Friston, Ashburner, et al., 1995).
Firstly, the structural T1 scan of each subject was segmented
and normalization parameters were derived from this step
from the subject space to the MNI space. Secondly, the
functional data were coregistered to the structural scan.
Thirdly, the structural and functional scans were normal-
ized using the normalization parameters (voxel size: 2 ×
2 × 2 mm for functional and 1 × 1 × 1 mm for structural
images) derived from the first step. Functional data were
then smoothed using an 8-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel.
Each subjectʼs data were modeled individually with a gen-
eralized linear model (Friston, Holmes, et al., 1995) and
images of effects of interest were produced. These images
were then analyzed with a mixed effects model aimed at
showing stereotypical effect in the population from which
the subjects are drawn (Penny & Holmes, 2003). The mixed
effects model was implemented in two processing steps
accounting for fixed and random effects, respectively (Boly
et al., 2007; Friston, Stephan, Lund, Morcom, & Kiebel,
2005).
For each subject, a first-level intraindividual fixed effects
analysis aimed at modeling the data to partition the ob-
served neurophysiological responses into components of
interest, confounds, and errors by using a general linear
model (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2009; Boly et al., 2007;
Friston, Holmes, et al., 1995). We created a design matrix
using a block design (lasting 3–30 sec) for every individ-
ual subject incorporating answers of subjects (“strongly ex-
ternal,” “moderately external,” “moderately internal,” and
“strongly internal”) as regressors of interest, time of beeps,
reaction time, and movement parameters as supplemen-
tary regressors. Reaction times were calculated by subtract-
ing timeof answer from timeof beep.Movement parameters
were derived from realignment of the functional volumes
(translations in the x, y, and z directions and rotations
around the x, y, and z axes). Reaction times and movement
parameters were included as covariates of no interest in the
design matrix. A first analysis identified stimulus-induced
brain activation in periods rated as “strongly external,” “mod-
erately external,” “moderately internal,” and “strongly in-
ternal.” These periods were incorporated as regressors of
interest in the design matrix using a block design (lasting
3–30 sec). The movements were modeled in supplemen-
tary regressors. Movement parameters derived from realign-
ment of the functional volumes (translations in the x, y, and
z directions and rotations around the x, y, and z axes) were
included as covariates of no interest in the design matrix.
High-pass filtering using a cutoff period of 128 sec was im-
plemented in the design matrix to remove low-frequency
drift from the time series (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2009;
Boly et al., 2007; Friston et al., 2000). Serial correlations
were estimated using a restricted maximum likelihood
algorithm with an intrinsic autoregressive model during
parameter estimation. The effects of interest were tested
through linear contrasts, generating statistical parametric
maps (SPM{t}) in each subject. Contrasts imageswere com-
puted, identifying a linear positive correlation with external
thoughts (1.5 0.5 −0.5 −1.5 contrast of the general linear
model parameters) and a linear positive correlation with
internal thoughts (contrast −1.5 −0.5 0.5 1.5). The re-
sulting set of voxel values for each contrast constituted
a map of t statistic (SPM{t}) thresholded at p < .001
(Peigneux et al., 2006). We then smoothed the contrast
images (6mmFWHMGaussian kernel) in order to improve
statistic across subjects by increasing the overlap between
activated areas of each subject, and balancing the existing
intersubject anatomical variability (Mikl et al., 2008; White
et al., 2001). These smoothed contrast images were en-
tered in a second-level general linear model, acting as a
random effects analysis investigating consistent effects at
the population level. Statistical inferences were then ob-
tained after correction for multiple comparison at the voxel
level using false discovery rate p < .05 (whole head vol-
ume) for areas previously reported to be involved in in-
ternal awareness (i.e., mesiofrontal/anterior cingulate and
precuneal/posterior cingulate cortices; Boly et al., 2007;
Laureys, Perrin, & Bredart, 2007; Mason et al., 2007),
whereas a small volume (8 mm radius sphere) corrected
at p < .05 (Worsley, 1996) was calculated for areas pre-
viously reported to be involved in external awareness (i.e.,
bilateral posterior parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex; Boly et al., 2007; Haynes, Driver, & Rees, 2005; Dehaene
et al., 2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2001), and internal aware-
ness (i.e., mesiofrontal/anterior cingulate and precuneal/
posterior cingulate cortices; Boly et al., 2007; Laureys et al.,
2007; Mason et al., 2007).
RESULTS
Behavioral Experiment
We observed a significant negative correlation between ex-
ternal and internal awareness scores at the group level
(Spearmanʼs r = −.44, p < .02, two-tailed). At the sub-
ject level, 24 participants showed significant negative cor-
relations between internal and external awareness, one
showed a positive correlation, and six participants showed
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nonsignificant correlations. The switching between ex-
ternal and internal awareness was calculated to occur,
on average, with a mean frequency of 0.05 ± 0.03 Hz
(SD) frequency (range = 0.01–0.1 Hz) (Figure 1). External
thoughts reported were auditory in 65% of subjects,
somesthetic in 58%, olfactory in 13%, and visual in 1%;
internal thoughts were experiment-related in 52%, auto-
biographical in 42%, and inner speech in 13% of subjects.
The contents of external and internal awareness are sum-
marized in Table 1.
fMRI Experiment
Scanning was ended when on-line analysis showed at least
15 responses in each state of awareness [meaning 18 ±
2 minutes (X ± SD)]. The intensity of internal aware-
ness intensity correlated linearly with activity in posterior
cingulate/precuneal, anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal, and
bilateral parahippocampal cortices (whole-brain false dis-
covery rate <0.05; Figure 2, blue areas; Table 2A). The in-
tensity of external awareness scores correlated linearly with
activity in the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus and inferior pa-
rietal lobule (small-volume correction; Figure 2, red areas;
Table 2B). Additional contrasts looking for linear positive
correlations with external thoughts only (1.5 0.5 0 0), in-
dependently of a linear positive correlation with internal
thoughts only (0 0 0.5 1.5), showed similar results.
Reaction times obtained during the fMRI study did not
differ when subjects were in “extrinsic”modes as compared
to those obtained during “intrinsic” modes of conscious
activity [mean (SD) 1352 (1132) msec vs. 1427 (837) msec;
t(20) = 0.72, p = .48].The switching between external
and internal awareness was calculated (Laguna, Moody, &
Mark, 1998) to occur with a mean (SD) frequency of 0.03
(0.004) Hz (range = 0.03–0.4 Hz). The mean duration
of periods of external [mean (SD) = 28 (41) sec] versus
internal awareness [29 (66) sec] was not significantly differ-
ent ( p = .35).
Figure 1. The temporal dynamics of the two components of awareness in a representative subject illustrating that external and internal
awareness scores anticorrelate.
Table 1. The Contents of the Two Components of Awareness Based on Semi-structured Interview after Completion of the
Behavioral Experiment
Content Number of Subjects (%) Examples
External
Auditory 20 (65) Hearing sounds from outside the room
Somesthetic 18 (58) Felt itchiness, uncomfortable body posture
Olfactory 4 (13) Smelling perfume
Visual 2 (1) Visual perceptions through closed eyelids
Internal
Experiment-related 16 (52) Thoughts related to the length of the study
Autobiographical (future and past) 13 (42) Vacation, plans for weekend
Inner speech 4 (13) Instruction to oneself to stay vigilant
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DISCUSSION
Growing neuroscientific evidence supports the idea that
the brainʼs intrinsic or default activity is essential to its
global functioning (Raichle & Snyder, 2007). This notion
was initially stressed by positron emission tomography
studies, which revealed metabolic decreases in specific
brain areas (e.g., posterior cingulate/precuneal and ante-
rior cingulate/medial–prefrontal cortices) during perfor-
mance of specific cognitive tasks as compared to passive
resting state (Shulman et al., 1997). Raichle and Snyder
(2007) and Raichle et al. (2001) considered these “deactiva-
tions” as deviations from an ongoing metabolic/physiologic
baseline which characterizes the functionality not only of
the aforementioned areas, the so-called default network,
but also of most areas of the brain. Searching for joined
Figure 2. Brain regions showing a correlation between BOLD signal and the intensity of internal and external awareness scores in 22 healthy
volunteers. Stronger internal awareness scores correlate with increased activity in anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal, posterior cingulate/precuneal,
and parahippocampal cortices (areas in blue). External awareness scores correlate with increased activity in bilateral inferior parietal lobule and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (in red).
Table 2. Peak Voxels of Brain Areas Showing a Positive Correlation with Intensity of External and Internal Awareness
Region x (mm) y (mm) z (mm) Z p
(A) Internal
PCC/precuneus −10 −42 8 4.68 <.0001a
ACC/mesiofrontal −12 20 38 5.01 <.0001a
Left parahippocampal −24 −18 −20 3.87 <.0001a
Right parahippocampal 38 −30 −10 4.76 <.0001a
(B) External
R Inferior frontal gyrus 38 44 4 2.66 .004b
L Inferior frontal gyrus −36 32 16 2.25 ns (.012)
R Inferior parietal 60 −42 32 2.86 .002b
L Inferior parietal −58 −30 22 2.49 ns (.006)
R = right; L = left; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; ns = nonsignificant.
aFalse discovery rate corrected.
bSmall-volume corrected (8 mm radius sphere centered on previously published coordinates).
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activations in this “default state,” two meta-analyses of
positron emission tomography activation protocols with
healthy subjects revealed that a network of frontal and
parietal heteromodal associative cortices was more ac-
tive at rest as compared to other cognitive tasks (Mazoyer
et al., 2001; Shulman et al., 1997). Such evidence led to
the assumption that the brain at rest is not silent. On the
contrary, the brainʼs activity at rest is characterized by spon-
taneous low-frequency fluctuations, in the range of 0.01–
0.1 Hz, which can be detected in the BOLD signal of the
fMRI measurement in “resting” conditions. These spon-
taneous BOLD fluctuations cannot be attributed to pe-
ripheral noise (e.g., cardiac and respiratory fluctuations,
motion of the subject) but show synchronized activity with
other functionally related brain regions (Fox & Raichle,
2007; Cordes et al., 2000). In particular, it is suggested that
the brainʼs baseline activity is organized in two widespread
brain networks: “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” (Boly et al., 2007;
Fox & Raichle, 2007; Golland et al., 2007; Tian et al., 2007;
Fox et al., 2005; Fransson, 2005; Cordes et al., 2000). The
extrinsic system encompasses lateral fronto-parietal areas,
resembling the brain activations during goal-directed
behavior, and it has been linked to cognitive processes of
somatosensory (Boly et al., 2007; Bornhovd et al., 2002;
Buchel et al., 2002), visual (Fuhrmann, Hein, Tsai, Naumer,
& Knight, 2008; Rees, 2007), and auditive (Fuhrmann et al.,
2008) external sensory input. The intrinsic system encom-
passes mainly medial brain areas, is similar to the activity of
the default network, and has been associated with cogni-
tive processes such as mind wandering or daydreaming
(Mason et al., 2007; McKiernan, DʼAngelo, Kaufman, &
Binder, 2006), mental imagery (Knauff, Fangmeier, Ruff,
& Johnson-Laird, 2003), inner speech and self-oriented
thoughts (Goldberg, Harel, & Malach, 2006; Lou et al.,
2004).
The present study aimed to bridge the gap between our
knowledge on default resting state neural networks as as-
sessed by fMRI and their subjective cognitive counterparts.
In our behavioral experiment, we showed a negative cor-
relation between external and internal awareness scores
in nearly 80% of the studied subjects (24 out of 31 par-
ticipants). It should be noted that despite the significant
anticorrelation between external and internal modes of
conscious processing at the group level, there seems to
exist a substantial variability at the individual subject level.
Future studies could correlate this variability of conscious
content with personality traits (e.g., from normal controls
to “schizoid” subjects with dissociative contents of con-
sciousness). We also showed a periodic shift from external
to internal awareness occurring, on average, every 20 sec
(0.05Hz), corresponding to the spontaneous low-frequency
fluctuations (range of 0.01–0.1 Hz) previously reported
(Fox & Raichle, 2007; Cordes et al., 2000). Engagement to
demanding self-oriented tasks makes us less receptive
to environmental stimuli ( James, 1890) and this switch
in attention can happen without conscious recognition
(Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). In the absence of conscious
control, human minds like to wander during both resting
periods and heavily loaded cognitive tasks (Giambra, 1995;
Antrobus, 1968). Such stimulus-independent thoughts are
reported significantly more often during rest than when
performing externally oriented tasks (e.g., tone detection
task; Filler & Giambra, 1973) and during tasks that are over-
learned as compared to novel ones (Goldberg et al., 2006).
This unconstrained mental activity was shown to impair
signal detection (Giambra, 1995; Singer, 1993), reading
(Antrobus, 1968), detailed encoding (Teasdale et al., 1995),
and sustained attention tasks (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). In
this sense, psychological research suggests that deprivation
of external sensory input may result in an increase of inter-
nally generated activity (Smallwood,McSpadden, & Schooler,
2008; Schooler, Reichle, & Halpern, 2005; Schooler, 2002;
Giambra, 1995). However, clinical cases such as Charles–
Bonnet syndrome (i.e., visually impaired patients that experi-
ence visual illusions) might counterbalance these findings
(Kester, 2009).
Our fMRI study showed a link between the intrinsic
and extrinsic brain networks and spontaneous menta-
tion. In the fMRI experiment, subjectsʼ reports of being
“strongly externally aware” correlated with activation in
the “extrinsic system” (i.e., lateral fronto-parietal areas)
and reports of being “strongly internally aware” correlated
with activation in the “intrinsic system” (i.e., medial brain
areas). Our data are in line with previous studies showing
the competing character of the two systems in the sense
that these two systems can disturb or even interrupt one
another (Tian et al., 2007; Weissman, Roberts, Visscher, &
Woldorff, 2006), illustrated also by studies on motor per-
formance (Fox, Snyder, Vincent, & Raichle, 2007), percep-
tual discrimination (Sapir, dʼAvossa, McAvoy, Shulman, &
Corbetta, 2005), attention lapses (Weissman et al., 2006),
and somatosensory perception of stimuli close to sensory
threshold (Boly et al., 2007). These studies have shown
that high prestimulus baseline activity in the intrinsic sys-
tem is associated with a tendency to ignore environmental
stimuli, whereas perceived external stimuli were associated
with an increased activity in the extrinsic system. The pre-
dictive value of the prestimulus baseline activity to behav-
ior has been also shown by studies with EEG (Sapir et al.,
2005) and magnetoencephalography (Linkenkaer-Hansen,
Nikulin, Palva, Ilmoniemi, & Palva, 2004). It should be noted
that, to date, no definite answer can be given as to whether
these two systems constitute the causal correlates of in-
ternal and external awareness. The sufficiency and neces-
sity of these two components to consciousness remains
to be further explored by, for example, transcranial mag-
netic stimulation lesional protocols or other more invasive
methodologies.
Although it has been suggested that the low-frequency
fluctuations observed at resting state reflect nothing but
vascular processes (Lamme, 2003), others support that
they refer to conscious mentation (Goldberg et al., 2006).
According to our results, collected via a semi-structured inter-
view, the content of spontaneous thought was preferentially
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autobiographical and referred to mental images, remi-
niscent of past experiences and plan making, which
correspond to accumulating data that the default network is
mediating self-related processes (Golland, Golland, Bentin,
& Malach, 2008; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Li, Yan,
Bergquist, & Sinha, 2007; Mitchell et al., 2007; Hester, Foxe,
Molholm, Shpaner, & Garavan, 2005; Naghavi & Nyberg,
2005; Sapir et al., 2005; Otten & Rugg, 2001). Several other
explanations have been introduced for the functional
role of the resting state, such that it reflects spontaneous
thoughts (Buckner & Carroll, 2007) or that it accounts
for the monitoring of the external world (for a review,
see Hahn, Ross, & Stein, 2007). Nevertheless, the per-
vasiveness of the default network after general anesthe-
sia in monkeys (Vincent et al., 2007), in vegetative state
(only cortico-cortical connectivity), and its absence in brain
death (Boly et al., 2009), reflects a fundamental in-
trinsic property of the brainʼs organization that seems to
transcend the levels of consciousness (Boly et al., 2009;
Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). Future stud-
ies could apply the presented methodology to modified
states of consciousness such as hypnosis. We hypothesize
that in hypnotic resting state, internal and external modes
would be dissociated with a predominance of intrinsic net-
work activity.
The critical role of the extrinsic and intrinsic systems
to consciousness is well illustrated in cases of impaired
conscious states. For example, in the vegetative state (a
state of arousal without awareness, Laureys, 2005), system-
atic metabolic dysfunctions have been identified in a wide
fronto-parietal network encompassing the bilateral lateral
and frontal regions, the bilateral parieto-temporal and pos-
terior parietal areas, posterior cingulate cortex, and the
precuneus (Laureys, 2005; Laureys et al., 1999). In addi-
tion, disconnections between latero-frontal and midline
posterior areas and between thalamic nuclei and lateral
and medial frontal cortices have been also found in vegeta-
tive patients (Laureys et al., 1999, 2000). The lack of exter-
nal and internal awareness is observed not only in these
patients but also in slow-wave sleep (Maquet et al., 2005)
and in general anesthesia (Kaisti et al., 2003), whereas
they resume their functionality during REM sleep (Maquet
et al., 2005), supporting our findings.
In conclusion, our data shed light on the neural cor-
relates of awarenessʼ two major dimensions: external
or environmental awareness relating to activity in lateral
fronto-parietal associative networks and internal aware-
ness relating to midline “default” networks. The study of
the functional integrity of these two interdependent brain
networks may offer clinical interest in our search for neu-
ral markers of awareness in heath and disease (e.g., coma
and related “vegetative” states).
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309DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53839-0.00020-XCHAPTER 20Hypnotic modulation of resting state fMRI default
mode and extrinsic network connectivityA. Demertzi{, A. Soddu{, M.-E. Faymonville{, M. A. Bahri}, O. Gosseries{,
A. Vanhaudenhuyse{, C. Phillips},}, P. Maquet}, Q. Noirhomme{,
A. Luxen} and S. Laureys{,*{ Coma Science Group, Cyclotron Research Centre and Neurology Department, University and University Hospital of
Liège, Liège, Belgium
{ Pain Clinic, University Hospital of Liège, Liège, Belgium
} Cyclotron Research Centre, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
} Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of Liège, Liège, BelgiumAbstract: Resting state fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) acquisitions are characterized by
low-frequency spontaneous activity in a default mode network (encompassing medial brain areas and
linked to self-related processes) and an anticorrelated “extrinsic” system (encompassing lateral
frontoparietal areas and modulated via external sensory stimulation). In order to better determine the
functional contribution of these networks to conscious awareness, we here sought to transiently modulate
their relationship by means of hypnosis. We used independent component analysis (ICA) on resting state
fMRI acquisitions during normal wakefulness, under hypnotic state, and during a control condition of
autobiographical mental imagery. As compared to mental imagery, hypnosis-induced modulation of resting
state fMRI networks resulted in a reduced “extrinsic” lateral frontoparietal cortical connectivity, possibly
reflecting a decreased sensory awareness. The default mode network showed an increased connectivity in
bilateral angular and middle frontal gyri, whereas its posterior midline and parahippocampal structures
decreased their connectivity during hypnosis, supposedly related to an altered “self” awareness and
posthypnotic amnesia. In our view, fMRI resting state studies of physiological (e.g., sleep or hypnosis),
pharmacological (e.g., sedation or anesthesia), and pathological modulation (e.g., coma or related states) of
“intrinsic” default mode and anticorrelated “extrinsic” sensory networks, and their interaction with other
cerebral networks, will further improve our understanding of the neural correlates of subjective awareness.
Keywords: consciousness; hypnotic state; awareness; fMRI; default mode network; functional
connectivity.
310Introduction
Spontaneous brain activity has recently received
increasing interest in the neuroimaging commu-
nity. However, the value of functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) resting-state studies
to a better understanding of brain–behavior
relationships has been challenged (e.g., Boly
et al., 2008). During task-negative conditions, sev-
eral cerebral networks, characterized by low-fre-
quency dynamic fluctuations, appear to play a
potential functional role in sensory and higher
cognitive functioning (Damoiseaux et al., 2006).
Correlation analysis among these distinct
networks has identified functional correlations
between distinct somatosensory systems which in
turn appear to anticorrelate with an “intrinsic sys-
tem” or default network (Fox et al., 2005; Tian
et al., 2007). More particularly, the “extrinsic”
system, encompassing lateral frontoparietal areas,
has been linked to processes of externally derived
input via somatosensory (Boly et al., 2007;
Bornhovd et al., 2002; Buchel et al., 2002), visual
and auditory modalities (Fuhrmann et al., 2008;
Rees, 2007). The default mode network
encompasses midline brain areas and it has been
associated with internally oriented cognitive pro-
cesses, such as mind wandering or daydreaming
(Mason et al., 2007; McKiernan et al., 2006), men-
tal imagery (Knauff et al., 2003; Wang et al.,
2008), inner speech (Morin and Michaud, 2007),
and self-oriented thoughts (Goldberg et al.,
2006; Lou et al., 2004). The functional significance
of this anticorrelated pattern is not completely
understood but there seems to be a link between
cerebral function and its conscious behavioral
counterpart under healthy situations
(Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011) and during experi-
mentally manipulated states of unconsciousness,
such as anesthesia (Boveroux et al., 2010).
In order to better determine the functional con-
tribution of these anticorrelated networks to con-
sciousness, we sought to transiently modulate
their relationship by means of hypnosis. Hypnosis
is “a procedure during which a healthprofessional or researcher suggests that a patient
or subject experiences changes in sensations,
perceptions, thoughts, or behavior” (The Execu-
tive Committee of the American Psychological
Association—Division of Psychological Hypnosis,
1994) by inducing an altered state of conscious-
ness with a distinct cerebral pattern (Maquet
et al., 1999; Rainville et al., 2002). At the phe-
nomenological level, hypnosis is characterized by
increased degrees of private processes, such as
absorption (i.e., the capacity to remain implicated
in a mental state), dissociation (i.e., the mental
separation from the environment), disorientation
in time, space and person, diminished tendency
to judge and censor, whereas it reduces spontane-
ous thoughts and gives the feeling of one's
own response as automatic or extravolitional
(Oakley and Halligan, 2009; Rainville and
Price, 2003). The experimental manipulation of
these basic dimensions of experience is thought
to provide leverage to investigate not only the
contents of consciousness but also the neural
correlates of its background states (Chalmers,
2000).
We here used independent component analysis
(ICA) on resting state fMRI acquisitions during
normal wakefulness, under hypnotic state and
during a control condition of autobiographical
mental imagery. The ICA approach to study func-
tional connectivity is a user-independent way to
analyze complex signals as it does not require
predefined regions of interest or the identification
of a seed voxel location and is powerful to sepa-
rate the neuronal from the global signal and other
noise-related signal variations (Beckmann et al.,
2005). Hence, the anticorrelations of the resting
state cannot be explained as an artifact of the
global signal regression, which underlies their
biological basis (Fox et al., 2009).
We here hypothesized that, compared to auto-
biographical mental imagery, subjects under hyp-
notic state would report a phenomenology of an
altered state of consciousness, showing increased
“self” absorption, dissociated from decreased
external sensory awareness. Recording of “resting
311state” fMRI networks under hypnosis was pre-
dicted to show an altered functional connectivity
of both the default mode network and the anti-
correlated “extrinsic” system.Methods
Subjects and procedure
Twelve healthy subjects (4 women, 8 men; mean
age 21 years, SD 3) with no previous neurologi-
cal or psychiatric history participated in the study
after giving written informed consent in accor-
dance with the Ethics Committee of the Faculty
of Medicine of the University of Liège. For their
inclusion in the study, subjects needed to report
an absorption and dissociation level >6/10 during
a familiarization session with hypnosis which pre-
ceded the main experiment. During this session,
detailed information about past pleasant life
experiences, which the subject wanted to use dur-
ing hypnotic induction, was obtained through a
semi-structured interview as described elsewhere
(Faymonville et al., 2003).
The hypnotic state was induced in the same
way as in our patients during surgery
(Faymonville et al., 1995, 1997, 1999) and as in
our previous functional neuroimaging studies
with healthy volunteers (Faymonville et al.,
2003; Maquet et al., 1999; Vanhaudenhuyse
et al., 2009a). The hypnotic instruction
encompassed a 3-min induction procedure involv-
ing progressive eye fixation and muscle relaxa-
tion. Subjects were then invited to reexperience
their pleasant autobiographical memories. As in
clinical conditions, permissive and indirect
suggestions were used to develop and deepen
the hypnotic state. Subjects were continuously
given cues for maintaining a hypnotic state. The
exact words and details of the induction tech-
nique and specific suggestions and details during
the course of the induction varied depending
upon the experimenter's (M.E.F.) observation of
subject behavior, and on her judgment ofsubjects’ needs. During the experimental session,
the experimenter remained silent.Data acquisition and analysis
Three scanning sessions were performed: during
normal wakefulness, under hypnotic state, and
during a controlled condition of mental imagery
of autobiographical memories (i.e., the same
memories used in hypnotic session but here with-
out the hypnotic induction). In order to exclude
carry-over effects, the order of the sessions was
randomized across subjects. In all subjects, resting
state fMRI data were acquired on a 3T magnetic
resonance scanner (Magnetom Allegra; Siemens
Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany). Three
hundred and fifty multislice T2*-weighted fMRI
images were obtained with a gradient echoplanar
sequence using axial slice orientation (32 slices,
FoV¼220220 mm2, voxel size¼3.4 3.4
3 mm3, 30% interslice gap, matrix size¼ 64 
64 32, TR¼2460 ms, TE¼40 ms, FA¼90).
Headmovements wereminimized using customized
cushions. A T1 magnetization prepared rapid gradi-
ent echo sequencewas also acquired in the same ses-
sion for coregistration of subject's anatomy with
functional data. The most comfortable supine posi-
tion attainable was sought to avoid painful stimula-
tion related to position. During data acquisition,
subjects wore earplugs and headphones through
which they were receiving the instructions for the
hypnotic induction. After each session, subjects
were asked to rate on a 0 (not at all) to 10 (fully)
scale their subjective experiences concerning the
level of arousal, absorption, dissociation, and exter-
nal thoughts.
fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed
with “Brain Voyager” software package (Brain
Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands).
Preprocessing of functional scans included 3D
motion correction, linear trend removal, slice scan
time correction and filtering out low frequencies
of up to 0.005 Hz. The data were spatially
smoothed with a Gaussian filter of full width at
312half maximum value of 6 mm. The first three
fMRI volumes were discarded to allow for signal
equilibration. In two subjects, 197 scans were kept
in the analysis due to increased motion across
time (i.e., >6 mm). The functional images from
each participant were each aligned to the par-
ticipant's own anatomical scan and warped into
the standard anatomical space of Talairach and
Tournoux, 1988 by individually defining bounding
boxes for the entire brain, using anterior com-
misure (AC) and posterior commisure (PC) as
anchor points for the transformation. ICA, as
implemented in “Brain Voyager” (Formisano
et al., 2004), was performed using 30 components
(Ylipaavalniemi and Vigario, 2008). Then self-
organizing ICA (Esposito et al., 2005) permitted a
spatial similarity test on single subjects’ indepen-
dent components and an averaged template
obtained in seven independent controls (mean
age ¼ 48 years, SD  13, range: 25–65, 3 females;
300 functional scans acquired on a 3TMR scanner,
Trio Tim, Siemens, Germany; gradient echo-
planar sequence with axial slice orientation: 32
slices; voxel size: 3.0 3.0 3.75 mm3; matrix size:
64 64 32; repetition time: 2,000ms, echo time¼
30 ms, flip angle: 78; field of view: 192 mm).
At a first-level analysis, the component of inter-
est (z-map) was transformed into a statistical
parametric map (SPM) for each individual sub-
ject: the time courses of all components but that
of interest (i.e., which contained the z values of
the two systems) were used to regress out the ini-
tial BOLD signal; the saved residuals represented
the BOLD activity of the default mode and the
“extrinsic” system. Then by using the time course
of the component of interest as a predictor of this
residual BOLD activity, the t-maps were
obtained. At a second-level analysis, the beta
values extracted from the previous step were
entered in repeated-measures multiple subjects
general linear models (random effects) with three
levels (normal wakefulness, hypnotic state, men-
tal imagery). One-sample ANOVAs (FDR
corrected p<0.05) were ordered to calculate the
mean effects of each level. The contrast betweenhypnotic state versus mental imagery was
ordered. Statistical parametric maps resulting
from the voxel wise analysis were considered sig-
nificant for statistical values that survived a clus-
ter-based correction for multiple comparisons as
implemented in Brain Voyager (Goebel et al.,
2006) using the “cluster-level statistical threshold
estimator” plug-in. This approach to correction
for multiple comparisons is based on a 3D exten-
sion of the randomization procedure described by
Forman and colleagues (Forman et al., 1995).
First, voxel-level threshold was set at t¼2.2
(p¼0.05, uncorrected). Thresholded maps were
then submitted to a region of interest (ROI)
brain-based correction criterion (masks for the
default mode and “extrinsic” systems) that was
based on the estimate of the map's spatial
smoothness and on an iterative procedure (Monte
Carlo simulation) for estimating cluster-level
false-positive rates. After 1000 iterations, the min-
imum cluster size threshold that yielded a cluster-
level false positive rate of 5% was applied to the
statistical maps. After each session, subjective
reports were collected as regards the level of
arousal, absorption, dissociation and intensity of
external thoughts on a 10-point scale (0: not at
all, 10: totally). Wilcoxon's signed-rank tests
(SPSS v. 16) were preformed to test the
differences in scores within each variable across
the three conditions per subject. Results were
considered significant at a p<0.05 (two-tailed).Results
Participants reported similar arousal scores dur-
ing normal wakefulness (6.42.0 mean and SD;
range 2–10), mental imagery 6.11.8 (range
3–8), and hypnotic state (5.32.3). Dissociation
and absorption scores were higher in hypnotic
state as compared to mental imagery and normal
wakefulness. Self-reported intensity scores of
external thoughts were lower in hypnotic state,
as compared to mental imagery and normal wake-
fulness (Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1. Absorption, dissociation, and external awareness scores in normal wakefulness (white), autobiographical mental imagery
(light gray), and hypnotic state (dark gray) (mean values with 95% confidence intervals; ** p<0.01; *p<0.05).
313In normal wakefulness, the identified default
mode network encompassed posterior cingulate
and adjacent precuneal cortices, anterior cingu-
late and adjacent medial prefrontal cortices, bilat-
eral angular, middle and inferior temporal, and
parahippocampal gyri. The anticorrelated “extrin-
sic” system encompassed bilateral inferior frontal
and supramarginal gyri (Table 1). In autobio-
graphical mental imagery, the identified default
mode and anticorrelated “extrinsic” networks
encompassed similar areas as described above
albeit less widespread (Table 2). In hypnotic
state, a further decrease in default mode and
“extrinsic” network connectivity extent and inten-
sity was observed, as illustrated graphically in
Fig. 2.
The comparison between hypnosis and mental
imagery showed an increased connectivity in part
of the default network encompassing the middle
frontal and bilateral angular gyri whereas the
restrosplenial/posterior cingulate and bilateral
parahippocampal areas showed a decreased con-
nectivity. The “extrinsic” network did not show
any increased connectivity but we identified adecreased connectivity in the right supramarginal
and left superior temporal areas in hypnosis as
compared to mental imagery (Table 3; Fig. 3).Discussion
Resting state fMRI acquisitions are characterized
by low-frequency spontaneous activity in a
default mode network (i.e., relatively decoupled
from external input, encompassing medial brain
areas and linked to self-related processes;
Gusnard and Raichle, 2001) and an anticorrelated
“extrinsic” or externally oriented network (i.e.,
modulated via external sensory stimulation
encompassing lateral parietal areas; Damoiseaux
et al., 2006; Golland et al., 2007; Raichle et al.,
2001). We here aimed to determine how these
two networks are influenced by a transient
altered conscious state, such as hypnosis. In nor-
mal wakefulness, we first identified both networks
in accordance to prior studies (Damoiseaux et al.,
2006; Fox et al., 2005; Golland et al., 2007; Tian
et al., 2007). The relationship between these two
Table 1. Peak voxels of the default mode network and anticorrelated extrinsic system identified in normal wakefulness
Common names (Brodmann area)
Cluster size
(number of voxels) x y z t p
Default mode network
Posterior cingulate/precuneus (23, 31, 7) 68,050 1 59 24 25.19 <0.001
Medial prefrontal cortex/anterior cingulate (24, 32, 10) 47,407 1 40 12 14.89 <0.001
R Angular gyrus (39) 7287 47 59 18 11.31 <0.001
L Angular gyrus (39) 5609 43 59 21 8.20 <0.001
R Middle temporal gyrus (21) 3827 62 8 15 6.91 <0.001
L Middle temporal gyrus (21) 4594 55 17 12 9.66 <0.001
R Inferior temporal gyrus (38) 521 41 22 24 5.49 <0.001
L Inferior temporal gyrus (38) 255 43 22 21 5.20 <0.001
L Postcentral gyrus (2) 313 13 29 69 5.97 <0.001
Medial occipitotemporal gyrus (17) 278 7 89 6 4.30 0.001
Thalamus 421 2 17 15 4.91 <0.001
Brainstem 510 1 23 24 7.52 <0.001
Cerebellar tonsils 252 5 53 33 4.95 <0.001
Extrinsic system
R Inferior frontal gyrus (45) 10,403 41 1 15 7.32 <0.001
R Inferior frontal gyrus (47) 376 47 31 0 5.10 <0.001
L Inferior frontal gyrus (47) 12,612 49 19 3 7.98 <0.001
R Supermarginal gyrus (40) 3971 53 32 24 7.02 <0.001
L Supermarginal gyrus (40) 2923 67 29 15 5.79 <0.001
L Superior frontal gyrus (9) 1416 40 37 27 5.58 <0.001
L Medial frontal gyrus (32) 4130 4 7 45 7.67 <0.001
L Precentral gyrus (6) 615 46 2 45 5.05 <0.001
L Inferior occipital gyrus (19) 469 43 53 0 5.21 <0.001
Anterior cingulate gyrus (24) 437 17 20 42 5.44 <0.001
Stereotaxic coordinates are in normalized Talairach space, p values are FDR corrected for multiple comparisons at the whole brain level.
314networks at conscious resting state has been pre-
viously characterized as competing, where one
system can disturb or even interrupt the other
(Boly et al., 2008; Fox et al., 2005; Golland
et al., 2007; Tian et al., 2007) with a consequence
on the way we perceive the external world. For
example, this ongoing resting activity has been
shown to mediate sensory awareness in the sense
that increased activity in the “extrinsic”
frontoparietal network seemed to facilitate the
conscious perception of low-intensity somatosen-
sory stimuli, whereas unperceived intensity-
matched stimuli were preceded by increased
activity in the default mode network (Boly et al.,
2007). Previous studies have also shown that
increasing attentional demands in cognitive taskslead to decreased activity in the default mode net-
work (McKiernan et al., 2003) and lapses in atten-
tion were shown to correlate with reduced
prestimulus activity in the anterior cingulate and
right prefrontal regions, areas involved in
controlling attention (Weissman et al., 2006).
We recently showed that this opposed functional-
ity of the default mode and anticorrelated “extrin-
sic” system has a cognitive behavioral
counterpart. Explicit subjective reports for
increased intensity of “internal” awareness (i.e.,
self-related stimulus-independent processes) were
related to increased connectivity in the default
network, whereas increased “external” awareness
scores (i.e., perception of the environment) was
associated with increased connectivity in the
Table 2. Peak voxels of the default mode network and anticorrelated extrinsic system identified in mental imagery (A) and
hypnotic state (B)
Common names
(Brodmann area)
Cluster size
(number of voxels) x y z t p
A. Mental imagery
Default mode network
Posterior cingulate/precuneus (23,
30, 7)
31,502 7 53 12 19.79 <0.001
Medial prefrontal cortex/anterior
cingulate (32)
11,372 2 49 3 14.44 <0.001
R Angular gyrus (39) 1908 38 62 21 6.08 <0.001
L Angular gyrus (39) 2068 40 62 27 6.8 <0.001
R Parahippocampal gyrus (35) 2874 26 26 15 10.08 <0.001
R Middle frontal gyrus (8) 923 23 19 42 6.46 <0.001
L Middle frontal gyrus (8) 823 22 19 36 6.67 <0.001
L Superior temporal gyrus (38) 309 34 22 24 5.41 <0.001
R Middle occipital gyrus (17) 234 17 89 3 5.38 <0.001
Cerebellar tonsil 340 10 56 33 5.45 <0.001
Extrinsic system
R Inferior frontal gyrus (44) 4167 47 7 6 8.05 <0.001
L Inferior frontal gyrus (6) 3063 49 4 21 7.15 <0.001
L Inferior frontal gyrus (44) 1461 43 34 18 5.48 <0.001
R Supermarginal gyrus (40) 5863 53 32 36 7.49 <0.001
L Supermarginal gyrus (40) 4715 61 32 33 8.17 <0.001
R Middle occipital gyrus (17) 337 29 80 9 5.61 <0.001
B. Hypnotic state
Default mode network
Posterior cingulate/precuneus (31) 14,718 4 56 30 17.95 <0.001
Anterior cingulate/mesiofrontal
(32)
8272 4 28 9 7.29 <0.001
R Angular gyrus (39) 3755 44 59 24 12.75 <0.001
L Angular gyrus (39) 1598 49 56 21 6.85 <0.001
R Superior frontal gyrus (8) 534 23 19 48 7.04 <0.001
L Superior frontal gyrus (10) 624 13 46 18 8.24 <0.001
R Middle temporal gyrus (38) 216 56 8 15 6.51 <0.001
Extrinsic system
R Inferior frontal gyrus (45) 440 32 31 9 7.57 <0.001
L Inferior frontal gyrus (44) 637 43 4 6 6.04 <0.001
Stereotaxic coordinates are in normalized Talairach space, p values are FDR corrected for multiple comparisons at the whole brain level.
315“extrinsic” system (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011),
confirming the functional significance underlying
the activity of both resting networks to conscious
experience in health and disease (e.g., Laureys
et al., 2007; Qin et al., 2010).
The selection of a control condition for hyp-
notic state remains challenging as, a priori, no
cerebral state is close to hypnotic state. Thus,results from studies with hypnosis need to be
interpreted based on the chosen control condition
because the generation of different types of men-
tal images will be associated with different cere-
bral activation patterns (e.g., Gardini et al.,
2005; Ishai et al., 2000). We here chose to study
hypnotic state as we use it in the clinical setting
and during surgery (Faymonville et al., 1997,
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3162000), asking subjects to revive pleasant autobio-
graphical memories. Hence, our control condition
employed mental imagery of pleasant autobio-
graphical memories without induction of hypnosis
because it is characterized by a polymodal con-
tent (motor, visual, and contextual) of episodic
nature (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).
We here observed that, in comparison to auto-
biographical mental imagery, under hypnosis the“extrinsic” system exhibited reduced functional
connectivity, whereas the default network showed
reduced connectivity in its posterior midline and
parahippocampal structures but increased con-
nectivity in its lateral parietal and middle frontal
areas. The hypnosis-related increases in cerebral
connectivity is in line with previous activation
studies showing enhanced functional connectivity
of anterior midline structures during hypnotic
Table 3. Peak voxels of areas showing increased and decreased connectivity in (A) the default mode network and (B) extrinsic
system in hypnotic state as compared to mental imagery
Common names
(Brodmann area)
Cluster size
(number of
voxels) x y z t p
A. Default mode network
Increases in connectivity
R Medial prefrontal (10) 2417 8 62 18 3.53 0.005
L Angular gyrus (39) 997 58 52 18 3.21 0.008
R Angular gyrus (39) 775 51 59 33 3.03 0.011
Decreases in connectivity
L Parahippocampal gyrus (35)/ Posterior
cingulate (30)
19,088 25 23 18 6.33 <0.0001
B. Extrinsic system
Increases in connectivity
–
Decreases in connectivity
R Supermarginal gyrus (40) 385 47 39 27 2.98 0.013
L Superior temporal gyrus (22) 936 68 32 18 4.64 0.001
Stereotaxic coordinates are in normalized Talairach space, p values are cluster level corrected.
317analgesia (Faymonville et al., 2003). Frontal
increases in regional cerebral blood flow have
also previously been demonstrated by positron
emission tomography (PET) in the hypnotic state
(e.g., Faymonville et al., 2000; Rainville et al.,
1999) However, a recent fMRI study showed a
hypnosis-related reduction in default mode con-
nectivity in the middle frontal areas (McGeown
et al., 2009). These divergent findings may be
explained by the distinct suggestion instructions
used to induce hypnosis and the different experi-
mental fMRI designs utilized. In our study, we
acquired continuous eyes-closed resting state data
during each condition where pleasant autobio-
graphical memories were performed during
both hypnosis and the control mental imagery
task. McGeown et al. (2009) employed a block
design comparing an eyes-open visual perceptual
task with and without hypnosis. It could also
be that the observed persisting activity in the
anterior midline part of the default network in
our study is due to the chosen less challenging
experimental conditions (Greicius and Menon,
2004).The observed reduction in connectivity of the
posterior midline parts of the default mode net-
work during hypnosis might reflect a decreased
degree of continuous information gathering from
the external world with its relation to oneself
(Gusnard and Raichle, 2001). These posterior ret-
rosplenial, cingulate, and precuneal areas of the
default network have been previously associated
with various cognitive functions, such as visuospa-
tial orientation, episodic memory retrieval, and
self-processing (e.g., self-relevance, social cogni-
tion, visuospatial perspective taking, and agency;
Cavanna and Trimble, 2006) and support
functions concerning both orientation within,
and interpretation of, the environment (Vogt
and Laureys, 2005). The special contribution of
the precuneus to consciousness is supported by
evidence of its dysfunction in profound uncon-
scious states, such as deep sleep (Horovitz et al.,
2009), pharmacological coma (Boveroux et al.,
in press), and pathological coma and vegetative
states (Laureys et al., 1999; Vanhaudenhuyse
et al., 2009b) suggesting that it is a critical node
in the neural network subserving conscious
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318experience (Baars et al., 2003). Our results on
decreased connectivity of retrosplenial and poste-
rior cingulate cortices extend previous PET stud-
ies demonstrating prominent reductions in
regional blood flow and metabolism in these pos-
terior midline structures during the hypnotic state
(e.g., for review, see Faymonville et al., 2006).
The generation of autobiographical episodic
mental images, as evoked in the present study in
both normal and hypnotic conditions, is known to
involve posterior cingulate, precuneal, and para-
hippocampal areas (Gardini et al., 2006). The
reported reduced connectivity in the latter can be
related to posthypnotic amnesia (Barber, 2000),thought to involve a disruption of retrieval pro-
cesses similar to the functional amnesias observed
in clinical dissociative disorders (Kihlstrom, 1997).
The decreased functional connectivity observed
in the lateral frontoparietal “extrinsic” system,
along with the subjective reports of diminished
external awareness, might reflect a blockage of
the sensory systems to receive sensory stimuli as
a result of hypnotic suggestion which was shown
to induce (Derbyshire et al., 2004) or alter
somatosensory perceptions (Cojan et al., 2009).
Increasing evidence points to the critical role of
lateral associative frontoparietal cortical network
in the emergence of conscious sensory perception
319(e.g., Boveroux et al., 2008; Laureys, 2005).
The observed hypnosis-induced decreased
frontoparietal connectivity could elucidate the
clinical finding that patients undergoing surgery
during hypnosedation (e.g., Faymonville et al.,
1997) show modified phenomenological sensory
awareness of their aversive encounters (e.g., see
Kupers et al., 2005).
Our results are also in line with a previous
suggested framework (Soddu et al., 2009), where
it was hypothesized that a hypofunctional “extrin-
sic” system and a preserved default network
activity would account for the participants’ sub-
jective experience of disengagement from their
external environment leading to a “self-centered
absorption” state, translated into a reduced sen-
sory responsivity (i.e., limitation of sensory input
or reduced motor output). Indeed, according to
the behavioral data, participants reported a
higher degree of absorption and dissociation from
their surroundings during hypnosis as compared
to mental imagery and normal wakefulness. Past
phenomenological analysis of reports from
subjects in hypnotic state suggests a diminished
tendency to judge and monitor, a disorientation
in time, space, and person and the experience of
one's own response as automatic (Rainville and
Price, 2003). Such increased absorption and disso-
ciation levels during hypnotic state account for its
antinociceptive effects during various surgical
procedures, where hypnosis in combination with
local anesthesia and minimal conscious sedation
(i.e., “hypnosedation”) is used to reduce pain,
anxiety, intraoperative use of anxiolytic and anal-
gesic drugs as well as faster recovery of the
patient (Faymonville et al., 1998, 2006).
In conclusion, hypnosis-induced modulation of
resting state fMRI networks, as compared to
mental imagery, seems to result in a reduced
“extrinsic” lateral frontoparietal cortical connec-
tivity, possibly reflecting a decreased sensory
awareness. The default mode network showed
an increased connectivity in bilateral angular
and middle frontal gyri whereas its para-
hippocampal and posterior midline structuresdecreased their connectivity during hypnosis,
putatively related to an altered “self”-awareness
and posthypnotic amnesia. In our view, fMRI
“resting state” studies of physiological (e.g., sleep
or hypnosis), pharmacological (e.g., sedation or
anesthesia), and pathological modulation (e.g.,
coma or related states) of “intrinsic” default
mode and anticorrelated “extrinsic” sensory
networks and their interaction with other cerebral
networks will further improve our understanding
of the neural correlates of subjective awareness.Acknowledgments
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Abstract Previous European surveys showed the support
of healthcare professionals for treatment withdrawal [i.e.,
artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) in chronic vege-
tative state (VS) patients]. The recent definition of mini-
mally conscious state (MCS), and possibly research
advances (e.g., functional neuroimaging), may have lead to
uncertainty regarding potential residual perception and
may have influenced opinions of healthcare professionals.
The aim of the study was to update the end-of-life attitudes
towards VS and to determine the end-of-life attitudes
towards MCS. A 16-item questionnaire related to con-
sciousness, pain and end-of-life issues in chronic (i.e.,
[1 year) VS and MCS and locked-in syndrome was dis-
tributed among attendants of medical and scientific con-
ferences around Europe (n = 59). During a lecture, the
items were explained orally to the attendants who needed
to provide written yes/no responses. Chi-square tests and
logistic regression analyses identified differences and
associations for age, European region, religiosity, profes-
sion, and gender. We here report data on items concerning
end-of-life issues on chronic VS and MCS. Responses were
collected from 2,475 participants. For chronic VS
([1 year), 66% of healthcare professionals agreed to
withdraw treatment and 82% wished not to be kept alive
(P \ 0.001). For chronic MCS ([1 year), less attendants
agreed to withdraw treatment (28%, P \ 0.001) and
wished not to be kept alive (67%, P \ 0.001). MCS was
considered worse than VS for the patients in 54% and for
their families in 42% of the sample. Respondents’ opinions
were associated with geographic region and religiosity. Our
data show that end-of-life opinions differ for VS as com-
pared to MCS. The introduction of the diagnostic criteria
for MCS has not substantially changed the opinions on
end-of-life issues on permanent VS. Additionally, the
existing legal ambiguity around MCS may have influenced
the audience to draw a line between expressing preferences
for self versus others, by implicitly recognizing that the
latter could be a step on the slippery slope to legalize
euthanasia. Given the observed individual variability, we
stress the importance of advance directives and identifica-
tion of proxies when discussing end-of-life issues in
patients with disorders of consciousness.
Keywords Ethics  Vegetative state  Minimally
conscious state  Euthanasia  End-of-life  Survey
Introduction
Technological developments in the intensive care led to the
survival of severely brain-damaged patients who, until that
time, would have died almost instantly from apnea. These
patients survive in states of disordered consciousness
ranging from coma, vegetative state (VS) and minimally
conscious state (MCS). Patients in coma lie with their eyes
closed, show no awareness of themselves and their sur-
roundings, and never open their eyes even when intensively
stimulated [1]. Patients in VS regain phenomenal sleep-
wake cycles but their motor, auditory, and visual functions
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are restricted to mere reflexes [2]. Patients in MCS mani-
fest fluctuating signs of purposeful behavior, may follow
simple commands, show gestural or verbal yes/no respon-
ses regardless of accuracy, and/or may verbalize intelligi-
bly [3]. In some cases, patients’ cognitive abilities are
preserved but are not evident due to limited motor capac-
ities, such as quadriplegia or quadriparesis. Such patients
are considered to be locked-in [4], and are not among
patients with disorders of consciousness although they can
be mistaken for unconsciousness [5, 6]. Prolonged survival
in these profound unconscious states has been raising
medical, ethical, and public policy controversies mainly
stemming from how different people regard indefinite
survival in such states [7]. By means of a wide European
survey among healthcare professionals, we here aimed at
updating the end-of-life attitudes towards the VS and
determining for the first time in a consistent way the atti-
tudes towards MCS.
Methods
A questionnaire was distributed during lectures at medical
and scientific conferences and meetings (n = 59) within
Europe (data were collected between September 2007 and
October 2009). To ensure comparability of responses, par-
ticipants were first introduced to the clinical definitions of
disorders of consciousness and were then asked to provide
‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers to 16 questions related to conscious-
ness, chronic VS (i.e.,[1 year), chronic MCS (i.e.,[1 year)
and locked-in syndrome (LIS). We here report the replies
obtained in European medical and paramedical professionals
to the questions: ‘Being in a chronic VS is worse than death
for the patient/for the family’; ‘Being in a chronic MCS is
worse than being in a VS for the patient/for the family’; ‘Do
you think that it is acceptable to stop treatment (i.e., artificial
nutrition and hydration-ANH) in patients in chronic VS?’;
‘Do you think that treatment can be stopped in patients in
chronic MCS?’; ‘Would you like to be kept alive if you were
in a chronic VS?’; ‘Would you like to be kept alive if you
were in a chronic MCS?’. The remaining 10 questions related
to consciousness [8] and pain [9] have been reported before.
Demographic data including age, gender, nationality, pro-
fession, and religious beliefs were recorded. Religiosity was
defined as the belief in a personal god belonging to an
institutionalized religion (i.e., Christianity, Islam, Judaism)
independently of practicing. Nationalities were categorized
into three geographic regions based on previous classifica-
tion criteria [10]: Northern (Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden,
UK), Central (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany,
Hungary, Luxembourg, Moldavia, Romania, Serbia, Slova-
kia, Slovenia, Switzerland), and Southern Europe (Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain,
Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Sta-
tistical analyses were performed using SPSS v.16.0 software
package. Chi-square tests assessed differences within and
between categorical variables. Multiple logistic regressions
(enter method) were used to examine and test the associa-
tions of the odds for agreement with the questions with five
predictor variables (age, profession, European region, reli-
giosity, and gender). Results were considered significant at
P \ 0.05 (two-sided). The study was approved by the ethics
committee of the University of Lie`ge. Completion of the
questionnaire was voluntary, anonymous, and considered as
consent for participation in the survey.
Results
The study sample included 2,475 medical and paramedical
professionals coming from 32 European countries (see
Table 1 for demographic data). The attitudes towards end-
of-life statements for VS and MCS as expressed by the whole
sample are summarized in Fig. 1. Respondents more often
wished not to be kept alive themselves as compared to
accepting to let others die in VS (P \ 0.001) and MCS
(P \ 0.001) and this dissociation was more important for
MCS as compared to VS (interaction analysis; P \ 0.001).
Participants’ end-of-life attitudes towards VS and MCS
differed based on the three geographic regions (Fig. 2) and
religiosity, professional background and gender (Table 2).
Table 1 Demographic characteristics of the studied sample
(n = 2,475)
Age (years), mean ± SD (range) 39 ± 14 (18–88)
Gender, no. (%)
Women 1,314 (53%)
Men 1,098 (44%)
Missing data 63 (3%)
Respondents by European Region, no (%)
Northern 402 (16%)
Central 1,213 (49%)
South 855 (35%)
Missing data 5 (0%)
Profession, no. (%)
Medical professionals 1,608 (65%)
Paramedical professionals 651 (26%)
Missing data 216 (9%)
Religiosity, no. (%)
Religious respondents 1,407 (57%)
Non-religious respondents 1,004 (40%)
Missing data 64 (3%)
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Multiple logistic regression analysis showed that agreement
with these questions was mainly associated with geographic
region and respondents’ religiosity (Table 3).
Chronic MCS was considered worse than VS more so
from the perspective of the patient (54%) as compared to
that of the family (42%; P \ 0.001). Inversely, respondents
found that chronic VS is worse than death more so from the
perspective of the family (80%) as compared to that of the
patient (55%; P \ 0.001).
Discussion
Our attempt to open a discussion on treatment withdrawal
from patients with chronic disorders of consciousness (VS,
MCS) is not an easy one. We here surveyed end-of-life
attitudes of European medical and paramedical profes-
sionals (n = 2,475) towards VS [now called ‘unresponsive
wakefulness syndrome’, 11] and determined, for the first
time, attitudes towards the recently defined entity of MCS
[3]. Concerning chronic VS (i.e., lasting more than one
year and, hence, considered as permanent), two-thirds of
the surveyed participants reported that it was acceptable to
withdraw ANH from these patients and most (82%) pre-
ferred not to be kept alive if they imagined themselves in
this condition. These results are in line with surveys from
previous decades, where the majority of physicians, despite
different cultural background, would generally support
ANH withdrawal from VS patients and would not wish
life-sustaining treatments for themselves (Table 4). Here,
although agreement with withdrawal of treatment was
somewhat less as compared to historical data, possibly due
to different adopted research methodologies, the surveyed
sample expressed similar end-of-life attitudes towards
permanent VS despite the recent introduction of the diag-
nostic criteria for MCS [12], the recent confirmation of
potential diagnostic error in VS patients [12], the apparent
evidence for residual cognitive processing coming from
functional neuroimaging technologies [13, 14] and the
potential prognostic value of the latter [15].
Concerning chronic MCS, there were clear differences
in opinions as compared to permanent VS: although almost
70% would not wish to be kept alive in this state, recog-
nizing it to be worse than VS, less than one-third of our
respondents supported treatment withdrawal from these
patients. Such differences in attitudes between VS and
MCS are comparable to a previous survey, where 92% of
British physicians considered it appropriate to withdraw
ANH from patients for whom the predicted outcome was
VS and only 22% would think so for patients who were
able to communicate simple needs without the capacity for
speech production [16]. Our data are opposed to the pro-
posed view that the distinction between MCS and VS is
artificial and unneeded [17]. We illustrated that most
healthcare professionals hold different views on end-of-life
issues for VS as compared to MCS. Similarly, outcome
studies [18–20] and neuroimaging studies [21] have stres-
sed the importance to disentangle both clinical entities.
Fig. 1 End-of-life attitudes towards the vegetative state (VS) and
minimally conscious states (MCS) as expressed by 2,475 medical and
paramedical professionals. Bars represent % agreement (**P \ 0.001)
Fig. 2 End-of-life attitudes towards the vegetative state (VS) and
minimally conscious states (MCS) depending on geographic region.
Bars represent % agreement (white: Northern, grey: Central, black:
Southern Europe; *P \ 0.05, **P \ 0.001)
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Additionally, the distinction between personal preferences
with private consequences (i.e., ‘I would like to be kept
alive if I were…’) and more objective statements of soci-
etal significance (i.e., ‘It is acceptable to stop treatment
in…’) are in accordance with previous findings showing
that the majority of surveyed physicians and nurses would
refuse treatment for themselves more than for patients [22].
The legal ambiguity which exists around MCS may have
influenced the audience to draw a virtual line between
expressing preferences for self versus others, by implicitly
recognizing that the latter could be a step on the slippery
slope to legalize killing [23], a controversial issue around
Europe judging from the legislation diversities among
European countries [24].
We empirically showed that the majority of our sample
(80%) considered chronic VS worse than death and that
this was more relevant for the patient’s family. It should be
noted that this is an emotionally loaded statement which
could influence subsequent answers. In principle, we are
unable to account with certainty for the sample’s responses,
especially in the case of MCS where opinions appeared
more dissociated. Such results may be due to the different
outcome which characterizes VS and MCS [25], or the
potential pain perception that the sample ascribes to MCS
[9], or the distinct brain activation patterns of these two
clinical entities [26]. We preferred, though, to use the
present formulation of questioning so as to evaluate in a
comparable way our data with past surveys’ results [e.g.,
22, 27; also Table 4]. Likewise, in order to permit com-
parisons between items, MCS and LIS questions were
formulated in a similar manner as those for VS. The
present survey setup (i.e., on the spot data collection as
opposed to mailing questionnaires) allowed the audience to
ask for clarifications when an item was not well
Table 3 Logistic regression of agreement vs. disagreement with the four end-of-life related questions on participants’ predictor variables
Predictor
variable
It is acceptable to stop
treatment in chronic VS
It is acceptable to stop
treatment in chronic MCS
I would like to be kept alive
if I were in chronic VS
I would like to be kept alive
if I were in chronic MCS
Odds ratio (95% CI) Odds ratio (95% CI) Odds ratio (95% CI) Odds ratio (95% CI)
Agea 0.98 (0.97–0.99)** 0.98 (0.98–0.99)** 1.01 (1.01–1.02)* 1.00 (0.99–1.01)
Women 0.79 (0.64–0.97)* 0.91 (0.73–1.13) 0.87 (0.67–1.12) 0.92 (0.75–1.13)
Southern Europe 1 1 1 1
Northern Europe 3.36 (2.38–4.74)** 3.82 (2.79–5.23)** 0.34 (0.21–0.55)** 0.47 (0.34–0.66)**
Central Europe 1.84 (1.49–2.26)** 2.24 (1.77–2.83)** 0.72 (0.56–0.92)* 0.69 (0.56–0.85)**
Medical professionals 1.18 (0.94–1.49) 0.91 (0.73–1.15) 1.18 (0.88–1.59) 1.28 (1.02–1.62)*
Religious respondents 0.45 (0.37–0.55)** 0.46 (0.37–0.55)** 2.20 (1.70–2.85)** 2.24 (1.84–2.73)**
Predicted response: ‘agreement’. An odds ratio higher than 1 signifies more agreement with the statement, whereas an odds ratio less than 1
notifies less agreement
VS vegetative state, MCS minimally conscious state
* P \ 0.05, ** P \ 0.001
a For continuous variables, the odds ratio equals the relative change in the odds ratio when the variable is increased by one unit
Table 2 End-of-life attitudes towards vegetative (VS) and minimally conscious states (MCS) depending on professional background, religiosity
and gender
Question Type of profession Religiosity Gender
Medical
professionals
Paramedical
professionals
Religious
respondents
Non-religious
respondents
Men Women
It is acceptable to stop treatment in
… chronic VS 1,053 (67%) 433 (67%) 844 (61%) 729 (74%)** 739 (68%) 836 (65%)
… chronic MCS 429 (27%) 215 (33%)* 308 (22%) 363 (37%)** 307 (28%) 371 (29%)
I would like to be kept alive if I were in
… chronic VS 295 (19%) 79 (12%)** 318 (23%) 107 (11%)** 217 (20%) 206 (16%)*
… chronic MCS 552 (35%) 157 (24%)** 570 (41%) 217 (22%)** 383 (35%) 399 (31%)*
VS vegetative state, MCS minimally conscious state
* P \ 0.05, ** P \ 0.001
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understood. We also document that significantly more
physicians prefer to be kept alive if in chronic MCS as
compared to paramedical professionals (Table 2). The
reasons for these differences remain speculative and
beyond the scope of the present study. Future studies
should tackle the importance of the nature of the respon-
dents on end-of-life issues and possible differences
between medical caregivers and the general public. Given
the observed individual variability in these emotionally
highly charged matters we stress the need for advance
directives and proxy identification, acknowledging their
known limitations such as vague or misleading statements
of wishes [28], negation of previously expressed wishes
when illness is an actual fact [29] and inconsistency in
preferences over time [30]. Finally, it is important to stress
that the present study assessed opinions of healthcare
professionals. Our sample is, hence, not representative of
the general public, which might have different (possibly
more positive) views on end-of-life issues than medical and
paramedical staff.
End-of-life decisions are not always governed by clini-
cal circumstances and patients’ preferences; rather, physi-
cians’ characteristics (i.e., age, religion and geographic
region) seem to play a critical role for picking such options
[31, 32]. In our study, geographic differences as well as
religious background were the variables that consistently
predicted all four end-of-life statements. Residents from
Northern and Central Europe, as compared to Southern
Europeans, were more likely to agree with ANH with-
drawal in chronic VS whereas religious respondents, older
respondents, and women were less likely to find it
acceptable. Physicians in Southern Europe have been
reported to hold more paternalistic views on medical
practice and the presumption to continue to treat is usual
[7]. Considering these different attitudes within and out of
Europe, it has been suggested that an international con-
sensus regarding standards of care for patients with disor-
ders of consciousness needs to be reached [33].
Additionally, religious affiliation was previously shown to
influence the decisions of European intensivists to with-
draw treatment [10].
The majority of our sample (80%) considered chronic
VS worse than death especially from the family’s point of
view. In the past, Jennett [27] similarly reported that nearly
90% regarded vegetative survival worse than death, a few
commenting that the question was irrelevant for the patient,
whereas 95% would consider that the families would
regard it worse. Indeed, it was previously shown that
families of long-hospitalized VS patients are confronted
with an emotional paradox as they cannot adopt a strategy
of mourning because their patients are not dead [34]. More
recently, it was shown that VS patients’ families have been
characterized by emotional distress increasing with dura-
tion of the disorder, have unsatisfactory family relation-
ships, adopt situation-oriented coping strategies (i.e.,
efforts aimed at solving and cognitively restructuring the
problem or attempting to change the situation), and
thoughts of the imminent death of their beloved ones were
associated with anxiety and depressive symptoms [35].
Despite these figures, although most families of VS
patients were shown to be in favour of interventions for
acute complications (e.g., antibiotics), the majority (76%)
did not wish their relative to receive cardiopulmonary
resuscitation or mechanical ventilation in case needed [36].
It is important to stress that our survey showed differ-
ences in opinions on VS and the recently defined MCS [3].
MCS patients are characterized by minimal fluctuating
awareness with possible perception of suffering [9, 21],
whereas VS patients, by definition, are deprived of such
experiences [19]. Similarly, we observed that medical
Table 4 Past surveys on end-of-life attitudes
Statement Audience (n) Agreement (%) References
Withdrawal of ANH from patients who will remain
in a VS is ethically justified
Physicians (208) 94 [49]
Withdrawal of ANH from patients who will remain
in a VS is ethically justified
Physicians (1,027) 94 [37]
It is ethical to withhold or withdraw ANH from PVS patients Neurologists (169)/Medical
directors (150)
88/89 [50]
I am in favour of withdrawing feeding tube from a PVS patient Internists (326) 80 [51]
I would desire ANH if I were in a PVS Neurologists (169)/Medical
directors (150)
10/13 [50]
I do not wish to be treated if I were in a PVS Physicians (115)/Nurses (127) 90/89 [22]
I would refuse artificial feeding if I were permanently comatose Physicians (345) 92 [52]
ANH artificial nutrition and hydration, VS vegetative state, PVS permanent vegetative state
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caregivers agreed less to stop treatment in MCS as com-
pared to VS. A previous survey showed that British doctors
were more reluctant not to treat or withdraw ANH as the
predicted degree of patients’ awareness and interaction
with the environment increased [37]. It, hence, seems that
participants may have considered consciousness as a cri-
terion for making treatment limitation decisions. However,
the significance of consciousness as a criterion to withhold
treatment has been criticized on the grounds that it may not
always be in the patient’s best interest to keep on living in a
state which may be considered worse than VS; thus, run-
ning the risk of acting against the ethical principle of
patients’ autonomy [38, 39]. In cases of non-communi-
cating patients, like VS and MCS, patients’ opinions can-
not be obtained, except in the few cases where patients had
made advance directives or had indicated an informed
surrogate decision maker. However, although advanced
directives continue to be widely used in clinical practice
[40], one should also consider the empirical fact that the
formerly competent person’s critical interests do not nec-
essarily reflect her/his experiential interests after incom-
petency is established irreversibly [29, 41]. Additionally,
the literature on traumatic paraplegia and quadriplegia [42]
as well as on patients with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis
[43] shows that once patients have become accommodated
to this state of reduced function, they generally rate their
quality of life as satisfactory and are glad to be alive. In
cases of legal representation, the proxy decision maker
should mediate trying to maximize patients’ self-determi-
nation and protect their interests on the principles of
beneficence (i.e., decisions should be made on patient’s
best interests and benefits should outweigh the burdens of
treatment) and non-maleficence [i.e., ongoing treatment
may be judged to be futile on the basis of low likelihood of
significant recovery, 44]. Even though for VS patients end-
of-life provisions have been introduced [45], for MCS no
ethical or legal consensus about withdrawing life support
has been formulated [46] and no distributive justice and
resource allocation for these patients have yet been deter-
mined. Hence, it remains a bioethical debate as to whether
and how treatment limitations should be applied for MCS
patients [47].
In conclusion, the introduction of diagnostic criteria of
MCS in 2002 [3] seems not to substantially change Euro-
pean caregivers’ opinions on end-of-life issues on perma-
nent VS. Most of the surveyed participants do not wish to
live in this condition and consider it acceptable to stop
ANH, even if the observed frequency of agreement seems
to be lower as compared to historical data. As for previous
surveys, opinions differed between Northern, Central, and
Southern European countries and were mostly explained by
religious beliefs. For the recently defined MCS, there
seems to be a strong dissociation between what we want for
ourselves (most caregivers do not wish to be kept alive in
this condition) and what we consider acceptable in patients
(only a minority considered it acceptable to stop treatment
in chronic MCS). Our observation that opinions on treat-
ment withdrawal and personal treatment wishes differ in
VS as compared to MCS, stresses the importance to dis-
tinguish both clinical entities when preparing advanced
directives and discussing personal preferences with prox-
ies. Indeed, 20% of respondents who did not wish to be
kept alive if they were themselves VS they preferred to be
kept alive if they were in MCS. At present, templates for
written instructional directives do not make the difference
between vegetative and non-communicative albeit mini-
mally conscious states. Additionally, the finding that
healthcare professionals’ views are dependent on geo-
graphic and religious variables makes the formulation of
universal legal and ethical guidelines a challenging task
[48]. Despite the prevalent support for the right to die in
chronic VS, the observed diversity and complexity around
MCS makes us propose to increase efforts promoting
advance directives and identification of proxies in tackling
the ethical and legal challenges surrounding end-of-life
issues in DOC.
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Communication and intentional behavior are supported by the brain’s integrity at a structural 
and a functional level. When widespread loss of cerebral connectivity is brought about as a 
result of a severe brain injury, in many cases patients are not capable of conscious interactive 
behavior and are said to suffer from disorders of consciousness (e.g., coma, vegetative state/
unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, minimally conscious states). This lesion paradigm has 
offered not only clinical insights, as how to improve diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment, but 
also put forward scientific opportunities to study the brain’s plastic abilities. We here review 
interventional and observational studies performed in severely brain-injured patients with regards 
to recovery of consciousness. The study of the recovered conscious brain (spontaneous and/
or after surgical or pharmacologic interventions), suggests a link between some specific brain 
areas and the capacity of the brain to sustain conscious experience, challenging at the same 
time the notion of fixed temporal boundaries in rehabilitative processes. Altered functional 
connectivity, cerebral structural reorganization as well as behavioral amelioration after invasive 
treatments will be discussed as the main indices for plasticity in these challenging patients. 
The study of patients with chronic disorders of consciousness may, thus, provide further 
insights not only at a clinical level (i.e., medical management and rehabilitation) but also from 
a scientific-theoretical perspective (i.e., the brain’s plastic abilities and the pursuit of the neural 
correlate of consciousness).
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InterventIonal studIes
deep braIn stImulatIon
Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is an interventional surgical proce-
dure which requires the implantation of microelectrodes in deep 
structures of the brain and the administration of low voltage elec-
tricity in these structures. Despite some sparse evidence that DBS 
may have some ameliorating effects on arousal in VS/UWS patients 
(Cohadon and Richer, 1993; Yamamoto et al., 2001), in general one 
cannot argue in favor of this treatment in the VS/UWS population. 
This is mainly due to the widespread underlying neuropathology 
of VS/UWS (Adams et al., 2000) which does not permit a straight-
forward functional re-integration after stimulating the structures 
of interest in these patients (Schiff and Fins, 2007).
In a more controlled experimental setting, where patients’ selec-
tion was based on both their neuropathological status (i.e., specific 
information about the connections between the central thalamus, 
cerebral cortex, basal ganglia and other subcortical structures) 
and behavioral profile (i.e., exhibition of preserved arousal and 
fluctuating behavioral performance), a 38-year-old patient in a 
MCS more than 6 years after severe traumatic brain injury was 
selected for DBS treatment (Schiff et al., 2007). Up to the point of 
DBS treatment, the patient did not show any clinical amelioration 
despite a 2-year rehabilitation program. However, after applying 
DBS in bilateral central intralaminar thalamic nuclei (Figure 2), 
the patient showed stimulation-related improved levels of arousal, 
motor control, and interactive behavior as measured by neuropsy-
chological testing during the DBS “on” periods.
Thanks to last decades’ technological advances, the study of 
consciousness has been under the scrutiny of neuroscientific 
research. The notion that consciousness is supported by and 
emerged from the brain is well-documented by clinical cases of 
neurological patients suffering from disorders of consciousness 
(DOC): in coma, patients are unable to be awakened and hence 
show no awareness of themselves and of their environment; in 
the vegetative state (VS) now called unresponsive wakefulness 
syndrome (UWS; Laureys et al., 2010) there is a dissociation 
between arousal which is preserved (i.e., clinically evident by 
eyes opening) and awareness which is abolished (Jennett and 
Plum, 1972). The recently defined minimally conscious state 
(MCS) describes patients who show fluctuating signs of aware-
ness but remain unable to communicate (Giacino et al., 2002). 
Through this lesion paradigm we have the opportunity not 
only to better understand the neural correlates of conscious-
ness (Tononi and Laureys, 2009) but also to gain insight about 
the brain’s plastic abilities (Laureys et al., 2006a). In the present 
review, the study of neural plasticity is approached via neu-
rological evidence coming from neuroimaging technologies, 
such as structural and functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (MRI), and positron emission tomography (PET), during 
pathological states and after recovery of consciousness. Altered 
cerebral functional connectivity, structural reorganization as 
well as behavioral amelioration after invasive and non-invasive 
treatments will be discussed as the main indices for plasticity 
in this challenging population (Figure 1).
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research  February 2011 | Volume 1 | Article 245 | 2
Demertzi et al. Plasticity and disorders of consciousness
mesio-frontal cortical neurons, which send excitatory projections 
to the central thalamus, or modulate the striatum leading to the 
restoration of the global dynamics of the cortico-thalamic system. 
On the other hand, zolpidem effects may be explained by a direct 
action at the level of the global pallidus interna which sends inhibi-
tory projections to the central thalamus; this inhibitory effect could 
substitute for the normal inhibition of the globus pallidus from 
the striatum and hence lead to a more stabilized central thalamic 
activity (Schiff, 2010).
non-pharmacologIc InterventIons
Non-pharmacologic interventions for DOC patients here refer to 
sensory stimulation techniques and physical therapy, which mainly 
aim at both preventing complications (i.e., contractures or pressure 
sore preventions) and/or at enhancing recovery. Sensory stimula-
tion can refer to two types of approaches: multisensory stimu-
lation or sensory regulation (Tolle and Reimer, 2003). The first 
expresses the principles of behaviorism and holds that enhanced 
environmental stimulation of the sensory systems is hoped to 
enhance synaptic re-innervations, whereas the second is based 
on the principles of information processing and focuses on the 
enhancement of selective attention by regulating the environment. 
Concerning physical therapy, there is some evidence that early (Oh 
and Seo, 2003) and increased intervention (Shiel et al., 2001) leads 
to  better outcome.
perspectIves
The existing therapeutic nihilism in the field of DOC is currently 
getting challenged by recent data supporting that some DOC 
patients could benefit from some rehabilitative interventions (sur-
gical, pharmacologic, or behavioral) reviewed above. Larger-scale 
The effects of DBS were attributed to the recruitable large-scale 
networks underlying the neuropathology of this MCS patient and 
were interpreted as a promotion of the patient’s arousal regulation 
via the direct activation of the frontal cortical and basal ganglia 
systems, innervated by the stimulated thalamic neurons (Schiff 
et al., 2007; Schiff, 2010).
pharmacologIc trIals
Regarding the effects of pharmacologic trials in patients with 
DOC, generally speaking no satisfactory results exist (Laureys et al., 
2006b). Small-scale pharmacologic studies indicate some excep-
tional respondents to either stimulant or depressant pharmacologic 
agents, but for whom no evidence-based recommendations can be 
made yet (Whyte et al., 2005; Demertzi et al., 2008).
Studies using amantadine, a mixed NMDA and dopaminergic 
agonist, showed a better outcome in traumatic patients with DOC 
(Whyte et al., 2005; Sawyer et al., 2008). In addition to behavioral 
amelioration, a recent PET study of chronic anoxic MCS showed 
a drug-related increase in fronto-parietal metabolism (Schnakers 
et al., 2008). Other dopaminergic agents which have been reported 
to lead to favorable functional outcome are levodopa and bro-
mocriptine (Passler and Riggs, 2001). Clinical improvements has 
also been reported after administration of baclofen (GABA agonist 
administered mainly against spasticity; Taira and Hori, 2007) and 
zolpidem (non-benzodiazepine sedative drug that is used against 
insomnia in healthy people; for short review see Demertzi et al., 
2008). The exact neuromodulating mechanism of these agents 
is not clear yet. A mesocircuit hypothesis, involving the cortico-
thalamo-cortical system as well as projections of the basal ganglia 
to the central thalamus, has been recently proposed (Schiff, 2010). 
The dopaminergic agents are thought to either facilitate directly the 
Figure 1 | Outline of studies dealing with plasticity issues in patients with disorders of consciousness. DTI, diffusion tensor imaging; MRI, magnetic 
resonance imaging; MRS, magnetic resonance spectroscopy.
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studies with higher number of patients of various pathologies are 
ongoing, in order to better comprehend the underlying neuro-
modulatory effects of DBS and the induced neuroplastic changes in 
severely injured brains. Currently, the beneficial effects of the phar-
macologic and non-pharmacologic approaches described above are 
not evidence-based and hence are not generally accepted by the 
medical community (for a systematic review see Lombardi et al., 
2002). No unique hypothesis or theoretical framework (Laureys, 
2005; Tononi and Laureys, 2009) can at present combine the tem-
poral dynamics and pathophysiological mechanisms of all the 
aforementioned interventions (e.g., Pistoia et al., 2010) and many 
questions remain as to the precise mechanisms differentiating spon-
taneous from therapy-induced cerebral plasticity.
In the therapeutic management of patients with DOC, no 
“standards of care” do yet exist, mainly due to the limitation of 
their scientific evidence coming from small-scale studies under 
suboptimal or uncontrolled settings. Thus, no evidence-based 
recommendations can be made for a particular treatment option 
(Demertzi et al., 2008).
observatIonal studIes
FunctIonal connectIvIty studIes
Passive paradigms
Functional neuroimaging does not only allow one to examine the 
functional segregation (i.e., localizing a function to a cerebral area) 
but also the functional integration (i.e., assessing the interaction 
between functionally segregated areas). Current analytical tools 
permit to assess the functional or effective connectivity between 
distant cerebral areas in functional imaging. Such analyses explain 
the activity in one cortical area in terms of an interaction between 
the influence of another area and some experimental condition 
(i.e., comparing data obtained during unconsciousness and after 
recovery). Functional connectivity is defined as the temporal cor-
relation of a neurophysiological index (hemodynamic or meta-
bolic) measured in different remote brain areas, whereas effective 
connectivity is defined as the influence one neural system exerts 
over another (Friston, 2002). Based on their experimental design, 
functional connectivity studies can be reduced to two main cat-
egories: passive (i.e., resting state, stimulus-induced activity) and 
active (i.e., mental task command following) paradigms (Bruno 
et al., 2010).
Using “resting state” fluorodeoxyglucose PET imaging, decreased 
global metabolic levels have been identified in VS/UWS patients, 
with no significant global metabolic resumption after recovery of 
consciousness. However, “functional disconnections” were identi-
fied in a large fronto-parietal network which exhibited regional 
metabolic restoration in long-range cortico-cortical (between 
latero-frontal and midline-posterior areas; Laureys et al., 1999) 
and cortico-thalamo-cortical (between non-specific thalamic 
nuclei and midline-posterior cortices) after recovery of conscious-
ness from chronic VS/UWS (Laureys et al., 2000b; Figure 3). It is 
hence suggested that fronto-parietal network connectivity is criti-
cal in sustaining conscious awareness (Baars et al., 2003; Laureys 
et al., 2004a), as is also supported by evidence from studies on 
sensory perception in normal volunteers (Dehaene et al., 2006; 
Boly et al., 2007).
Positron emission tomography and fMRI studies have 
identified a “default mode network,” defined as a set of areas, 
encompassing posterior cingulate/precuneus, anterior cingulate/
mesio-frontal cortex, and temporo-parietal junctions, which 
show more activity at rest than during attention-demanding 
tasks. Recent studies have shown that it is possible to reliably 
identify this network in the absence of any task, by resting state 
fMRI connectivity analyses in healthy volunteers (Boly et al., 
2008b, 2009). This “default mode network” is considered to be 
involved in self-related processes (Mason et al., 2007; Buckner 
et al., 2008; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011) but the functional 
significance of these spontaneous brain activity fluctuations 
in pathological states remain only partially understood. It has 
recently been shown that default mode connectivity decreases 
during propofol general anesthesia (Boveroux et al., 2010), sleep 
(Gould et al., 1999), and hypnotic state (McGeown et al., 2009; 
Demertzi et al., in press). In pathological impaired consciousness, 
resting state connectivity was shown to disappear in brain death 
(Boly et al., 2009) and to show a non-linear disintegration in 
pseudocoma or locked-in syndrome as compared to minimally 
conscious or relative to unconscious states (VS/UWS or coma; 
Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2009; Figure 4).
Apart from resting state acquisitions, valuable information is 
gathered by studies observing the cerebral responses to external 
sensory stimulation. Using PET, stimulus-induced somatosensory 
(Laureys et al., 2002; Boly et al., 2008a) and auditory (Laureys 
et al., 2000a; Boly et al., 2004) activation protocols in VS/UWS 
patients have identified a cerebral response restricted to primary 
sensory cortices, whereas MCS patients demonstrated a stronger 
functional connectivity between sensory and fronto-parietal asso-
ciative areas in these patients. These findings indicate that the 
presence of isolated neuronal groups that work in a module-like 
fashion, are not functionally sufficient for the conscious percep-
tion of the world and the generation of conscious behavior (Schiff 
et al., 2002). Additionally, stimuli with emotional valence like 
infant cries (Laureys et al., 2004b) or the patient’s own name 
Figure 2 | Clinical setup of electrodes implementation in the central 
thalami bilaterally (white arrows) during deep brain stimulation. Adapted 
from Schiff et al. (2007).
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and only then one can infer that this subject is conscious. Using 
this approach, a collaborative study between the Cambridge and 
Liège imaging centers, we showed in a clinically VS/UWS patient 
fMRI evidence of obeying to simple commands (i.e., “imagine 
walking around in your house” or “imaging playing tennis”) in 
specific brain areas (i.e., parahippocampal and supplementary 
motor areas, respectively) indistinguishable from that observed 
in healthy controls (Owen et al., 2006). Such activation could not 
be attributed to automatic recruitment of these areas of interest 
(Soddu et al., 2009) and thus the patient was considered to be 
conscious. Of note is that 6 months later, when the patient was 
clinically re-examined, she recovered visual pursuit of a mirror 
(Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2008), indicating her transition to a MCS. 
The residual brain activity detected via neuroimaging technologies 
could not be initially identified in the patient’s bedside, suggest-
ing that neuronal activation was taking place in absence of any 
behavioral output.
structural ImagIng
Structural connectivity refers to a network of physical or structural 
(axonal) connections which bines sets of neuronal populations. In 
clinical cases, information about the structural architecture of the 
brain can provide insights about recovery and neural plasticity in 
anoxic or traumatic brain injury. In chronic DOC, patients will 
progressively develop diffuse brain atrophy. In these cases, classical 
morphological MRI may not be a reliable indicator of the sever-
ity of the axonal injury and hence of the level of consciousness 
(Tshibanda et al., 2009). However, tools with higher sensitivity 
have been introduced which hold promise for studying plasticity 
in patients with DOC, such as diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) and 
magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS; Tshibanda et al., 2010).
Diffusion tensor imaging assesses the architectural organiza-
tion of white matter fibers and hence can detect in vivo diffuse 
axonal injury (Arfanakis et al., 2002). In an exceptional case of late 
recovery from traumatic brain injury, Voss et al. (2006) used DTI 
to document an increased fractional anisotropy (thought to reflect 
fiber density) in large, bilateral regions of medial parieto-occipital 
areas of the white matter paralleling his clinical recovery of speech 
and motor function 19 years after the acute insult. These findings 
were contingent to an increased regional metabolism in these areas 
when measured with PET, similar to the partially restored cortical 
regions observed in patients who recover consciousness after being 
in a chronic VS/UWS (Laureys et al., 2000b, 2006a; Figure 5). This 
multimodal posteriomedial associative area has been previously 
suggested to be part of the human awareness network (Vogt and 
Laureys, 2005).
Magnetic resonance spectroscopy is another non-invasive tech-
nique that can provide in vivo quantification of certain biochemical 
markers such as N-acetylaspartate (heralding information about 
neuronal density and viability), choline (reflecting cell membrane 
turnover), and creatine (reflecting cell aerobic energy metabo-
lism; Tshibanda et al., 2009). When information from this tech-
nique was combined with morphological MRI in traumatic brain 
injury, patients could be separated in prognostic subgroups based 
on the Glasgow Outcome Scale which was not possible when the 
different imaging techniques were applied separately (Carpentier 
et al., 2006).
(Di et al., 2007) induced a widespread near-normal activation 
in MCS. The latter fMRI study also showed to be informative of 
patients’ prognosis and recovery as confirmed by a recent study 
by Coleman et al. (2007).
Active paradigms
“Active paradigms” in neuroimaging studies, aiming to show com-
mand following, constitute a more direct proof to demonstrate 
conscious awareness, independent of motor activity. If a patient 
systematically follows a specific mental command, then this subject 
is expected to activate certain brain areas in a consistent manner 
Figure 3 | Functional connectivity between the thalami and prefrontal 
cortex is abolished during pathological unconsciousness (uWS/VS; red 
regression line) and resumes a near-normal modulation after recovery 
of consciousness (blue line). The green line illustrates connectivity in 
healthy controls. Regression lines represent cross-correlation of normalized 
regional cerebral blood flow as measured by H2O
15-PET. Adapted from 
Laureys et al. (2000b).
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perspectIves
The use of resting state fMRI to study functional recovery and 
neural plasticity in DOC patients and its clinical routine use as a 
diagnostic and prognostic tool needs a controlled methodology and 
inclusion of a larger number of patients as is currently being tackled 
by multicentric collaborations. Nevertheless, clinicians should be 
aware of the many limitations and pitfalls intrinsic to “resting state” 
analyses – especially the challenge to disentangle genuine neural 
activity from artifactual movement-related fMRI signal in studies 
on severe brain injury (Soddu et al., in press). Although  clinical 
assessment presently remains the gold standard in diagnosing this 
challenging population (Majerus et al., 2005), neuroimaging instru-
ments in some exceptional cases of motor-deprived non-communi-
cating DOC patients may be used as a means to establish a reliable 
communication code (Monti et al., 2010b). The challenge now will 
be to validate these novel technologies and to define the ethical and 
legal frameworks redefining cognitive competence in these patients 
with very limited and technology-dependent communication (Fins 
et al., 2008). Structural MRI coupled to spectroscopic and DTI tech-
niques are currently being validated as prognostic  markers in acute 
Figure 4 | The most representative nodes of the “default mode network” show a decrease in functional connectivity as we move from normal 
consciousness and locked-in syndrome (red squares) to minimally conscious or unconscious states. Graphs represent connectivity strength (mean z scores 
with 90% confidence intervals). PCC, posterior cingulate cortex. Adapted from Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2009).
Figure 5 | (A) Restoration of glucose metabolism in posteriomedial cortices after recovery from the VS/UWS (area in white; arrows indicate the functional 
disconnections observed in VS/UWS patients). (B) In the same posteriomedial area, lower metabolism was observed in VS/UWS patients (black bar) as compared to 
those who recovered consciousness (gray bar) and to healthy controls (white bar), suggesting its critical role in the mediation of conscious awareness. Scale 
represents cerebral metabolic rates for glucose uptake (in mg/100 g/min). Adapted from Laureys et al. (2006a).
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patients has been largely overlooked by the medical community 
and deserves further investigation. We believe that the challenge 
is now to identify the conditions in which and the mechanisms by 
which some patients may recover consciousness by use of the latest 
MRI and PET neuroimaging tools. The absence of large, controlled 
randomized interventional studies in patients with chronic DOC 
account for the present lack of evidence-based guidelines and ten-
dency for therapeutic nihilism and can be related to the continuing 
societal, political, legal, and ethical debates in this field. The study 
of patients with chronic DOC may hence provide further insights 
in the medical management and rehabilitation of these patients 
at the clinical level, as well as increasing our understanding of the 
brain’s long overlooked plastic abilities and the scientific quest for 
the neural correlates of human consciousness.
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Abstract Pain, suffering and positive emotions in
patients in vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness
syndrome (VS/UWS) and minimally conscious states
(MCS) pose clinical and ethical challenges. Clinically,
we evaluate behavioural responses after painful stimu-
lation and also emotionally-contingent behaviours (e.g.,
smiling). Using stimuli with emotional valence, neuro-
imaging and electrophysiology technologies can detect
subclinical remnants of preserved capacities for pain
which might influence decisions about treatment
limitation. To date, no data exist as to how healthcare
providers think about end-of-life options (e.g., with-
drawal of artificial nutrition and hydration) in the
presence or absence of pain in non-communicative
patients. Here, we aimed to better clarify this issue
by re-analyzing previously published data on pain
perception (Prog Brain Res 2009 177, 329–38) and
end-of-life decisions (J Neurol 2010 258, 1058–65) in
patients with disorders of consciousness. In a sample
of 2259 European healthcare professionals we found
that, for VS/UWS more respondents agreed with treat-
ment withdrawal when they considered that VS/UWS
patients did not feel pain (77%) as compared to those
who thought VS/UWS did feel pain (59%). This inter-
action was influenced by religiosity and professional
background. For MCS, end-of-life attitudes were not
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influenced by opinions on pain perception. Within a
contemporary ethical context we discuss (1) the evolv-
ing scientific understandings of pain perception and
their relationship to existing clinical and ethical guide-
lines; (2) the discrepancies of attitudes within (and be-
tween) healthcare providers and their consequences for
treatment approaches, and (3) the implicit but complex
relationship between pain perception and attitudes
toward life-sustaining treatments.
Keywords Pain . End-of-life . Vegetative state .
Minimally conscious state . Ethics . Attitudes . Survey
Introduction
Pain and pleasure are inherently subjective experien-
ces that can be verbally communicated to others. In the
absence of oral communication, we can infer these
experiences in others by observing facial expressions
of “liking” or “disliking”. For example, in newborns
the tongue protrusion that can lick the lips can be
considered a positive affective expression whereas
brow wrinkling and wide-eyes opening are usually
considered as facial expressions of negative affect
[e.g., 1]. Likewise, in non-communicative severe brain-
damaged patients we are limited to infer emotional
states by evaluating behavioural responsiveness to ex-
ternal stimuli. Patients in a vegetative state [VS, now
called unresponsive wakefulness syndrome/UWS 2]
are in a condition of preserved wakefulness with absent
volitional behaviour and response to command [3].
Minimally conscious state (MCS) characterizes patients
who show discernible but fluctuating signs of awareness
without effective communication with their environ-
ment [4]. MCS is now subcategorized in MCS- (i.e.,
showing signs of volitional behaviour that is non-reflex
movements like visual pursuit, orientation to pain and
contingent motor responses to specific stimuli) and
MCS+ (i.e., patients showing response to verbal or
written commands) [5]. To date, the management of
pain continues to raise controversial issues both at a
clinical and ethical level [6, 7]. Clinically, the pharma-
cological and non-pharmacological therapy of pain in
non-communicative patients varies from country to
country, mainly depending on the ascription of pain to
these patients [8, 9]. For example, the Multi-Society
Task Force on PVS [10] rules out the possibility that
VS/UWS patients experience pain and hence makes no
recommendations for its management. The Royal Col-
lege of Physicians [11], however, recommends the ad-
ministration of sedatives after treatment withdrawal,
recognizing the possibility of pain and suffering at the
end of life. Suffering (which is considered a property of
sentient organisms) is an ill-defined term, referring to
states of increased distress associated with events threat-
ening the intactness of the person [7, 12]. Suffering in
patients with disorders of consciousness raises contro-
versial questions about whether non-responsive patients
might have such an experience. The issue of suffering
becomes even more challenging when treatment limita-
tion has been agreed upon. End-of-life decisions in
patients with disorders of consciousness are not rare
but the legal provisions currently differ from country
to country [13, 14]. In Europe, there are differences in
the way treatment limitation is perceived, especially
between Northern and Southern countries [15]. We also
showed that opinions on end-of-decisions depend on the
diagnosis of the patient (for VS/UWS there is more
support for treatment withdrawal as compared to
MCS), on the professional status (paramedical workers
agree more with treatment withdrawal as compared to
medical doctors) and on the cultural background of the
clinician making the decision (religious respondents
agree less with treatment limitation as compared to
non-religious).
Here we aim to summarize available evidence on
the study of pain but also of positive emotion and
affect in non-communicative patients. We review the
assessment tools measuring pain at the bedside and
recent functional neuroimaging and electrophysiolog-
ical studies. Some scholars suggest that when pain
perception is suspected in patients with disorders of
consciousness, continuation of life-sustaining treat-
ment may be against patients’ best interests and harm
them by exposing them to unpleasant feelings [16].
Others support that the question should not be about
whether or not to withhold or withdraw life sustaining
treatment patients with disorders of consciousness but
about how much of analgesic care should be adminis-
tered to them [8]. Here, with a further aim to add at
the ethical discussion on end-of-life options with
regards to pain perception in these patients, we re-
analyzed European survey data on healthcare pro-
viders previously published on attitudes on pain per-
ception [6] and end-of life [15] in patients with
disorders of consciousness. We assessed whether opin-
ions on end-of-life options associate with beliefs
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regarding pain perception in patients with disorders of
consciousness and identified variables explaining this
association. Considering the data, we further discuss
(1) the evolving scientific understandings of pain per-
ception and their relationship to existing clinical and
ethical guidelines, (2) the discrepancies in attitudes of
healthcare workers and their consequences for consis-
tent treatment approaches and (3) the implicit but
complex relationship between pain perception and
attitudes toward life-sustaining treatments.
Behavioural Assessment of Negative and Positive
Affect in Non-communicative Patients
According to the International Association for the
Study of Pain (IASP), pain is “an unpleasant sensory
and emotional experience associated with real or po-
tential tissue damage” [17]. This implies that pain has
both physical and emotional properties. We will use
the term ‘nociception’ to refer to the physical respon-
siveness to noxious (harmful) stimulation [18]. Noci-
ception may elicit unconscious postural responses (as
well as other motor reflexes, autonomic and endocri-
nologic responses) without necessarily evoking the
experience of suffering, especially when the brain
has lost its capacity for self-awareness [e.g. spinal
reflexes and lazarus sign in brain death, 10, 19]. As
stressed by the IASP, the inability to communicate
verbally does not negate the possibility that an indi-
vidual is experiencing pain and is in need of appropri-
ate pain-relieving treatment. As pain can also be
present in the absence of noxious stimulation [18],
then how can one know whether patients in VS/
UWS or in MCS experience pain or suffering? At
the bedside, we infer pain perception in these patients
by evaluating behavioural responsiveness to noxious
stimuli. Three types of motor responses are usually
tested: a) stereotypical responses, which are slow ex-
tension or flexion movements of the arms and legs, b)
flexion withdrawal, where the limb moves away from
the point of stimulation and c) localisation responses,
where the non-stimulated limb touches the part of the
body that received the stimulation. Localisation of
pain is the only motor response thought to be a pur-
poseful and intentional act to eliminate a noxious
stimulus [4] but one cannot be sure of how specifically
painful a stimulation can be or how salient it is to the
patient [7]. Hence, pain localization does not necessarily
imply that the patient suffers, but this possibility has to
be considered. Other observed behaviours resulting
from noxious stimulation (i.e., eyes opening, quickening
of breathing, increasing heart rate and blood pressure,
occasional grimace-like or crying-like behaviours) are
considered to be of subcortical origin [also seen in
infants with anencephaly, e.g. 20, 21] and do not neces-
sarily reflect conscious perception of pain. Studies in
general anesthesia also suggest that motor or autonomic
responses are not reliable indicators of consciousness
[e.g. 22]. Clinically, noxious-related behaviours are stud-
ied by applying pressure to the fingernail, to the joints of
the jaw or above the eyes. However, which specific type
of noxious stimulation is the most effective at detecting
signs of conscious perception still remains to be deter-
mined [23]. Numerous scales have been developed for
the assessment of pain in non-communicative subjects,
especially in newborns (e.g., Neonatal Infant Pain Scale;
Faces, Legs, Activity, Cry, Consolability Pain Assess-
ment Tool) and the demented elderly (Pain Assessment
in Advanced Dementia Scale; Checklist of Nonverbal
Pain Indicators). Only recently a validated scale has been
introduced to measure pain in patients with disorders of
consciousness. The Nociception Coma Scale (NCS)
evaluates motor, verbal, facial and visual responses after
noxious stimulation [24]. Its total score ranges between 0
and 12, with 7 indicating perception of pain and hence
need for analgesic treatment.
Using the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R)
[25] for the clinical assessment of consciousness, the
clinician evaluates visual, auditory, motor, oromotor,
communication, and wakefulness levels. The manual
further proposes the additional evaluation of affective
behaviours occurring in the presence of a specific non-
noxious stimulus. Smiling, for example, is among
behaviours that family members and clinical staff
might notice but which can be missed during the
formal administration of the scale. Such responses, in
order to be considered as non-contingent and mean-
ingful, must occur in the presence of a specific stim-
ulus and not occur when the stimulus is absent.
Nevertheless, in clinical practice the behavioural as-
sessment of positive emotions is not yet included in
standardized assessments, possibly because they are
not as alarming compared to responses to threatening
stimuli. Alternative interventions, such as music ther-
apy, could assist in the extraction of positive emotional
responses. For example, it was previously shown that
a patient initially diagnosed as in VS/UWS was
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subsequently categorized in MCS because she showed
consistent emotional behaviours (changes in facial
gestures) to a song of significant personal valence;
such response could not be extracted during classical
evaluation of consciousness [26]. Compensation for false
negatives at the bedside, as a result of patients’ physical
condition (tetraplegia, spasticity, etc.) or low motivation,
is achieved by the assistance of neuroimaging technolo-
gies which begin to shed light on the grey zones of
consciousness in non-communicative patients [27].
Functional Neuroimaging and Electrophysiology
of Negative and Positive Affect in Non-
communicative Patients
At present no functional neuroimaging studies have
truly assessed positive emotions in patients with dis-
orders of consciousness. However, a number of stud-
ies did show that stimuli with emotional valence (as
compared non-neutral stimuli) result in higher-level
brain processing in severely brain damaged patients.
In MCS, infant cries and patient’s own name identified
that, as compared to meaningless noise, there was
more widespread brain activation for the patient’s
own name, followed by infant cries, comparable to
that obtained in controls [28]. Additionally, auditory
stimulation with personalized narratives elicited
similar-to-controls cortical activity associated with
language processing [29]. Residual cognitive process-
ing was also indentified in a MCS patient when he was
told stories by his mother [30] or when intimate family
pictures were presented [31].
In VS/UWS, emotion-related activity of sound or
speech was identified when a patient was told stories
by his mother [32]. In another unresponsive patient,
the mother’s voice elicited a peak EEG frequency at
33 Hz [gamma band, considered to be involved in
conscious perception; e.g., 33] parallel to changes in
heart rate [34]. Heart rate changes in these patients
were also found during the presentation of “positive”
and “negative” music [35]. A long-term comatose
patient with eyes closed and stereotypical motor be-
haviour, showed emotional processing as a response to
her children’s voice followed by her friend’s and by an
unknown voice [36]. In an emotional oddball para-
digm on affective prosody (i.e., a single sad exclama-
tion was presented among four equally probable joyful
exclamations) 6 out of 27 VS/UWS and MCS, and 3
patients with locked-in syndrome (LIS),1 showed a
similar-to-controls broadly distributed electrophysio-
logical negativity (N300) after the sad deviant stimu-
lus, considered indicative of an accurate detection of
affective mismatch [38].
In the absence of subjective response, one cannot
be certain whether such brain responses to emotional
entail conscious awareness. What we are interested in,
however, is to determine the minimal prerequisites of
conscious perception. With regards to pain, previous
neuroimaging studies in healthy volunteers showed
that pain cannot be localized in an isolated “pain
centre” in the brain, but it rather encompasses a neural
circuitry [39, 40]. Two distinct brain networks have
been implicated in pain perception: (i) a lateral pain
system or sensory network processing nociception
(lateral thalamic nuclei, primary and secondary so-
matosensory and posterior parietal cortices); and (ii)
a medial pain system or affective network (medial
thalamus, anterior cingulate, prefrontal and insular
cortices) considered to process the emotional aspects
of pain [41]. When noxious stimulation was applied to
VS/UWS patients, no evidence of noxious stimulation-
related downstream activation beyond primary somato-
sensory cortex was identified [42]. Instead, cortical ac-
tivation subsisted as an island, dissociated from higher-
order associative cortices that are currently thought to be
necessary for conscious awareness [e.g., 43, 44]. How-
ever, another study reported additional activation of
secondary somatosensory and insular cortices in VS/
UWS patients [45], suggesting the possibility of
affective experiences of pain in these patients. As
opposed to VS/UWS patients, noxious stimulation
in MCS patients measured with PET elicited cere-
bral responses not only in the midbrain, thalamus,
and primary somatosensory cortex but also more wide-
spread activation in secondary somatosensory, insular,
posterior parietal, and anterior cingulate cortices,
comparable to healthy controls [46, 47], strongly
1 Patients with locked-in syndrome (LIS) are unable to move
body parts, but remain fully conscious of themselves and their
environment. In classic cases, LIS patients use their eyes for
basic communication with their surroundings (e.g., look up for
“yes”, look down for “no”). In cases of complete LIS, patients
cannot even move their eyelids and, unless carefully assessed,
these patients can be erroneously diagnosed as unconscious
[37].
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suggesting preserved capacity of pain experience
in these patients.
Attitudes Towards Well-Being and Pain-Mediated
End-of-Life Decisions
In healthy controls, pleasure and well-being depends
on the positive affect (hedonia) and on the sense of
purposefulness or engagement in life (eudemonia)
[48]. Despite the general view that quality of well-
being is diminished in disease as a result of limited
capacities to functionally engage in everyday living,
these attitudes are formulated from a third-person per-
spective and may underestimate patients’ subjective
well-being [49]. Indeed, we recently showed that a
majority of patients in a chronic LIS, despite self-
reporting severe restrictions in community reintegra-
tion, professed good subjective well-being [50]. The
self-reported happiness status was associated with lon-
ger duration in LIS, the ability to produce speech and
lower rates of anxiety. In patients with disorders of
consciousness, however, self-ratings are impossible to
acquire and only estimates about what it is like to be in
this situation can be made. An analysis of public
media reports on Terri Schiavo [a patient in a VS/
UWS; e.g., 51], revealed that in some cases the patient
was described as feeling discomfort which was incom-
patible with her state [52]. In another study, ratings
from family members, who are more acquainted with
VS/UWS, showed that 90% of families reported,
among others, that the patients perceived pain [53].
When clinicians were recently asked to express their
opinions on possible pain perception in VS/UWS [6],
a significant number of medical doctors ascribed pain
perception in VS/UWS (56%) despite formal guide-
lines suggesting the opposite [e.g., 10]. Analysis of the
respondents’ characteristics showed that paramedical
professionals, religious respondents, and older health-
care providers reported more often that VS/UWS
patients may experience pain (as opposed to medical
doctors, non-religious and younger respondents). For
MCS, there was no discrepancy in opinions and the
majority (97%) of respondents found that MCS
patients feel pain [6]. Inconsistencies in the medical
management of pain have been shown in a recent
survey in the United States with (conscious) patients
visiting the emergency department with pain-related
complaints; the investigators found that patients aged
older than 75 years were less likely to receive pain
medication as compared to patients aged between 35-
54 years [54]. The issue of pain management in non-
responsive patients becomes more challenging when
withdrawal from life-supporting treatment, such as
artificial nutrition and hydration, has been agreed upon
[15]. In these cases, VS/UWS patients can be left
without administration of opioids or other analgesic
drugs during their dying process [19, 55] on the
grounds that they are deprived from experiencing
suffering due to hunger or thirst [56]. To date, no data
exist as to how opinions on pain perception in patients
with disorders of consciousness could influence views
on end-of-life decisions.
We re-analyzed our previously published survey
data [6, 15] looking for possible correlations between
healthcare providers’ opinions on pain perception in
VS/UWS and MCS and views on end-of-life prefer-
ences in these patients. A sample of 2259 healthcare
professionals coming from 32 European countries (see
Table 1 for demographic data) expressed their opin-
ions (yes-no answers) to the questions: “Do you think
that patients in a vegetative state can feel pain?”; “Do
you think that patients in a minimally conscious state
can feel pain?”; “Do you think that it is acceptable to
stop treatment (i.e., artificial nutrition and hydration-
ANH) in patients in chronic VS?”; “Do you think that
treatment can be stopped in patients in chronic MCS?”
Recorded demographic data included age, gender, na-
tionality, profession, and religious beliefs2 (Table 1).
For chronic VS/UWS, agreement with treatment with-
drawal was negatively correlated with opinions on
pain perception in this state; in other words, the more
respondents found it appropriate to withdraw treat-
ment from VS/UWS patients, the less they recognized
that these patients feel pain (Table 2a; Fig. 1). For
chronic MCS, end-of-life attitudes were not mediated
by opinions on pain perception (Table 2b, Fig. 1). We
then investigated the characteristics of respondents
who supported treatment withdrawal when they
thought that patients in VS/UWS and MCS feel pain
or not. With respect to professional background, for
chronic VS/UWS, more paramedical workers than
2 Religiosity was defined as the belief in a personal God belong-
ing to an institutionalized religion (i.e., Christianity, Islam,
Judaism) independently of practicing.
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medical doctors supported treatment limitation when
they thought that VS/UWS patients feel pain (Fig. 2a,
left panel). For chronic MCS, medical doctors and
paramedical professionals’ opinions did not differ in
terms of pain perception in these patients (Fig. 2b, left
panel). With respect to religious beliefs, for chronic
VS/UWS, less religious than non-religious respond-
ents supported treatment limitation both when they
considered pain perception and not in VS/UWS
patients (Fig. 2a, right panel). For chronic MCS, less
religious than non-religious respondents agreed with
treatment withdrawal when they considered that MCS
patients feel pain (Fig. 2b, right panel).
Ethically Salient Questions
The previously discussed points on clinical assessment,
neuroimaging/electrophysiology applications and
expressed attitudes of laymen and healthcare workers
on pain in VS/UWS and MCS patients generate ethical-
ly salient questions. Some important questions concern:
(1) the evolving scientific understandings of pain per-
ception and their relationship to existing clinical and
ethical guidelines; (2) the discrepancies of attitudes
within (and between) healthcare providers and their
consequences for treatment approaches, and (3) the
implicit but complex relationship between pain percep-
tion and attitudes toward life-sustaining treatments.
Evolving Scientific Understandings of Pain
Perception and their Relationship to Existing
Clinical and Ethical Guidelines
The consistency among respondents’ opinions that
MCS patients are capable for pain perception is sup-
ported by both neuroimaging [e.g., 46] and behaviou-
ral [4] data, showing a distinct clinical picture from
VS/UWS patients. Yet, there is still a minority holding
that VS/UWS feel pain. Interestingly, clinicians have
Table 1 Demographic data of the surveyed clinicians
(n02259)
Age, mean ±SD (range), years 38±14 (18–88)
Gender, no (%)
Women 1222 (54)
Men 1001 (44)
Missing 36 (2)
Respondents by geographical region, no (%)
Northern Europe 316 (14)
Central Europe 1148 (51)
Southern Europe 790 (35)
Missing 5 (0)
Profession, no (%)
Medical professionals 1606 (71)
Paramedical professionals 653 (29)
Religiosity, no (%)
Religious respondents 1286 (57)
Non-religious respondents 915 (40)
Missing 58 (3)
Table 2 Logistic regression (method: enter) results of the
agreement with treatment withdrawal in patients in a vegetative
state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) and min-
imally conscious state (MCS) as predicted by opinions on pain
perception in these states. (a) For VS/UWS, agreement with
treatment withdrawal was significantly predicted when respond-
ents thought less that VS/UWS patients feel pain. (b) For MCS,
agreement with treatment withdrawal was not significantly pre-
dicted by opinions on pain perception in these patients
Odds ratioa 95.0% Confidence interval p value
Lower Upper
a. Treatment can be stopped in VS/UWS
Patients in VS/UWS can feel pain 0.420 0.348 0.507 <.001
Constant 3.414 <.001
b. Treatment can be stopped in MCS
Patients in MCS can feel pain 0.658 0.414 1.046 0.077
Constant 0.612 0.034
Predicted response: ‘agreement’
a An odds ratio higher than 1 signifies more agreement with the statement, whereas an odds ratio less than 1 notifies less agreement
A. Demertzi et al.
consistently offered ambiguous or mixed answers
about pain perception in VS/UWS (or MCS) patients
[57]. For example, Payne et al. [57] surveyed 170
physicians from the American Academy of Neurology
and 150 from the American Medical Directors Asso-
ciation and reported that 30% believed VS/UWS
patients experience pain (interestingly, they found no
differences between academic and non-academic
physicians). Similarly, an unpublished survey by the
American Neurological Association reported that 31%
of its members were “uncertain” about whether VS/
UWS patients could experience pain (31%) and suf-
fering (26%) [58].
Two possible non-mutually exclusive interpretations
of this tension or gap between guidelines and clinicians
merit our attention. On the one hand, perhaps clinicians
are blatantly wrong, or are what we could call in dis-
agreement of knowledge with guidelines, i.e., they are or
were wrong because they did not know. In support of this
interpretation, research on diagnostic accuracy has shown
that clinicians have trouble distinguishing the VS/UWS
from MCS [59–61] and even confuse the VS/UWS with
more remote states, like brain death and the locked in
syndrome [62–64]. Knowledge disagreement could also
be explained by the fact that, prior to the 2002 guidelines
on MCS [4], MCS patients could have been clustered
with VS/UWS patients within the broader category of
vegetative patients. On the other hand, perhaps a different
kind of disagreement could also be at work, a disagree-
ment of apprehension or perspective, entailing that clini-
cians are or were observing pain perception in some
Fig. 1 Attitudes towards treatment withdrawal in VS/UWS are
mediated by opinions on pain perception in patients in vegeta-
tive state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) but
not in minimally conscious state (MCS)
Fig. 2 Attitudes towards treatment withdrawal in patients in
vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS;
panel a) and minimally conscious state (MCS; panel b) with
regards to pain perception as formulated by professional back-
ground and religious beliefs
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patients which was not reflected fully in guidelines of-
fered to them. Following this interpretation, clinicians
who may have or have not been in agreement of knowl-
edge with guidelines may have nonetheless been at odds
with them, deliberately or not, because of a difference in
apprehension of pain perception. For example, influential
guidelines such as the Multi-society Task Force’s guide-
lines on the VS [10] could have under-recognized pain
in MCS patients, not well distinguished from VS patients
at the time of their publication. Accordingly, perhaps
clinicians might have been partly right not to offer
answers consistent with the views of major professional
societies.
Now that we realize with hindsight that MCS is
acknowledged as a distinct diagnostic category and
that these patients feel pain, we are invited to greater
humility in discussing pain perception (and awareness
more generally) in disorders of consciousness. The
different interpretations of the disagreement between
clinicians and guidelines open up room for a caution-
ary medico-ethical approach where the perspective of
a broad base of clinicians may need to be considered
carefully in the development of guidelines as an addi-
tional process to establish external validity of diagnos-
tic categories. There is no doubt that some confusion
about VS/UWS and MCS exists due to lack of knowl-
edge in healthcare professionals, including specialized
clinicians [63]. However, to date, discrepancies have
often been considered to be a knowledge gap on the
part of clinicians; not a possible misapprehension of
the guidelines themselves in spite of unspecific or
indirect evidence about capacities like pain perception.
In these patients, closer attention to why clinicians
disagree with common understandings (e.g., through
methodologies that allow to capture these information)
could be an important ingredient in the development
of consensual approaches and guidelines to tease apart
disagreements of knowledge and disagreements of
apprehension.
Discrepancies in Attitudes of Healthcare Providers
and Their Consequences for Consistent Treatment
Approaches
Our analysis suggests discrepancies between or within
healthcare providers, which merit close attention. For
example, respondents’ opinions for chronic VS/UWS
patients were mediated by professional background
(Fig. 2). More paramedical respondents (64%) as com-
pared to medical doctors (56%) were in favor of treat-
ment withdrawal when also thinking that these
patients perceive pain. The observed differences based
on professional background might be related to many
factors including differences in proximity to the patient,
time spent at the bedside, sensibilities, and education
[65, 66]. Nonetheless, this variability is concerning.
Family members may be exposed to various messages
about pain perception based on who they talk to [67].
Opinions on pain perception and end-of-life in MCS
seemed to be less controversial among respondents,
with no differences between physicians and paramedical
professionals. In other research, we have found
similarly that physician characteristics can shape
attitudes toward end-of-life care, judgments about
quality of life, and prognosis for post-coma recovery
[67]. Several studies have shown differences between
medical specialists and various healthcare providers in
end-of-life care [65, 68–71].
Religiosity in general (i.e., when both religious and
non-religious respondents were taken together) did not
mediate the support on treatment withdrawal when
comparing opinions about pain perception in VS/
UWS patients (Fig. 2). However, some differences
were identified between religious and non-religious
respondents about withdrawal of life support. Al-
though treatment withdrawal was generally supported
less for MCS than for VS/UWS, religious respondents
disagreed with treatment withdrawal significantly
more than non-religious respondents (Fig. 2). We have
previously shown that religious beliefs influence per-
sonal philosophical convictions towards dualistic
views on the relationship between consciousness and
the brain [72]. Such personal beliefs have also been
shown to weigh on physicians’ clinical decisions [e.g.,
73]. In line with our findings on the influence of
religion and age on beliefs about pain perception in
VS/UWS [6], other studies on, for example, end-of-
life decisions in intensive care patients have shown
that older and more experienced doctors and doctors
with religious convictions (i.e., Christians) more often
refused to opt for treatment limitations [74, 75].
The impact of physician- (or other clinicians) de-
pendent variability is not well understood although its
existence is now well established. Future research
could pay closer attention to this phenomenon in the
context of disorders of consciousness a) to better un-
derstand the existence of variability between members
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of healthcare teams; b) to better characterise the im-
pact of variability on family members and proxy de-
cision makers; and c) to develop, if applicable,
approaches to mitigate variability or its consequences
through, for example, consensual chart notes and team
discussion and communication [76].
The Implicit but Complex Relationship
Between Pain Perception and Attitudes Toward
Life-Sustaining Treatments
The data we reviewed above suggest a connection
between beliefs about perception of pain and attitudes
toward end-of-life decision-making in VS/UWS. Gen-
erally, the more a patient is able to feel pain, the less
favorable a clinician is to withdrawal of life support.
For instance, treatment withdrawal for chronic VS/
UWS was supported more when respondents consid-
ered that these patients do not feel pain (77%) as
compared to when they thought the patients feel pain
(59%; Fig. 1). The high number of participants sup-
porting treatment withdrawal in VS/UWS when con-
sidering that pain perception is absent is in line with
existing guidelines on pain perception in these
patients. However, the overall data suggest conflicting
or complex ethical reasoning made by respondents
regarding the relationship between pain perception
and acceptability of withdrawal of life support.
At first glance, the relationship observed could be
justified in as much as a patient with more sentience, and
therefore more awareness, could be judged to be apt to
be kept alive. Likewise, a patient who does not feel pain
could be exhibiting lack of awareness and be allowed to
die. We previously discussed that end-of-life opinions
referring to patients (as opposed to imagined scenarios
of oneself being in a state of disordered consciousness),
could be formulated based on evidence of awareness
[15]. With a similar rationale, pain as a subjective con-
scious experience corresponds to a form of conscious
awareness. And such evidence, according to some, may
give a strong reason to preserve life [77]. For the sake of
our discussion we can retain this hypothesis as one
possible explanation of the relationship observed in the
data and also an approach put forth by some commen-
tators [78] (and criticized by others [79]). We do admit
that this is an implicit connection but given its plausibility
and consequences, we discuss some of its assumptions
further.
The implicit connection between greater pain sen-
tience, greater awareness and therefore for greater
reticence to withdrawal of life support resonates with
a heavy trend in bioethics exploring the principle of
respect for persons in terms of personhood or moral
status of the person. This trend or line of argument
usually assumes that we respect persons or other moral
agents because of their ability or capacity as moral
agents or persons. The capacities of persons usually
refer to things like sentience and interests [80] or
cognitive abilities [81] according to different authors.
An enormous literature has examined and discussed if
and what conditions or criteria a person or a moral
agent must fulfill [e.g., 82], hoping thereby to shed
lights on debates related to the beginning or the end of
life [83]. In this scheme, evidence of sentience could
very well be understood as a proof of being a moral
agent. As suggested by Ropper, recent neuroimaging
research, if it shows residual cognitive function or pain
perception, could easily be interpreted by family mem-
bers as an indication that treatments should be main-
tained [78]. Underlying this view is the assumption
that some ontological status can be correlated to being
a person and, once this state established, respect for
that person or moral agent is called for. For the sake of
clarity and simplicity, this could be designated as the
ontological understanding of respect for persons in
this paper.
Generally, equating persons with their brains or
neurological status has been described in other areas
of neuroethics as neuro-essentialism [84] and carries
wide-ranging philosophical and practical problems
[85]. A closer examination of the ontological under-
standing of respect for persons reveals specific prob-
lems of two different natures. First, at a more practical
level, greater sentience or pain perception in MCS
could mean greater ability to feel pleasurable states
or well-being, which would call for specific therapeu-
tic approaches [79] and an argument in favour of
maintaining treatments. But greater sentience could
very well mean a greater ability to feel both pain and
suffering, i.e., the effects of being in a severely com-
promised state. In this sense, pain perception does not
relate directly or clearly to a specific stance in favour
of (or against) maintaining life support. Second, and
more fundamentally, respect for persons entails other
aspects which are not captured in a canonical (and
allegedly simplified for this paper) ontological under-
standing of respect for persons. On the one hand, the
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preferences and interests of the person to be main-
tained in a state of pain sentience could still be argued
to depend largely on preferences and interests as de-
fined by the patient herself previously (or as voiced or
articulated by a proxy decision-maker). In this sense,
the close attention to what the patient would have
wanted is crucial and the establishment of pain sen-
tience is not by any standards a surrogate for this. On
the other hand, still, the ontological view also causes
problems because it does not capture stricto sensu
non-ontological aspects of the principle of respect for
persons. Respect for persons does partly rely on the
fact that entities respected are considered to have a
moral status or moral agency but also, at the same
time, because they have worth and value for (and in
relationship to) others. Consider the scenario, of a
loved one (e.g., child, parent, spouse) being in a neu-
rologically severely compromised state, and even in a
state of disordered consciousness. To treat such a
compromised loved one without respect would stir in
most if not all strong feelings of disapproval even if
one agrees that cognitive capacities have diminished or
maybe vanished. This urge for respecting the person is
not based on the person’s capacities; on the contrary she
may have lost them. It is rather a mixture of obligations
towards others, respect for human relationship or respect
for what a person was before the injury that support this
principle. This is a more relational (or contextual) un-
derstanding of respect for persons and such an under-
standing is ill-captured by common arguments, which
equate the person to a neurological status as found at the
basis of the ontological view.
Consequently, the implicit connection between
sentience and attitudes favoring life should be
examined critically (if it does exist in clinicians
as we have supposed for our discussion to better
examine it critically). This link is debatable be-
cause it may rely on a dubious understanding of
respect for persons which does not capture the
preferences or wishes of the patient as defined
by herself, overly objectifies persons and ontolo-
gizes the principle of respect for persons. The
ontological view may carry forth a broader reduc-
tionist framework which, by strongly linking per-
sonhood to some ontological status, does not
grasp the relational aspects captured in the princi-
ple of respect for persons. By extension, implicit
or explicit uses of the ontological understanding
in interpretations of recent neuroimaging research
should be carefully identified and considered to
ensure clarity about the reasons underlying respect
for persons. This is reinforced by different studies
showing strong appeal of neuroimaging data in
the public eye [86–89], which could easily lead
to neuroessentialism.
Conclusions
The quantification of pain and suffering as well of
possible pleasure and happiness in VS/UWS and
MCS patients remains extremely challenging. Func-
tional neuroimanging and electrophysiology studies
are offering new ways to better understand the residual
cerebral processing of emotional stimuli in patients
with disorders of consciousness. We here showed that
healthcare providers’ beliefs on possible pain percep-
tion in these patients influence opinions on end-of-life.
More respondents who considered these patients to
feel pain also opposed to withdrawing life sustain
therapy. This interaction was stronger in religious
caregivers and nurses. Recent neuroimaging findings
as well as research on attitudes of healthcare providers
bring forth important questions about the relationship
of this research to clinical guidelines, the discrepan-
cies of attitudes between healthcare providers and the
complex relationship between pain perception and
attitudes toward life-sustaining treatments. These
ethical questions illustrate the need for closer atten-
tion to perspectives in research and in clinical care
within the development of consensual approaches
and guidelines; the need to understand practice
variability and to minimize its impact on families;
and the careful interpretation of recent neuroimaging
findings and their consequences on withdrawal of life
support.
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Abstract 
Introduction: We here employed functional MRI to better characterize hypnosis-related 
functional connectivity changes in large-scale cerebral networks. Methods: Twelve subjects 
were scanned in three conditions:  (1) normal eyes-closed wakefulness, (2) during mental 
imagery of pleasant autobiographical memories (i.e., control condition), and (3) during hypnotic 
state (reviving pleasant autobiographical memories). Seven seed regions were used to identify 
functional connectivity patterns of the default mode, left and right frontoparietal, salience, 
sensorimotor, auditory, and visual networks. Behavioral data concerning body sense 
modification, partial amnesia, and time sense modifications were collected at the end of each 
fMRI session. Results: Behaviorally, more subjects under hypnosis (as compared to the control 
condition) reported a modified sense of body and time as well as partial amnesia. Compared to 
the control condition of autobiographical mental imagery, we identified increased within-
network functional connectivity for the default mode, left and right frontoparietal, salience, 
sensorimotor, and auditory networks; an enhanced cross-modal interaction between auditory and 
visual cortices was further observed. The visual network only showed decreases in functional 
connectivity in both within and between-network areas (i.e., hippocampus). Conclusions: 
Hypnosis, as compared to a control condition of revivification of pleasant autobiographical 
memories, leads to increases in functional connectivity in the default mode, left and right 
frontoparietal, salience, sensorimotor, and auditory networks, potentially reflecting lack of 
inhibitory cortico-cortical mechanisms. Additionally, hypnosis-related decreases in visual 
network functional connectivity and increases in cross-modal interaction between auditory and 
visual networks could be identified, hypothesized to reflect a revivification of hypnotic 
suggestions and not merely cognitively guided memory retrieval.  
Key words: hypnosis, fMRI, resting state networks, connectivity, cross-modal interaction. 
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1. Introduction 
 Hypnosis is “a  procedure during which a health professional or researcher suggests that a 
patient or subject experiences changes in sensations, perceptions, thoughts, or behavior” (The 
Executive Committee of the American Psychological Association - Division of Psychological 
Hypnosis, 1994). At the phenomenological level, hypnosis is characterized by increased degrees 
of private processes, such as absorption (i.e., the capacity to remain implicated in a mental state),  
dissociation (i.e., the mental separation from the environment), disorientation in time, space and 
person, diminished tendency to judge and censor, whereas it reduces spontaneous thoughts and 
gives the feeling of one's own response as automatic or extravolitional (Rainville and Price, 
2003; Terhune and Cardena, 2010). Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is an 
appropriate means to study hypnosis (Oakley et al., 2007). Such neuroimaging  studies have 
contributed in elucidating the nature of hypnosis (intrinsic studies) and have used hypnosis as a 
means to explore psychological processes using specific suggestions (instrumental studies) 
(Oakley and Halligan, 2009).  
Previous studies on fMRI resting state connectivity showed that the brain is characterized 
by coherent low-frequency fluctuations in cerebral blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) 
signals. These BOLD fluctuations are organized in large-scale “resting state” networks (RSNs) 
(e.g., Beckmann et al., 2005; Damoiseaux et al., 2006; De Luca et al., 2006). It has been 
suggested that RSNs are of behavioral-functional significance because they strongly correlate 
with subjective reports (e.g., Boly et al., 2007; Ploner et al., 2010; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011) 
and functional patterns from fMRI activation studies (Laird et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2009). We 
have previously shown that in normal waking conditions, activity in the “default mode network” 
(DMN) (encompassing precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), mesiofrontal/anterior 
cingulate (ACC), and temporoparietal junction areas) and an anticorrelated “extrinsic” system 
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(encompassing lateral frontoparietal cortices) corresponds to subjective ratings of internal (self-
related mental processes) and external (perception of the environment through the senses) 
awareness respectively (Vanhaudenhuyse, et al., 2011). By means of hypnosis, we recently 
determined the functional contribution of these two networks to conscious awareness (Demertzi 
et al., 2011). As compared to a control condition of autobiographical mental imagery, we showed 
a hypnosis-related reduction in connectivity in the “extrinsic” system, possibly reflecting a 
decreased sensory or perceptual awareness. Importantly, the  different functions of a brain region 
cannot be understood in isolation (i.e., in terms of functional segregation) but only in 
conjunction with regions it interacts with (i.e., functional integration) (Seghier et al., 2010). 
Therefore, in order to better understand the neural correlates of subjective awareness under 
hypnotic state, we aimed to characterize hypnosis-induced functional connectivity changes in 
seven previously identified RSNs (i.e., default mode, left and right frontoparietal, salience, 
sensorimotor, auditory, and visual networks). We here employed a hypothesis-driven functional 
connectivity analysis using a seed-voxel approach (e.g., Fox et al., 2005; Greicius et al., 2003) to 
calculate whole-brain voxel-wise functional connectivity maps of covariance with the seed 
region. The same dataset has previously been analyzed using a data-driven independent 
component analysis, limited to identifying changes in default mode and anticorrelated networks 
(Demertzi, et al., 2011). 
2. Methods 
2.1. Subjects and hypnotic induction 
 Twelve healthy subjects (4 women, mean age: 21 years ±3 SD) with no previous  
neurological or psychiatric history participated in the study after giving written informed consent 
in accordance with the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Liège. 
A familiarization session with hypnosis preceded the main experiment. Subjects who reported 
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absorption and dissociation level >6/10 on a numeric rating scale were further included in the 
study. During the familiarization session, detailed information about past pleasant life 
experiences, which the subject wished to use during hypnotic induction, was obtained through a 
semi-structured interview as described elsewhere (Faymonville et al., 2003). The hypnotic state 
was induced in the same way as in our patients during surgery (Faymonville et al., 2000; 
Faymonville et al., 1999; Faymonville, et al., 2003) and as in our previous functional 
neuroimaging studies with healthy volunteers (Maquet et al., 1999; Vanhaudenhuyse, Boly, et 
al., 2009). The hypnotic induction encompassed a 3-min instruction procedure involving 
progressive eye-fixation and muscle relaxation. Subjects were then invited to re-experience their 
pleasant autobiographical memories. As in clinical conditions, permissive and indirect 
suggestions were used to develop and deepen the hypnotic state. Subjects were continuously 
given cues for maintaining a hypnotic state. The exact words and details of the induction 
technique and specific suggestions and details during the course of the induction varied 
depending upon the experimenter's (M.E.F.) observation of subject behavior, and on her 
judgment of subjects’ needs. During the experimental session the experimenters remained silent. 
 Three scanning sessions were performed: (1) during normal wakefulness, (2) during a 
control condition of mental imagery of autobiographical memories (i.e. the same memories used 
in hypnotic session but here without the hypnotic induction) (3) under hypnotic state. In order to 
exclude carry-over effects, the order of the sessions was randomized across subjects. After each 
fMRI session, subjective experience was debriefed on a 10-point numeric rating scale concerning 
emotion levels. Additional subjective reports were acquired using dichotomous (yes-no) scales 
measuring body sense modification (e.g., one arm felt longer than the other), partial amnesia and 
time sense modification (i.e., the session felt longer/shorter). 
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2.2. Functional data acquisition and preprocessing 
 Functional MRI time series were acquired on a 3T head-only scanner (Magnetom 
Allegra, Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany). Multislice T2*-weighted functional 
images were acquired with a gradient-echo echo-planar imaging sequence using axial slice 
orientation and covering the whole brain (32 slices, FoV = 220x220 mm², voxel size 3.4×3.4×3 
mm³, 30% interslice gap, matrix size 64x64x32, TR = 2460 ms, TE = 40 ms, FA = 90°). The 
three initial volumes were discarded to avoid T1 saturation effects. Head movements were 
minimized using customized cushions. A T1 magnetization prepared rapid gradient echo 
sequence was acquired in the same session for coregistration with functional data. Data 
preprocessing was performed using Statistical Parametric Mapping 8 (SPM8; 
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) and encompassed reorientation, realignment, coregistration, 
segmentation, normalization, and smoothing (8-mm full width at half-maximum). Further motion 
correction (for small, large and rapid motions, noise spikes, and spontaneous deep breaths) was 
performed using ArtRepair toolbox for SPM 
(http://cibsr.stanford.edu/tools/ArtRepair/ArtRepair.htm). 
2.3. Extraction of resting state networks and statistical analysis 
The identification of resting state networks was done in three steps as reported elsewhere 
(Boly et al., 2009; Boveroux et al., 2010; Fox, et al., 2005). First, the six motion parameters were 
used to regress in the initial signal in order to create a “dummy” BOLD signal, from which the 
regions of interest (ROIs) would be extracted. A high-pass filter of 128s was used to remove 
very low frequency fluctuations (.008 Hz). Second, time courses of interest were computed as 
the first principal component of the BOLD signal in 8-mm spherical ROIs centered on a priori 
coordinates from published studies: DMN [6 -42 32], left frontoparietal network [-44 36 20], 
right frontoparietal network  [44 36 20], auditory network [-40 -22 8], visual network [-4 -84 8] 
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(Boveroux, et al., 2010), salience network [38 26 -10] (Seeley et al., 2007), and sensorimotor 
network [-2 -12 44] (Greicius et al., 2008). For the executive control network, we opted for both 
left and right network ROI analyses due to a lateralized pattern in functional connectivity 
reported in previous resting state studies (e.g., Damoiseaux, et al., 2006; Smith, et al., 2009). 
Similar time course extractions were performed for two other voxels of interest, located in white 
matter [-22 16 32] and lateral ventricles [-6 20 10]. Third, a design matrix (per subject, per 
network, per condition (normal waking, control condition of autobiographical mental imagery, 
hypnotic state) was created with the ROI’s time course and 12 nuisance covariates (time courses 
in white matter, lateral ventricles, global signal and their derivatives, and the six movement 
parameters). Serial correlations were then estimated with a restricted maximum likelihood 
algorithm using an intrinsic autoregressive model during parameter estimations. The effects of 
interest were tested by linear contrasts, generating statistical parametric T maps for each subject. 
A contrast image was computed for each subject, for each network and for each condition, 
identifying regions correlating with the selected seed-region after removal of sources of spurious 
variance. 
For each network, individual summary statistical images were entered in a second-level 
analysis, corresponding to a random effects model which estimates the error variance across 
subjects (Holmes and Friston, 1998). These second-level analyses consisted of repeated 
measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) with 3 regressors representing the three experimental 
conditions (normal wakefulness, control condition, and hypnotic state) and 12 extra regressors 
modeling the subject-effects for each condition. The error covariance was not assumed to be 
independent between regressors, and a correction for nonsphericity was applied. One-sided T 
contrasts tested for connectivity effects in all analyses. After model estimation, a first T contrast 
searched for areas correlated with each selected seed region during normal wakefulness. 
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Increased connectivity in hypnotic state was estimated by a conjunction analysis between normal 
wakefulness and the mental imagery < hypnotic state contrast. Decreased connectivity in 
hypnotic state was estimated by a conjunction analysis between normal wakefulness and the 
mental imagery > hypnotic state contrast. Results were corrected for multiple comparisons at the 
whole brain level using family wise corrections or cluster level corrections thresholded for 
significance at p<.05. Small volume corrections for multiple comparisons were only accepted in 
previously identified networks in the normal waking condition (i.e., identifying within network 
hypnosis-induced connectivity changes using an 8 mm sphere radius). Behavioral data were 
analyzed with SPSS v.16. Wilcoxon’s sign rank tests was used to test differences between 
conditions for the numerical rating scale. Chi-square tests were used to test differences between 
conditions for the dichotomous scale. Results were considered significant at p<.05. 
3. Results 
Under hypnosis, more subjects reported body sense modification (n=7), partial amnesia 
(n=10) and time sense modification (n=9) as compared to the control condition (Figure 1). 
Emotional state ratings were not different under hypnosis (mean and SD 5.8±2.7) as compared to 
the control condition (i.e., autobiographical mental imagery) (mean and SD 5.1±2.7, p=.068). 
The identified DMN during normal wakefulness encompassed precuneus/posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC), mesiofrontal/anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), bilateral temporoparietal 
junctions, bilateral middle frontal gyri, parahippocampal gyrus, and thalamus (Table 1, green 
areas in Figure 2). In hypnosis (as compared to the control condition), increased within-network 
connectivity was observed in mesiofrontal cortex, bilateral temporoparietal junctions, bilateral 
middle frontal gyri, and bilateral thalami (Table 1, red areas in Figure 2). No areas showed 
hypnosis-related decreases. 
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The left frontoparietal network identified during normal wakefulness encompassed 
bilateral inferior and superior frontal gyri, bilateral inferior parietal lobes and 
ACC/supplementary motor area (SMA) (Table 1, green areas in Figure 2). In hypnosis (as 
compared to the control condition), increased within-network connectivity was observed in the 
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and middle occipital gyrus (Table 1, red areas in Figure 2). 
Decreased within-network connectivity was observed in most areas of the network (i.e., left 
inferior parietal lobe, contralateral middle frontal gyrus, left superior frontal gyrus/SMA, and 
ACC; Table 1, blue areas in Figure 2). 
The right frontoparietal network identified during normal wakefulness encompassed 
bilateral inferior frontal gyri and bilateral inferior parietal lobes, ACC/supplementary motor area 
(SMA) and bilateral insular cortices (Table 1, green areas in Figure 2). In hypnosis, increased 
within-network connectivity was observed in bilateral inferior parietal lobes, the ACC and 
bilateral insular cortex (Table 1, red areas in Figure 2). No areas showed hypnosis-related 
decreases in functional connectivity.  
The salience network identified during normal wakefulness encompassed insula, 
superior, inferior and middle frontal gyri, ACC, bilateral inferior parietal lobes, right middle 
temporal gyrus and bilateral globus pallidus (Table 1, green areas in Figure 2). In hypnosis, 
increased within-network connectivity was observed in the left insula, left inferior and middle 
frontal gyrus, and the ACC. Additional functional increases were identified in midcingulate 
cortex, right parahippocampal gyrus and right thalamus (Table 1, red areas in Figure 2). 
Decreased connectivity was observed in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Table 1, blue areas 
in Figure 2). 
The sensorimotor network identified in normal wakefulness encompassed 
SMA/midcingulate cortex, bilateral primary motor cortex and middle frontal gyri (Table 1, green 
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areas in Figure 2). In hypnosis, increased within-network connectivity was observed in ACC and 
left middle frontal gyrus. Additional increases were identified in bilateral premotor cortices, left 
superior temporal gyrus and left inferior frontal gyrus (Table 1, red areas in Figure 2). Decreased 
within-network connectivity was observed in midcingulate cortex (Table 1, blue areas in Figure 
2). 
The auditory network identified in normal wakefulness encompassed bilateral superior 
temporal gyri/insular cortex, bilateral premotor, primary motor/somatosensory cortices, 
midcingulate cortex, bilateral thalami, left globus pallidus, and the brainstem (Table 1, green 
areas in Figure 2). In hypnosis, increased within-network connectivity was observed in bilateral 
middle and superior (spreading to fusiform area) temporal gyrus. Additional functional increases 
were identified in left inferior frontal gyrus and primary visual cortex (Table 1, red areas in 
Figure 2). The effect sizes of the observed cross-modal interaction between the primary auditory 
and primary visual cortex in the three conditions are displayed in Figure 3. Decreased within-
network connectivity was observed in the bilateral globus pallidus and the brainstem (Table 1, 
blue areas in Figure 2). 
The visual network identified in normal wakefulness encompassed primary and 
extrastriate visual cortices.  No areas showed hypnosis-related increases. Decreased within-
network connectivity was observed in the extrastriate visual cortex; additional functional 
decreases were observed with the left hippocampus (Table 1, blue areas in Figure 2). 
4. Discussion  
We here used hypnotic suggestion of pleasant autobiographical memories to investigate 
fMRI seed-based functional connectivity changes in seven functional “resting state” networks 
(RSNs). Subjects were invited to revive pleasant autobiographical memories as we use it in the 
clinical setting and during surgery (Faymonville, et al., 2000; Faymonville et al., 1997; 
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Faymonville, et al., 2003). At the behavioral level, significantly more subjects reported 
modifications in body sense, time sense and partial amnesia. Such experiential changes are 
commonly reported by hypnotized subjects who recognize an inability to judge, monitor and 
censor incoming information, with subsequent experiences that their own responses are 
automatic, characterized by suspension of usual orientation toward person, time, and location 
(Cardena, 2005; Rainville and Price, 2003). Emotional ratings were similarly high both in 
hypnosis and the control condition of autobiographical mental imagery, in contrast to previous 
studies showing higher emotional levels in hypnosis (Cardena, 2005). We should note here that 
the selection of the control condition to hypnosis remains challenging because in principle no 
cognitive state is comparable to hypnotic state. Past studies used subtraction analyses from 
baseline (e.g., Rainville et al., 2002) or mental imagery tasks (e.g., Derbyshire et al., 2004; 
Szechtman et al., 1998) to study hypnosis-related effects.  
fMRI analyses overall showed more important hypnosis-related increases in functional 
connectivity (both within- and between- network)  in six of the seven studied RSNs (i.e., DMN, 
right and left frontoparietal, salience, sensorimotor, and auditory networks); whereas the visual 
network was characterized by functional connectivity decreases in hypnosis (as compared to the 
control condition). These results extend  previous positron emission tomography (PET) studies 
showing that  hypnosis increases blood flow in the prefrontal cortex, right inferior parietal lobe, 
ACC, precentral regions, thalamus and brainstem, while decreasing activity in left inferior 
parietal lobe, precuneus/posterior cingulate, and occipital areas (Rainville, et al., 2002; Rainville 
et al., 1999). Similar increases and occipital decreases in functional connectivity during hypnosis 
were also observed after the application of noxious stimulation (Faymonville, et al., 2003; 
Vanhaudenhuyse, et al., 2009).  
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At the network-level, our identified DMN connectivity in normal waking conditions, 
classically encompassing precuneus/PCC, mesiofrontal/ACC, and bilateral temporoparietal 
junctions, corroborates previous studies in normal healthy controls (e.g., Fransson, 2005; 
Golland et al., 2007; Greicius, et al., 2003; Gusnard et al., 2001; Soddu et al., 2011). Albeit not 
systematically reported but in line with other studies, we also identified middle frontal (Greicius, 
et al., 2008; Laird et al., 2009), parahippocampal gyri (Greicius, et al., 2003; Vanhaudenhuyse, 
Noirhomme, et al., 2009), and thalami (Boveroux, et al., 2010; Fransson, 2005; Uddin et al., 
2009) as part of the DMN in normal waking conditions. Under hypnosis (compared to the control 
condition), we observed within-network functional increases in most areas of the DMN (i.e., 
mesiofrontal/ACC, bilateral temporoparietal junctions, middle frontal gyri, and thalami).  Such 
increases in connectivity might account for enhanced recollection of autobiographical 
information, previously shown to include medial prefrontal areas, medial and lateral temporal 
and retrosplenial/PCC, and temporoparietal junction (Svoboda et al., 2006). The hypnotized 
subjects might also have been more intensely involved in other self-related cognitive processes 
to which DMN activity has been classically linked, such as mind wandering (Mason et al., 2007), 
task-unrelated thoughts (McKiernan et al., 2006), introspection (Goldberg et al., 2006), and 
monitoring of the “mental self” (Lou et al., 2004). Indeed, we previously showed that hypnotized 
subjects self-rated increased absorption and dissociation levels parallel to diminished intensity of 
external thoughts, corroborating phenomenological studies where subjects’ scores during 
hypnosis were distributed across two response patterns, suggesting a dissociate type and an 
inward attention profile of experiencing hypnotic state (Terhune and Cardena, 2010). These 
findings can be discussed in light of a generally preserved functional connectivity in the DMN 
while the anticorrelated to DMN lateral frontoparietal network (broadly linked to perceptual 
awareness) showed reduced functional connectivity (Demertzi, et al., 2011). Other studies with 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
13 
 
hypnosis reported preserved connectivity in the precuneus/PCC next to cortical deactivations in 
the mesiofrontal part of the DMN during hypnosis, thought to mediate suspension of 
spontaneous non-goal directed cognitive activity (McGeown et al., 2009). Observed differences 
in functional patterns may be attributed to the different experimental protocols employed (i.e., 
guided mental imagery vs. resting state epochs from block and event-related designs) and the 
conditions under which the data have been collected. The choice of rest condition (eyes open, 
eyes closed) for instance, seems to influence cerebral spontaneous activity, as it was shown for 
visual areas (Bianciardi et al., 2009; Marx et al., 2004).  
In activation studies with healthy controls, the left frontoparietal network has been often 
identified together with the right frontoparietal network (e.g., Dosenbach et al., 2008; Shulman et 
al., 2002). However, spatial similarity analysis between RSNs extracted with data-driven 
independent component analyses and those emerging from activation studies revealed that the 
right and left frontoparietal networks correlate with different activation datasets: the left 
frontoparietal corresponding to cognitive and “language” paradigms and the right frontoparietal 
corresponding to perceptual, somesthetic and nociception paradigms (consistent with the 
identification of the insula) (e.g., Boveroux, et al., 2010; Damoiseaux, et al., 2006; Laird, et al., 
2011; Smith, et al., 2009). Due to this lateralized profile extracted with independent components 
analyses, here we studied functional connectivity separately for each network. During normal 
wakefulness, the identified left frontoparietal network encompassed bilateral inferior and 
superior frontal gyri, bilateral inferior parietal lobes, and ACC/supplementary motor area (SMA), 
similar to the aforementioned studies with independent component analysis. Under hypnosis 
(compared to the control condition), we found increased functional connectivity in the right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and occipital middle gyrus (areas not part of the initially identified 
network). Such increased connectivity between occipital and frontal areas has been recently 
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shown to contribute to the maintenance of visual short-term memories - evidenced as electrical 
oscillatory synchronization in non-human primates (Liebe et al., 2012). It could be hypothesized 
that the observed increases in connectivity of the left frontoparietal with occipital regions and the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex accounts for an enhanced ability of the subjects to retain more 
efficiently the suggested visual-related autobiographical hypnotic suggestions. We also observed 
a hypnosis-induced decreased connectivity in the left inferior parietal lobe, left middle frontal 
and superior frontal gyrus/SMA, and ACC. Altered activation of these areas, particularly of the 
left inferior parietal lobe, has been suggested to contribute to an altered monitoring of external 
time (Coull and Nobre, 1998; Wiener et al., 2010), consistent with our subjects’ behavioral 
reports of time sense modification under hypnosis. 
The right frontoparietal network during normal wakefulness encompassed bilateral 
inferior frontal gyri, bilateral inferior parietal lobes, ACC/SMA, and bilateral insular cortex 
similar to previous studies (Boveroux, et al., 2010; Damoiseaux, et al., 2006; Smith, et al., 2009). 
In healthy conditions, the right posterior parietal cortex mediates body-related visuospatial 
abilities and is suggested to exert inhibitory activity over the contralateral homologous areas 
(Koch et al., 2011). In hypnosis, we observed increased within-network connectivity in the right 
frontoparietal network (bilateral inferior parietal lobe, ACC, bilateral insular cortex) and no 
decreases in functional connectivity. Similar cerebral blood flow increases in  right inferior 
frontal and right inferior parietal gyri were also previously shown for hypnotic state using PET 
(Rainville, et al., 2002). In hypnosis, it can be that enhanced connectivity in the right 
frontoparietal network might account for increased inhibitory processes on the left hemisphere 
(by “imposing” its visuospatial abilities) parallel to an altered state of bodily self-awareness. 
Such modified bodily senses, like altered sense of agency and out-of-body experiences, have also 
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been linked to similar activity increases - especially in the right temporoparietal junction area 
(Blanke et al., 2002).  
 The identified regions of the salience network in normal wakefulness encompassed 
bilateral insular/ superior-inferior-middle frontal and ACC areas, as classically reported (Menon 
and Uddin, 2010; Ploner, et al., 2010; Seeley, et al., 2007; Sridharan et al., 2008; Wiech et al., 
2010). Additionally, we also identified bilateral inferior parietal lobes, right middle temporal 
gyrus, and bilateral globus pallidus also in accordance with previously published work (e.g., 
Seeley, et al., 2007). In normal conditions, activation of the insula and ACC are commonly 
observed in conflict monitoring, information integration, and response selection (e.g., Cole and 
Schneider, 2007; Roberts and Hall, 2008). The salience network  is also thought to be involved  
in interoception and pain (Laird, et al., 2011).We here found that in hypnosis (as compared to 
control condition) there was increased activity in most areas of the salience network (e.g., ACC, 
bilateral insular cortex) and reduced connectivity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. 
Altogether, these observations can be interpreted as a decreased capacity of hypnotized subjects 
to cognitively control (i.e., requiring dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) conflicting incoming 
information (i.e., requiring ACC). Indeed, previous findings measuring Stroop task performance 
under hypnosis showed increased conflict-related activity in the ACC and unmodulated cognitive 
control-related lateral frontal cortex activity and this activation pattern further correlated with the 
Stroop error-rate (Egner et al., 2005). The ACC and insula have also been implicated in the 
processing of emotional aspects of noxious stimuli (e.g., Ploner, et al., 2010; Wiech, et al., 
2010). Therefore, their increased coupling under hypnosis may reflect an enhanced emotional 
state, as it was previously reported that hypnotic suggestions for creating pain experiences led to 
activation of ACC and insula (Derbyshire, et al., 2004). Conversely, hypnosis-induced analgesia 
with suggestions of pleasant memories, failed to elicit ACC responses to noxious stimuli as 
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compared to normal wakefulness (Vanhaudenhuyse, et al., 2009). We also identified hypnosis-
induced increased connectivity between right insula and midcingulate cortex, right 
parahippocampal gyrus, and thalamus. Concerning the midcingulate cortex, similar connectivity 
increases with the insula have been previously identified by our group during hypnosis-induced 
analgesia towards noxious stimulation (Faymonville, et al., 2003). During normal wakefulness, 
the midcingulate cortex was also found functionally connected to the insular cortex (Taylor et al., 
2009). The authors interpreted this connectivity pattern as contributing to the integration of 
interoceptive information with emotional salience in order to form a subjective representation of 
the body. Hence, an enhanced increased insular-midcingulate connectivity in hypnosis might 
account for  experiences of an altered emotional state (mediated by the emotionally-related 
midcingulate cortex, Shackman et al., 2011) concerning the representation of the body (mediated 
by insula and ACC) (Damasio, 1994) including interoceptive awareness (Khalsa et al., 2009). 
This interpretation fits with our recorded subjective reports for a modified body sense in 
hypnotic state. Concerning the right parahippocampal gyrus, increases in functional connectivity 
in hypnosis may account for a vivid mental imagery, usually reported by hypnotized subjects 
(Pekala et al., 2010). Indeed, the right parahippocampal gyrus has been shown to mediate the 
formulation of prototypical mental images (Gardini et al., 2005). Concerning the thalamus, 
increased connectivity in the thalamus was previously suggested to maintain stable levels of 
performance in low arousal levels (e.g., occurring after sleep deprivation), hence preventing a 
generalized thalamocortical synchronization that would lead to sleep (Portas et al., 1998). The 
importance of thalamocortical connectivity to consciousness is further highlighted by its 
systematic absence in consciousness pathologies, like in vegetative state patients (eyes open, no 
signs of awareness of self and environment, Laureys et al., 2000). 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
17 
 
The identified sensorimotor network (in normal wakefulness) encompassed 
supplementary motor area (SMA),/midcingulate cortex, bilateral primary motor cortex and 
bilateral middle frontal gyri, as in previous studies (Biswal et al., 1995; Cordes et al., 2000; 
Greicius, et al., 2008; Mannfolk et al., 2011). In hypnosis (as compared to the control condition) 
we found increased connectivity in most areas of the sensorimotor network (i.e., ACC, left 
middle frontal gyrus, bilateral premotor cortex) but also in right superior temporal and left 
inferior frontal gyrus. Decreased connectivity was observed in midcingulate cortex. Previous 
studies with hypnosis also identified increases in motor-related areas (precentral and premotor) 
considered to reflect muscular relaxation (Maquet, et al., 1999; Rainville and Price, 2003). Other 
studies using hypnosis to study this network also reported increases in functional connectivity. 
For example, hypnotic suggestions for left or right hand paralysis observed increased coupling 
between precuneus and primary motor cortex (Cojan et al., 2009) or other cortical areas (i.e., 
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, angular gyrus, Pyka et al., 2011). The authors considered 
their evidence suggestive of enhanced self-monitoring processes or modified cerebral 
representation of self during hypnosis. In normal resting state, the sensorimotor network has 
been related to action-execution and perception-somesthesis paradigms (such as action 
imagination, preparation, and visual motion) (Laird, et al., 2011; Smith, et al., 2009).  It could 
then be that the observed enhanced connectivity under hypnosis reflects vivid motor-related 
mental imagery. Concerning the midcingulate cortex, previous studies showed that, together with 
the motor network, they are involved in monitoring response conflicts (as in go-trials, Huster et 
al., 2011). A decreased connectivity in the midcingulate cortex during hypnosis could imply a 
diminished capacity to monitor similar conflicts, corroborating phenomenological reports of 
hypnotized subjects experiencing their responses as automatic and extravolitional (Rainville and 
Price, 2003). Indeed, a previous study measuring regional cerebral blood flow indicated 
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increased connectivity between the midcingulate cortex and pre-SMA during hypnotic analgesia 
(Faymonville, et al., 2003). However, the pre-SMA is thought to be involved in inhibitory 
mechanisms but not in the processing of conflicts per se (Huster, et al., 2011). 
The auditory network during normal wakefulness encompassed bilateral superior 
temporal gyri/insular cortex, bilateral thalami, and left globus pallidus as is classically described 
(Cordes, et al., 2000; Eckert et al., 2008). We additionally identified motor-related areas (i.e., 
bilateral premotor and primary motor/somatosensory cortices) as well as midcingulate cortex, 
and brainstem also in accordance with previous findings (Martuzzi et al., 2010). In hypnosis, 
increased within-network connectivity was observed in bilateral middle temporal and superior 
temporal gyrus (spreading to the left fusiform area). Additional increases in functional 
connectivity were identified in left inferior frontal gyrus and primary visual cortex. The observed 
increased cross-modal connectivity between the primary auditory and primary visual cortex is 
confirmed by anatomical tracer studies in nonhuman primates (e.g., Clavagnier et al., 2004). 
Such cross-modal interaction is also present in controls during normal wakefulness (Eckert, et 
al., 2008) and disappeared during deep propofol anesthesia (Boveroux, et al., 2010). 
Behaviorally, such cross-modal interaction was shown in subjects who underwent hypnotic 
suggestions for having grapheme-color synesthesia, similar to what was observed in congenital 
grapheme-color synesthetes. The authors interpreted these findings as evidence for decreased 
inhibition processes between brain areas (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2009). Similarly here, the 
enhanced cross-modal interaction between low-level auditory and visual cortices in hypnosis 
could reflect increased cortical disinhibition during hypnosis, corroborating subjective reports of 
a dream-like state of consciousness of rich mental imagery (Cardena, 2005; Rainville and Price, 
2003). Decreased connectivity was observed in bilateral globus pallidus and brainstem. As 
regards the auditory system in normal wakefulness, globus pallidus was shown to respond to 
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auditory feedback of sensorimotor sequences (Prodoehl et al., 2008). A decreased functional 
connectivity with the auditory cortex in hypnosis could be indicative of a selective “neglect” to 
environmental auditory stimuli, consistent with subjects’ reports on having less external (i.e., 
environmental) thoughts in hypnotic state (Demertzi, et al., 2011). Finally, decreased 
connectivity of the auditory cortex with the brainstem might imply a lower-level processing of 
neural impulses generated in the inner ears (Langers et al., 2005), in line with hypnotized 
subjects’ self-reports on their experienced phenomenology dissociating from the external world.  
The visual network (identified during normal wakefulness) encompassed medial posterior 
occipital areas and included primary, secondary, and tertiary visual cortices as in previous 
studies (Lowe et al., 1998). Occipital activation in normal conditions is commonly detected in 
retrieval of nonverbal material (Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000) and during recollection of scenes 
(Johnson and Rugg, 2007). In “resting state” conditions, it has been associated to viewing simple 
visual stimuli (Laird, et al., 2011). The visual network was the only RSN showing hypnosis-
induced decreases in functional connectivity in extrastriate visual areas and the left 
hippocampus. Similar occipital decreases under hypnosis have been observed in hypnosis-
induced analgesia with pleasant autobiographical suggestions as studied by PET (Faymonville, et 
al., 2003). A previous fMRI study with posthypnotic suggestion to forget autobiographical long-
term memories (i.e., scenes of a previously watched movie) also showed pronounced diminished 
activity in the extrastriate occipital lobes in the subjects who underwent the posthypnotic 
amnesia suggestion as compared to those who did not (Mendelsohn et al., 2008). In combination 
with an observed decrease in the  hippocampus, a structure classically related to the encoding 
and retrieval of long-term memories (Kolb and Whishaw, 2003), it can be hypothesized that 
subjects in hypnosis do not merely retrieve stored memories, but rather revive them by following 
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the experimenters instruction. This pattern may also account for the observed significant increase 
of amnesia after the hypnotic state as compared to our control condition. 
In conclusion, as compared to a control condition of pleasant autobiographical memories, 
we here mainly identified increased within-network functional connectivity for the default mode, 
left and right frontoparietal, salience, sensorimotor, and auditory networks, potentially reflecting 
lack of inhibitory cortico-cortical mechanisms. This hypothesis is further supported by an 
increased cross-modal interaction between primary auditory and primary visual cortex in 
hypnosis as compared to the non-hypnosis conditions. The visual network only showed 
decreases in functional connectivity in both within and between-network areas (i.e., 
hippocampus), possibly reflecting a free revivification of hypnotic suggestions and not mere 
memory retrieval.  
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Subjective ratings during normal wakefulness, autobiographical mental imagery, and 
hypnotic state. More subjects reported body sense modification, partial amnesia, and time sense 
modification during hypnotic state as compared to autobiographical mental imagery and normal 
wakefulness (*p<.05). 
 
Figure 2. Identified functional connectivity during normal wakefulness (green areas) in seven 
large-scale resting state networks. Compared to control condition, resting state networks mainly 
exhibit hypnosis-related increases in functional connectivity (red areas) with some areas showing 
decreased functional connectivity (blue areas).  Of note is the visual network which exhibits only 
within-network hypnosis-related functional connectivity decreases. Results are displayed on a 
structural T1 magnetic resonance template. Normal wakefulness results are thresholded at family 
wise error rate corrected p<.05 (whole brain) and, for display purposes, functional connectivity 
increases/decreases in hypnosis are shown at uncorrected p<.001 (x, y and z values indicate the 
Montreal National Institute coordinates of represented sections). 
 
Figure 3. Increased cross-modal interaction between auditory network (seed) and identified 
visual network (shown in yellow) in hypnotic state (as compared to the control condition). For 
display purposes, data are thresholded at uncorrected p<.001 superimposed on a structural T1 
magnetic resonance template. Effect sizes (expressed as group mean and 90% CI) are shown in 
the right panel, reflecting for connectivity between auditory and visual cortices during normal 
wakefulness, autobiographical mental imagery, and hypnotic state.  
1 
 
Table 1. Peak voxels of the seven resting state networks identified in normal wakefulness and 
after contrasting hypnotic state with a control condition of autobiographical mental imagery.  
 x y z Z value p value  
Default mode network      
Normal wakefulness      
Precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex  (7/31)
+
 9 -49 37 inf <.001*** 
Mesiofrontal/Anterior cingulate cortex (10/32) 3 47 -5 6.53 <.001*** 
L Temporoparietal junction (39) -45 -64 25 7.37 <.001*** 
R Temporoparietal junction (39) 51 -58 19 7.24 <.001*** 
L Middle frontal gyrus (8) -21 20 43 5.95 <.001*** 
R Middle frontal gyrus (6) 24 20 52 6.39 <.001*** 
L Parahippocampal gyrus -24 -28 -14 4.64 .046*** 
R Thalamus 9 -13 7 4.63 .048*** 
Hypnosis > control       
Precuneus/posterior cingulate (7/31)
+
       
Mesiofrontal/Anterior cingulate cortex (10/32) 15 41 10 5.67 <.001*** 
L Temporoparietal junction (39) -48 -61 19 5.43 .001*** 
R Temporoparietal junction (39) 51 -55 13 4.71 .041*** 
L Middle frontal gyrus (8) -24 14 37 4.20 .013** 
R Middle frontal gyrus (6) 30 11 22 4.17 .016** 
L Thalamus -12 -10 7 4.48 <.001* 
R Thalamus 15 -10 7 3.61 .007* 
Hypnosis < control      
No areas identified      
Left frontoparietal network      
Normal wakefulness      
L Inferior frontal gyrus (9/46/13)
+
 -45 35 19 Inf <.001*** 
R Inferior frontal gyrus (9/46/13) 45 41 13 Inf <.001*** 
Table_1
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(continued) x y z Z value p value  
Left frontoparietal network      
Normal wakefulness      
L Inferior parietal lobe (40) -57 -43 43 6.45 <.001*** 
R Inferior parietal lobe (7) 36 -58 46 5.13 .007*** 
L Superior frontal gyrus (6) -21 8 52 5.35 .002*** 
R Superior frontal gyrus (6) 24 8 61 5.29 .003*** 
Anterior cingulate cortex/ Supplementary motor area (32/6) -9 20 37 5.64 <.001*** 
Hypnosis > control      
L Inferior frontal gyrus (9/45)
 +
 -54 20 16 5.30 .003*** 
R Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (9) 42 8 28 5.28 .003*** 
L Middle occipital gyrus (19) -42 -85 16 4.43 .001** 
Hypnosis < control      
L Inferior parietal lobe (40) -51 -46 49 3.91 .002* 
R Middle frontal gyrus (10) 33 47 13 4.54 .006** 
L Superior frontal gyrus/Supplementary motor area (8/6) -15 17 43 3.97 .036** 
Anterior cingulate cortex (32) 15 35 16 3.82 .004* 
Right frontoparietal network       
Normal wakefulness       
R Inferior frontal gyrus (9/46)
 +
 45 35 19 Inf <.001*** 
L Inferior frontal gyrus (9/46) -45 26 25 inf <.001*** 
L Inferior parietal lobe (40) -42 -55 40 inf <.001*** 
R Inferior parietal lobe  (40) 36 -55 40 inf <.001*** 
Anterior cingulate cortex/ Supplementary motor area (32/6) 9 20 43 7.01 <.001*** 
R insula 33 17 -8 6.86 <.001*** 
L insula -30 17 1 5.25 .004*** 
Hypnosis > control      
R Inferior frontal gyrus (9/46)
 +
 45 35 19 Inf <.001*** 
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(continued) x y z Z value p value  
Right frontoparietal network      
Hypnosis > control      
L Inferior parietal lobe  (40) -54 -46 34 3.70 .038** 
R Inferior parietal lobe  (40/39) 57 -46 43 4.28 .001** 
Anterior cingulate cortex (32) 9 23 40 4.74 .039*** 
L Insula -24 14 1 3.80 <.001* 
R Insula 27 11 1 4.53 <.001* 
Hypnosis < control      
No areas      
Salience network      
Normal wakefulness      
R Insula/Superior-Inferior-Middle frontal gyrus (6/9/10)
+
 39 23 -11 Inf <.001*** 
L Insula/Superior-Inferior-Middle frontal gyrus (6/9/10) -33 26 -14 Inf <.001*** 
Anterior cingulate cortex (32) 6 20 40 6.43 <.001*** 
L Inferior parietal lobe (40) -66 -43 22 5.19 .005*** 
R Inferior parietal lobe (40) 51 -43 31 5.36 .002*** 
R Middle temporal gyrus (21) 51 -25 -8 5.49 .001*** 
L Globus pallidus -15 5 -2 5.20 .005*** 
R Globus pallidus 15 8 1 5.67 <.001*** 
Hypnosis > control      
R Insula
+
 39 23 -11 Inf <.001*** 
L Insula/Inferior frontal gyrus/Middle frontal gyrus (47/10) -39 -13 -8 4.84 .023*** 
Anterior cingulate cortex (32) 9 35 19 3.82 .004* 
Midcingulate cingulate cortex (24) 3 8 40 3.52 .050** 
R Parahippocampal gyrus 27 -22 -5 4.04 .001** 
R Thalamus 9 -28 -5 3.93 .001** 
Hypnosis < control      
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(continued) x y z Z value p value  
Salience network      
Hypnosis < control      
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (9) 33 50 16 4.95 .015*** 
Sensorimotor network      
Normal wakefulness      
Supplementary motor area (SMA)/Midcingulate cortex (24)
+
 -3 -33 43 Inf <.001*** 
L Primary motor cortex (4) 39 -13 40 7.45 <.001*** 
R Middle frontal gyrus (4) -27 -28 46 inf <.001*** 
L Middle frontal gyrus (9) -30 35 25 5.13 .007*** 
R Dorsolatreral prefrontal cortex (9) 30 38 28 4.79 .030*** 
Hypnosis > control      
Supplementary motor area (SMA)
 + 
 -3 -13 43 Inf <.001*** 
Anterior cingulate cortex (32) 0 29 22 4.65 .002** 
L Middle frontal gyrus (9/10) -27 44 22 4.29 .027** 
L Premotor cortex (6) -51 -4 40 4.33 .003** 
R Premotor cortex (6) 48 -1 46 5.28 .003*** 
R Superior temporal gyrus (22) 45 -37 1 4.51 .020** 
L Inferior frontal gyrus (45) -39 20 4 4.53 .010** 
Hypnosis < control      
Midcingulate cortex (24)
 
-12 2 37 4.08 .033** 
Auditory network      
Normal wakefulness      
L Superior temporal gyrus (22/41)
+
/Insula -39 -22 7 Inf <.001*** 
R Superior temporal gyrus (41)/Insula 48 -25 13 inf <.001*** 
L Premotor cortex (6) -6 -10 70 4.97 .043*** 
R Premotor cortex (6) 15 -4 70 5.11 .007*** 
L Primary motor/somatosensory cortex (4/5) -18 -22 70 6.37 <.001*** 
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(continued) x y z Z value p value  
Auditory network      
Normal wakefulness      
R Primary motor/somatosensory cortex (4/5) 24 -31 67 5.83 <.001*** 
Midcingulate cortex (24) -3 5 37 6.32 <.001*** 
L Thalamus -15 -22 1 5.02 <.001*** 
R Thalamus 15 -19 -2 5.81 <.001*** 
L Globus pallidus -18 2 -5 5.45 .001*** 
Brainstem 6 -25 -20 5.59 .001*** 
Hypnosis > control      
L Superior temporal gyrus (22)
 +
 -39 -25 7 Inf .001*** 
L Middle temporal gyrus (21) -54 -7 -17 4.17 <.001* 
R Middle temporal gyrus (21) 57 2 -17 4.32 <.001* 
L Superior temporal gyrus (22)/Fusiform gyrus (37) -54 -52 7 4.46 .003** 
R Superior temporal gyrus (22) 51 -43 4 4.05 .008** 
L Inferior frontal gyrus (47) -39 29 -5 4.92 .018*** 
Primary visual cortex (17)  -6 -82 13 3.58 .001** 
Hypnosis < control       
L Globus pallidus  -24 -10 -2 3.93 <.001** 
R Globus pallidus 18 -4 -5 3.84 .038** 
Brainstem 3 -25 -20 4.16 <.001* 
Visual network      
Normal wakefulness      
Primary visual cortex (17)
+
 0 -85 7 Inf <.001*** 
Extrastriate visual cortex (18/19) 18 -76 10 inf <.001*** 
Hypnosis > control      
No areas identified      
Hypnosis < control      
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(continued) x y z Z value p value  
Visual network      
Hypnosis < control      
Primary visual cortex (17)
+
 0 -85 7 Inf <.001*** 
Extrastriate visual cortex  (19) -33 -61 7 4.29 <.001* 
Hippocampus -27 -28 -8 4.13 .005** 
*** Family wise error rate corrected p value 
  **Cluster-level p value 
    *Small-volume (8mm sphere) corrected p value  
    
+ 
Seed area 
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Introduction
The introduction of the mechanical ventilator in the 1950s and the development
of intensive care in the 1960s permitted many patients to sustain their vegetative
functions and survive severe injuries. Despite such advances, in many cases
patients were found to suffer from altered states of consciousness which had
never been encountered before as these patients would normally have died from
apnea [1]. The imminent ethical impact of these profound states of unconscious-
ness was reflected in the composition of the first bioethical committees discussing
the redefinition of life and the concept of therapeutic obstinacy. In 1968, the Ad
Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School published a milestone paper for the
redefinition of death as irreversible coma and brain failure [2]. The committee
was comprised of ten physicians, a theologian, a lawyer and a historian of science,
betokening the medical, legal and societal debates that were to follow. We will
here give a brief overview of some ethical issues related to the concept of con-
sciousness and the medical management of patients with disorders of conscious-
ness, such as comatose, vegetative and minimally conscious states that may be
encountered in the intensive care setting. We will emphasize the problem of pain
management and end-of life decision-making.
Ethical Issues in Clinical Management
Confusions and controversies are often related to the way we define things. One
such multifaceted term is consciousness, which has many divergent connotations
[3]. The way we define consciousness is crucial, as it may govern our attitudes
towards medical management of disorders of consciousness. For example, in a
survey among medical and paramedical professionals (n = 1858), compared to a
student population (n = 250), we recently found that although the majority of
health-care workers denied a distinction between consciousness and the brain,
more than one-third of medical and paramedical professionals still regarded the
mind and brain as separate entities (Fig. 1). Such dualistic opinions may have
implications in the formulation of scientific questions about the nature of con-
sciousness, in the clinical management of disorders of consciousness, and in the
reception of both by the general public [4]. We here adopt a perspective where
consciousness is clinically defined as having two components, wakefulness and
awareness [5]. Under this definition, many variant altered states of consciousness
may be hosted. The most transient and most familiar to us all is the transition
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Fig. 1. Dualistic attitudes towards the mind-brain relationship among students (Edinburgh survey,
n = 250) and health-care professionals (Lie`ge survey, n = 1858). Adapted from [4] with permission.
from conscious wakefulness to deep sleep; the drowsier we become, the less aware
we get of our surroundings and of ourselves. This implies that patients in coma
and under anesthesia (i.e., pharmacological coma) are unaware because they can-
not be awakened, even after noxious stimulation. The vegetative state is defined
as ‘wakefulness without awareness’, in which patients may open their eyes but
will never exhibit non-reflex voluntary movements [6]. A patient in a minimally
conscious state may show some signs declaring awareness (e.g., visual pursuit,
orientation to pain or non-systematic command following) but is unable to com-
municate his or her thoughts or feelings [7]. Because these behavioral signs of
consciousness are often small and fluctuating in time, this condition may be chal-
lenging to diagnose and differentiate from vegetative state [8]. It has been sug-
gested that once conscious awareness has been identified and its quality is esti-
mated in a non-communicating patient (e.g., see [9, 10]), this may well be a good
reason to preserve life-sustaining aids [11]. However, the moral significance of
preserved consciousness has been questioned on the grounds that it may not
always be in a patient’s best interest to continue a severely handicapped life [12].
One challenging issue in this debate is the conscious perception of pain in
these patients. As defined by the Multi-Society Task Force on persistent vegetative
state (PVS), ‘pain and suffering refer to the unpleasant experiences that occur in
response to stimulation of peripheral nociceptive receptors and their peripheral
and central afferent pathways or that may emanate endogenously from the depths
of human self-perception’ [13]. Thus, pain constitutes a conscious experience
with a physical (nociception) and a psychological counterpart (suffering), sug-
gesting that nociception by itself is not sufficient to cause suffering. The manage-
ment of pain in patients with disorders of consciousness is challenging because
patients in a vegetative or minimally conscious state cannot verbally or non-ver-
bally communicate their feelings or experiences [1]. This is reflected in how clini-
cians perceive pain in these patients. According to recently surveyed attitudes
among health-care professionals, there was unanimous support that patients in a
minimally conscious state (96 %) perceived pain whereas opinions were less clear
for the patients in a vegetative state (56 %) [14]. Considering these results on
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varying beliefs about pain perception in disorders of consciousness, physicians
and health-care workers’ views on analgesia and symptom management may also
be affected. Since nearly half of the surveyed doctors stated that vegetative state
patients do not feel pain, these physicians could be expected to act accordingly,
for instance, by not providing analgesic medication to these patients during care
or during the dying process after withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition
[15], the latter on the grounds that these patients do not experience suffering
from hunger or thirst [16].
How are clinicians supposed to determine whether patients in a vegetative or
minimally conscious state feel pain or suffering? At the patient’s bedside, we are
limited to evaluating the behavioral responsiveness to pain: If patients show no
signs of voluntary movement (i.e., localizing the source of pain) in response to a
noxious stimulus, it can be concluded that they do not experience pain. Con-
scious but paralyzed ‘locked-in syndrome’ patients, who classically show absent
or ‘decerebration’ (i.e., stereotyped extension) or ‘decortication’ (i.e., stereotyped
flexion) movements, teach that this need not necessarily be the case. In response
to noxious stimulation, patients with disorders of consciousness will frequently
show increased arousal levels (evidenced by opening or widening of the eyes),
quickening of breathing, increased heart rate and blood pressure, or grimace-like
or crying-like behavior. As all these abilities are also seen in infants with anen-
cephaly [17], they are considered to be of subcortical origin and not necessarily
reflecting conscious perception of pain. However, the absence of a behavioral
response cannot be taken as proof of the absence of conscious perception [18]
and the inference of pain and suffering merely by observing behavioral responses
may be misleading. Repeated clinical examinations by experienced examiners
with standardized tools such as the recently proposed ‘coma nociception scale’
(e.g., [19]) are paramount for the behavioral assessment of pain. Additional infor-
mation coming from functional neuroimaging studies may assist in the formula-
tion of a clearer clinical picture. For example, in a positron emission tomography
(PET) study, it was shown that patients in a vegetative state may show cerebral
processing of the incoming noxious stimulus (activation of primary somatosen-
sory areas), but the observed neural activity was isolated and disconnected from
higher-order associative brain areas which are considered necessary for conscious
perception of pain [20]. It is important to stress that very different results were
obtained in patients in a minimally conscious state in whom functional neuroi-
maging studies have shown more widespread activation in the cerebral network
compared to patients in vegetative state, but similar to healthy controls, suggest-
ing potential pain perception these patients [21]. In light of the incomplete pic-
ture of pain perception in patients in vegetative state, the existing risk for misdi-
agnosis [8], the inconclusive drug-related effects in disorders of consciousness
[22], and the limitations of interpreting neuroimaging results [23], pain prophy-
laxis and drug treatment have been proposed for all patients suffering from disor-
ders of consciousness [24].
In intensive care settings, medical doctors and assisting staff are confronted
daily with situations where clinical decisions are still more critical, such as con-
tinuing or withdrawing life sustaining treatment. Treatment limitations can be
viewed as having two directions depending on whether the decision is made pre-
operatively or after an intervention [25]. In the former case, it may come as a
refusal of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) in case of cardiopulmonary
arrest; in the latter case, it most usually comes as a decision to withdraw treat-
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ment, such as the artificial respirator or artificial nutrition and hydration. CPR is
almost automatically performed as an emergency therapy in order to restore
heartbeat and ceased breathing, unless the patient or the legal representative have
refused it in advance in a form of a do-not-resuscitate order (DNR). Nevertheless,
it should be noted that DNR orders do not necessarily prohibit other therapies;
they rather authorize the physician to act on this specific manner of therapy [26].
When the clinical condition of a patient has been stabilized and denoted as irre-
versible, decisions about artificial nutrition and hydration limitation may come
into play. From a bioethical standpoint, withdrawing artificial nutrition and
hydration is comparable to withdrawing mechanical ventilation, even if emotion-
ally these two actions may be perceived differently. In the intensive care unit
(ICU) setting, the majority of deaths are the result of a medical decision to with-
hold or withdraw treatment [27]. Such decisions are evidence-based and rely on
validated clinical or paraclinical markers of bad outcome ([e.g., for anoxic coma
see [28]). Despite the controversy as to whether artificial nutrition and hydration
constitutes a medical treatment [29] and thus should never be withdrawn from
patients [30], most of the medical community (especially Anglo-Saxon) would
agree with its being a medical therapy which can be refused by patients and sur-
rogate decision makers [31]. Such decisions in vegetative state patients are only
justified when a case is denoted as irreversible [32]. Guidelines with regard to
temporal determination of a definitive outcome in vegetative state currently state
that if no recovery is observed within 3 months after a non-traumatic or 12
months after a traumatic accident, the condition of the patient can be denoted as
permanent [13].
The controversies around the clinical management at the end-of-life in patients
with disorders of consciousness were reflected in a recent European survey
(n = 2475), where the majority of health-care professionals (66 %) agreed to with-
draw treatment from chronic vegetative state patients whereas only 28 % agreed
to do so for chronic minimally conscious state patients; additionally, most clini-
cians wished not to be kept alive if they imagined themselves in a chronic vegeta-
tive state (82 %) and a similar proportion (67 %) agreed if they imagined them-
selves in a chronic minimally conscious state [33]. Geographical region and reli-
gion were among the factors that explained most of the variance in the responses
and these results are in line with previous surveys in which physicians’ character-
istics (i.e., age, religion and geographic region) seem to play a critical role in gov-
erning such options [34]. The detected differences between the two states could
be due to the existing legal ambiguity around minimally conscious state which
may have influenced the surveyed participants to differentiate between expressing
preferences for self versus others, by implicitly recognizing that the latter could be
a step on the slippery slope to euthanasia.
Clinicians’ opinions appear much more uniform with regard to brain death
[35]. As mentioned earlier, the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School
went on to the redefinition of death as a consequence of the technological
advancements in intensive care, where patients could sustain severe injuries but
maintain the function of vital organs [2]. It was, therefore, possible to dissociate
between cardiac, respiratory and brain functions which in turn required an alter-
native definition of death, moving from a cardiorespiratory towards a neurocen-
tric formulation (i.e., irreversible coma). According to the latter, death can be
viewed either as death of the whole brain or of the brainstem [36] or as neocorti-
cal [37]. The first two are defined as the irreversible cessation of the organism as
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a whole, differing in their anatomical interpretation [38], whereas the last solely
requires the irreversible loss of the capacity of consciousness and social interac-
tion but has never convinced medical or legal scholars. The main utility of the
introduction of brain death is that it permitted vital organ procurement for trans-
plantation with the application of ethical restrictions, such as the dead donor rule
(i.e., a patient has to be declared dead before the removal of life-sustaining
organs). Based on the neocortical definition of death, however, both vegetative
and minimally conscious state patients can be declared dead. It has been argued
that the neocortical definition is conceptually inadequate and practically unfeasi-
ble, especially with the lack of a complete understanding of higher-order con-
scious functioning; hence, patients with disorders of consciousness are not dead
[27] and organ donation options in these patients should be excluded since they
violate the dead donor rule [39] – despite opposing opinions to abandon this ethi-
cal axiom [40].
Legal Issues in Disorders of Consciousness
Disorders of consciousness have posed not only medical challenges but in many
cases they required the mediation of legal authorities in order to regulate ambigu-
ous and controversial issues, such as end-of-life decisions. When end-of-life
wishes have not been earlier formulated in the form of an advanced directive (i.e.,
written statement completed by a competent person in anticipation of her/his
future incompetence, expressing personal treatment preferences and formal sur-
rogacy appointment), then a surrogate decision maker is eligible to take responsi-
bility for the patient’s clinical management. The way the legal representative
should act on behalf of the patient is a progressive one. The surrogate should first
attempt to follow the wishes of the patient as closely as possible, in the way in
which they were expressed before the accident, either orally or in the form of
advance directives. When the wishes are unknown and an advance directive is
not available, the surrogate decision maker should try to reproduce the patient’s
preferences based on their history and personal values. When this is not possible,
decisions should rely on more objective markers that determine the patient’s best
interest (e.g., likelihood of recovery, pain management, impact on family) [25,
41]. The proxy decision maker should mediate trying to maximize the patient’s
self-determination and protect their interests using the principles of beneficence
and non-maleficence [42].
The use of advance directives could also be considered as a means to regulate
cost savings in the end-of-life; once the wishes of a terminal patient are known,
care can be taken to constrain extraordinary means and spare the available
resources for other urgent cases. However, no such rationale corresponds to the
reality and advance directives, together with hospice care and the elimination of
futile care, have not contributed to the effective regulation of the economics of
dying [43]. Treatment resources are not unlimited and despite care for a good
death sometimes physicians need to make do with the means they have available.
The allocation of resources and the economics at the end-of-life have not yet been
fully determined for patients with disorders of consciousness. In intensive care
medicine, some unwritten rules can facilitate decisions as to who is to be treated,
like the ‘first come’ principle or ‘who will most likely benefit from intensive care’
[44]. However, for chronic disorder of consciousness cases, information on
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resource allocation is often lacking. This may be due to the nature of patients
with chronic vegetative or minimally conscious state. These are severely brain-
damaged patients for whom the dilemma on treating becomes crucial either
because treatments are not guaranteed as successful (i.e., the condition is too bad
to be treated) or unkind (i.e., the quality of life of those surviving is not accept-
able) which may lead to an unwise way to allocate available resources [44].
The legal provisions concerning end-of-life issues in disorders of conscious-
ness differ from country to country. In the United States, where a patient-cen-
tered medical framework has been adopted, the patient is allowed to participate
in the regulation of her/his own course of the disease. In the case of disorders of
consciousness, legal representatives in close collaboration with the clinical staff
and in line with the patient’s previously expressed wishes may decide together
about the long-term care of irreversibly comatose patients. There are times, how-
ever, when conflicts of interests arise while making such decisions, either between
family and physicians, such as in the Quinlan case [45], or among family mem-
bers, like the more recent Schiavo case [46]. As most often such cases require the
mediation of the court, they may have a wider publicity in which public opinion
can come into play and may lead to societal movements on pro-life versus right-
to-die action groups [47]. In Europe, there are more subtle differences in the way
treatment limitation is perceived, especially between Northern (more right-to-die
oriented) and Southern (more pro-life positioned) European countries [33]. In
general, decisions for treatment limitation (usually concerning artifical nutrition
and hydration) need to be taken after reference to the court. Exceptions are the
Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Scandinavian countries where no court
mediation is needed for limiting treatment in disorders of consciousness [48].
Considering these different attitudes within and out of Europe, it has been sug-
gested that an international consensus regarding standards of care for patients
with disorders of consciousness needs to be reached [49].
Conclusion
The ethical issues accrued from the study and management of patients with dis-
orders of consciousness are variant and multi-faceted. Medical, legal and public
controversies are partly shaped by how different people think about these issues
and in many cases are country-dependent. It is, therefore, evident that a uniform
ethical framework needs to be shaped to guide clinicians and caregivers in terms
of clinical outcome, prognosis, and medical management.
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Abstract 
Objective: By use of resting state fMRI we first aimed to investigate connectivity 
changes within and between multiple cerebral systems and then to assess residual pain - 
related processing in the absence of external stimulation in patients with disorders of 
consciousness. Methods: Functional connectivity in the default mode, left and right 
frontoparietal, salience, sensorimotor, auditory and visual networks was evaluated with 
seed - region approach. Behavioral Nociception Coma Scale scores were used as 
regressors of the salience network’s functional integrity, which is shown to mediate pain 
– related processes. Results: Data were obtained from 22 controls, 2 locked - in 
syndrome, 11 minimally conscious, 12 “vegetative”/unresponsive and 5 comatose 
patients (15 non - traumatic, 7 anoxic etiology). Between - group comparisons showed 
intra - network decreases in functional connectivity as a function of the level of 
consciousness. A disruption in crossmodal interaction between visual and auditory 
networks was further observed. “Vegetative”/unresponsive and minimally conscious 
patients’ Nociception Coma Scale scores showed a positive correlation with the salience 
network functional connectivity. Conclusions: Our results demonstrate a global 
breakdown in cortico - cortical connectivity in both sensory/ sensorimotor and “higher - 
order” networks, possibly accounting for patients’ limited capacities for conscious 
cognition. The observed positive correlation between the Nociception Coma Scale scores 
and the salience network connectivity reflects nociception - related processes measured in 
the absence of an external stimulus. Our results point to the utility of resting state 
analyses in clinical settings where short and simple setups are preferable to activation 
protocols.  
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Introduction  
Study protocols during resting state (i.e. eyes closed, no task performance) do not require 
sophisticated setup and surpass the need for patients’ active participation. Therefore, this 
paradigm is a suitable means to study patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC), 
such as patients in coma, vegetative state/ unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS)1 
and minimally conscious state (MCS). Past studies in these patients using resting state 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (rsfMRI) have shown reduced connectivity in a 
default mode network (DMN) as a function of the level of consciousness.2, 3  Importantly, 
however, the functions of a brain region can be better understood in conjunction with 
other brain areas with which it interacts. Therefore, we here aimed  to assess rsfMRI 
functional connectivity in DOC patients by investigating various large - scale cerebral 
networks (including the DMN), such as the left and right frontoparietal, salience, 
sensorimotor, auditory and visual networks.4 Data from two patients with locked - in 
syndrome (LIS; awake and conscious with/without means of producing speech, limb or 
facial movements) were used as further control on patients’ data. We hypothesized that 
rsfMRI functional connectivity strength in these different networks will be related to the 
level of consciousness.  
As the issue of pain in the study of coma and related states continues to raise 
clinical and ethical concerns,5 we further aimed to assess residual pain - related 
processing during resting state conditions, in the absence of noxious stimulation. For this 
purpose, we correlated clinical “pain” scale scores, i.e. Nociception Coma Scale,6 with 
the functional integrity of the salience network, given that previous studies have 
correlated salience network connectivity with pain - related processes.7-9  
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Methods 
Patients  
We prospectively assessed patients in MCS, VS/UWS, coma and LIS following 
severe brain damage studied at least 5 days after the acute brain insult. Clinical 
examination was performed using the Coma Recovery Scale - Revised (CRS - R).10 
Exclusion criteria were contraindication for MRI (e.g. presence of ferromagnetic 
aneurysm clips, pacemakers), MRI acquisition under sedation or anesthesia, uncertain 
clinical diagnoses, large focal brain damage (>50% of total brain volume) and the 
presence of head movements (i.e., >10mm displacement). Healthy volunteers were free 
of psychiatric or neurological history. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee 
of the Medical School of the University of Liège. Informed consent to participate in the 
study was obtained from the healthy subjects and from the legal surrogates of the 
patients.  
 
Functional data acquisition and preprocessing 
In all patients and controls, functional MRI time series were acquired on a 3T head - 
only scanner (Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany). Three hundred multislice 
T2* - weighted functional images were acquired with a gradient - echo echo - planar 
imaging sequence using axial slice orientation and covering the whole brain (32 slices; 
voxel size: 3×3×3 mm; matrix size 64×64×32; repetition time = 2000 ms; echo time = 30 
ms; flip angle = 78°; field of view = 192 mm). The three initial volumes were discarded 
to avoid T1 saturation effects. For anatomical reference, a high-resolution T1-weighted 
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image was acquired for each subject (T1 - weighted 3D magnetization-prepared rapid 
gradient echo (MPRAGE) sequence).  
Data preprocessing was performed using Statistical Parametric Mapping 8 (SPM8; 
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) and encompassed reorientation, realignment, coregistration, 
segmentation, normalization, and smoothing (8 - mm full width at half - maximum). 
Further motion correction (for small, large and rapid motions, noise spikes, and 
spontaneous deep breaths) was applied using ArtRepair toolbox for SPM 
(http://cibsr.stanford.edu/tools/ArtRepair/ArtRepair.htm). 
 
Extraction of resting state networks and statistical analysis 
The identification of resting state networks was done in three steps as employed in 
previous studies.11, 12 First, the six motion parameters were used to regress in the initial 
signal in order to create a “dummy” BOLD signal, from which the regions of interest 
(ROIs) would be extracted. A high - pass filter of 128s was used to remove very low 
frequency fluctuations (<.008 Hz). Second, time courses of interest were computed as the 
first principal component of the BOLD signal in 8mm spherical ROIs centered on a priori 
coordinates: DMN [6  -42 32], left frontoparietal network [ -44 36 20], right 
frontoparietal network [44 36 20], auditory network [ -40  -22 8], visual network [ -4  -84 
8],12 salience network [38 26  -10],7 and sensorimotor network [ -2  -12 44].13 Similar 
time course extractions were performed for two other voxels of interest, located in white 
matter [ -22 16 32] and lateral ventricles [ -6 20 10]. Third, a design matrix (per subject, 
per network) was created with the ROI’s time course and 12 nuisance covariates (time 
courses in white matter, lateral ventricles, global signal and their derivatives, and the six 
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movement parameters). The effects of interest were tested by linear contrasts, generating 
statistical parametric T maps for each subject. A contrast image was computed for each 
subject and for each network identifying regions correlating with the selected seed - 
region after removal of sources of spurious variance. 
For each network, contrast images were entered in a second - level random effects 
analysis (one - way ANOVA with four levels: controls, MCS, VS/UWS and coma 
patients). A correction for non - sphericity was applied to account for potentially unequal 
variance across groups. In controls, one - sided T contrast searched for areas correlating 
with each selected seed region in each network. Assuming that patients with DOC show 
similar brain activity as compared to controls, we used an exponential one - tailed T 
contrast searching for decreases in functional connectivity as a function of the level of 
consciousness (controls, MCS, VS/UW, coma) in each network.2 Data of the two LIS 
patients were not included in the design matrices but their contrast estimates per network 
were displayed for visual comparison to the data of controls and patients with DOC. For 
the T contrasts in controls, results were considered significant at p<.05 corrected for 
multiple comparisons at family wise error (FWE) rate for the whole brain volume. For 
the between - group contrasts, results were considered significant at FWE p<.05 
calculated at the whole brain level or after small volume correction (SVC; 10mm - radius 
sphere) around a priori expected coordinates taken from an independently - assessed  
group of healthy individuals (n=12; 4women; mean age 21±3 years; 350 scans acquired 
on a 3T head - only scanner (Siemens Medical Solutions,  Erlangen, Germany); 32 slices, 
FoV = 220x220 mm², voxel size 3.4×3.4×3 mm³, 30% interslice gap, matrix size 
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64x64x32, TR = 2460 ms, TE = 40 ms, FA = 90°; see Supplemental table e-1 for group 
mean effects for each network). 
For the salience network, a regression analysis was performed with the available 
Nociception Coma Scale (NCS)6 total scores in 13 patients (3 coma, 7 UWS, 3 MCS). As 
a control to this regression analysis, we opted to use the same NCS scores as predictors of 
the functional connectivity in the auditory network. The choice of this network was based 
on the fact that this system also encompasses ACC and insular cortices in healthy 
volunteers.14  For the NCS – salience network regression analysis results were considered 
significant at p<.05 SVC (10mm - radius sphere) around a priori expected coordinates 
taken from the healthy control group. For the auditory network - NCS regression 
analysis, results were considered significant at uncorrected p<.001 for the whole brain 
volume.  
 
Results  
Between April 2008 and July 2011, 145 patients underwent MRI scanning out whom 
59 were excluded due to fMRI scanning under sedation, 27 due to presence of ambiguous 
clinical signs or uncertain diagnosis or change of diagnosis within a week after scanning, 
12 due to large focal brain damage (>50% of total brain volume), 6 due to presence of 
functional communication, 6 due to motion artifacts (i.e., >10mm displacement) and 5 
due to technical reasons. Twenty - eight patients (11 MCS, 12 VS/UWS, 5 coma) were 
eventually included for further analysis (11 women; mean age 52±17 years, range 20 - 
87; 6 traumatic, 22 non - traumatic of which 7 anoxic); 18 patients were assessed in the 
chronic setting (>1 month post - insult). Data from 2 LIS patients were used for visual 
Demertzi, 9 
 
comparison with controls’ values. Supplemental table e-2 summarizes the patients’ 
demographic and clinical characteristics. Patients’ data were compared with an age - 
matched healthy volunteer group (n=22; 8 women; mean age 46±17 years; range 20 - 75).  
All rsfMRI networks were successfully replicated across the group of healthy controls 
(red areas in figure 1; Supplemental table e-3). Group - level exponential contrasts 
showed consciousness - level dependent connectivity breakdown in all areas of the 
identified networks (blue areas in figure 1; table 1). More specifically, the DMN showed 
a drop in functional connectivity strength in precuneus/PCC, mesiofrontal/ACC, bilateral 
temporoparietal junction, left middle frontal gyrus when comparing controls, MCS, 
VS/UWS and coma patients. For the regions anticorrelating to the DMN, a functional 
connectivity breakdown as a function of the level of consciousness was identified in 
bilateral inferior frontal gyri, right middle frontal gyrus, bilateral inferior parietal lobes, 
and supplementary motor area/midcingulate cortex. In the left and right frontoparietal 
network, between - group comparisons showed decreases in connectivity strength in 
bilateral inferior frontal and inferior parietal lobes. In the sensorimotor network there 
were between - group decreases in connectivity strength in SMA and the claustrum. In 
the auditory network between - group decreases in connectivity were observed in bilateral 
superior temporal gyri/insular cortices, ACC, and right claustrum. In the visual network 
between - group decreases in connectivity were observed in primary visual cortex; 
additional decreases in functional connectivity were observed in left primary auditory 
cortex and left insula, areas not initially identified in the group of healthy controls.  
 
Demertzi, 10 
 
The between - group comparisons in the salience network showed decreases in 
connectivity strength in bilateral insula and ACC; additional drops in functional 
connectivity were found in left pars opercularis (Broca’s area), left superior temporal 
gyrus (primary auditory cortex and up to Wernicke’s area), areas not initially identified in 
the group of healthy controls (table 1, figure 1). Nociception Coma Scale total scores 
showed a positive correlation with functional connectivity of the salience network’s ACC 
(z = 3.26, p=0.001 SVC; x=0, y=20, z=37), left insula (z = 4.04, p<.001 SVC; x= - 39, y= 
- 16, z=7), and right insula (z = 2.99, p=.001; SVC ; x=36, y=5, z= - 2) (figure 2). For the 
control auditory network regression analysis, no correlation between functional 
connectivity in pain - related areas and NCS scores was identified (Supplemental table e-
4).  
 
Discussion 
We here investigated fMRI functional connectivity of seven large - scale cerebral 
networks in 28 patients with DOC, 2 patients with LIS and 22 healthy controls in resting 
state conditions. Overall, the studied networks (reliably replicated across controls) 
showed a consciousness level - dependent breakdown in connectivity ranging from 
controls and LIS, MCS VS/UWS and coma patients.  
For the DMN, which is classically linked to self - related processes,15 our results 
corroborate previous fMRI2 and PET studies16 and are in line with other studies in altered 
states of consciousness, such as deep sleep,17, 18 midazolam sedation13 and propofol 
anesthesia.12 We also identified a connectivity breakdown in areas anticorrelating to the 
DMN. Similar reductions in the anticorrelated system have been identified for hypnosis,19 
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sleep,17 propofol anesthesia12 and  a VS/UWS patient20 suggesting an important role of 
this system to conscious awareness. We recently showed that this anticorrelated to the 
DMN fMRI activity (encompassing bilateral frontoparietal regions) corresponds to overt 
subjective reports of “external awareness”, namely that it reflects conscious perception of 
the environment through the senses.21 Taken together, our results for the DMN and its 
anticorrelated network in DOC could imply that these patients have limited capacities for 
self - related mentation. Nevertheless, our limited understanding of the dynamic neural 
complexity underlying consciousness and its resistance to quantification in the absence of 
communication22 makes it difficult to establish strong claims about the self - 
consciousness in non - communicative patients.  
We also observed a breakdown in connectivity strength in the left (involved in 
cognitive and “language” paradigms) and right frontoparietal network (relating to 
perceptual, somesthetic and nociception processing)4, 23 as a function level of 
consciousness. Activity in these frontoparietal areas has been considered a necessary 
condition for conscious reportable perception.24 Here, our findings are in line with 
previous PET studies showing a bilateral frontoparietal metabolic impairment in MCS 
patients which is more profound and widespread in VS/UWS.16, 25 fMRI results from  
light sleep26 and propofol anesthesia12, however, support a generally preserved resting 
state functional connectivity pattern in these frontoparietal networks. Overall, our results 
suggest that the reduced rsfMRI connectivity in these frontoparietal networks reflects a 
reduced level of “external” awareness in patients with DOC, as previously 
hypothesized.27  
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For the salience network, which has been linked to conflict monitoring, information 
integration, response selection as well as to emotional, interoception and pain - related 
processes4, 7-9 we found consciousness - level dependent decreases in connectivity both 
within the network (i.e. in ACC and bilateral insula) and in language - related areas (i.e. 
extending to Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas) which were not initially identified in 
controls. Similar altered rsfMRI connectivity in salience network was recently reported 
for deep sleep.28 Altogether, our findings might account for a decreased capacity of 
patients with DOC to respond to salient stimuli, including auditory29, 30 and noxious. 
Here, the identified correlation between salience network connectivity and NCS scores 
suggests that salience network rsfMRI can be used as a tool to assess residual attentional 
resources to salient stimuli, including possible pain processing in DOC, in the absence of 
noxious stimulation. The necessity of a paraclinical marker for pain assessment is 
highlighted by studies showing that clinical examination alone may under -  or 
overestimate the capacity of non - communicative patients for pain.31  
For the sensorimotor network (linked to action - execution and perception - 
somesthesis paradigms4, 23), the between - group comparison showed a drop in 
connectivity strength in the claustrum and the SMA as a function of the level of 
consciousness. In normal wakefulness, the claustrum was suggested to permit the binding 
of disparate perceptual, cognitive and motor events into a single conscious percept32 and 
the SMA was thought to relate to voluntary intentional motor planning33. Hence, a 
disruption of this network in DOC is in line with these patients’ incapacities for 
conscious (motor) cognition. Our results are in contrast to what is observed in rsfMRI 
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studies under light midazolam sedation13 or during light sleep26  where generally no 
significant reductions in sensorimotor network connectivity could be identified. 
The between - group connectivity decreases in the auditory network, which has been 
associated with tone and pitch discrimination, music, speech, phonological and oddball 
discrimination,34 corroborate previous activation studies in VS/UWS patients showing 
restricted auditory responses to primary auditory cortices, dissociated from higher - order 
auditory areas.29 Auditory stimulation in MCS patients, in contrast, recruits stronger 
connectivity between the secondary auditory cortex and temporal and prefrontal 
association cortices, thought to be necessary for the gain of conscious auditory 
perception.35 Our results here are different from what has been observed under propofol 
anesthesia, where intra - network connectivity is generally preserved.12 Importantly, we 
here also report an inter - network connectivity decrease between auditory and salience 
systems, suggesting a decoupling between these networks in DOC in the absence of 
salient auditory stimulation. Similar inter - network fMRI connectivity changes have been 
reported for deep sleep28 and propofol anesthesia,36 highlighting the functional 
importance of such inter - system connectivity to conscious awareness. 
For the visual network, we also show a consciousness - level dependent breakdown of 
both intra -  and inter - network connectivity in DOC. Studies in rsfMRI in light sleep, 
however, show preserved or increased functional connectivity for the visual system,26, 37 a 
pattern also observed in propofol anesthesia.12 Interestingly, we here further observed an 
impaired crossmodal interaction between visual - auditory networks when comparing 
normal controls, LIS, MCS, VS/UWS and coma patients. Such visual - auditory 
crossmodal interaction was previously described in normal conscious conditions14 and is 
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considered relevant to multisensory integration which subsequently enhances visual 
awareness.38 Our findings are also in line with data from propofol anesthesia in healthy 
volunteers showing decreased crossmodal interaction as a function of pharmacologically 
- induced unconsciousness.12   
In summary, we here show a consciousness - level dependent breakdown of rsfMRI 
connectivity in “lower - level” sensory (auditory and visual) and sensorimotor and in 
“higher - order” associative networks (default mode, right and left frontoparietal and 
salience) when comparing controls, LIS, MCS, VS/UWS and coma patients. As 
previously proposed, these types of networks support conscious awareness by making 
incoming information (via sensory systems) globally available to multiple brain systems 
via long - range neurons (associative systems).24 In that respect, our results account for 
the disrupted conscious awareness characterizing patients with DOC. In contrast to 
pathological coma, under propofol anesthesia functional connectivity was shown to be 
decreased in “higher - order” networks (DMN and bilateral frontoparietal) next to 
relatively preserved functional connectivity in the sensory systems (visual and auditory) 
possibly accounting for the after - anesthesia recovery of consciousness.12 These 
differences between anesthesia and pathological coma could be partially explained by the 
fully preserved structural connectivity shown in healthy subjects undergoing anesthesia. 
It is indeed well known that part of the measured functional connectivity in resting state 
EPI paradigms reflects structural (white matter) connectivity as, for example, shown by 
diffusion tensor imaging studies.39 The precise mechanisms underlying the reversible 
unconsciousness of anesthesia and the disrupted consciousness in patients with DOC 
need to be further documented.40 
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In conclusion, resting state functional connectivity in the default mode and its 
anticorrelated regions, left and right frontoparietal, salience, sensorimotor, auditory and 
visual networks were reliably identified in controls and showed reduced connectivity in 
patients with DOC. A reduced crossmodal interaction between visual and auditory 
cortices was further observed. In patients, the salience network correlated with 
Nociception Coma Scale scores reflecting nociception - related processes measured in the 
absence of external noxious stimulation. Our results point to the utility of resting state 
analyses in clinical settings where short and simple setups are preferable to activation 
protocols with somatosensory, visual, and auditory stimulation devices. The challenge 
now is the clinical translation of this approach as a routine para - clinical marker. We 
think that such evolution will bring relevant ancillary information on patients' residual 
brain function adding to their medical care and management.  
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Table 1. Areas (peak voxels) of the resting state networks showing connectivity 
breakdown as a function of the level of consciousness, ranging from healthy controls and 
locked - in syndrome patients, to minimally conscious state, “vegetative”/ unresponsive 
and patients in coma. 
Area x y z z value Corrected 
p value 
Default mode network 
 Precuneus/ Posterior cingulate cortex (7/31) 0 - 55 25 5.58 <.001 
 Anterior cingulate cortex/ Mesiofrontal cortex (24/10) 3 38 4 4.88 .006 
L Temporoparietal junction (39) - 51 - 64 25 5.29 .001 
R Temporoparietal junction (39) 54 - 55 28 3.56 <.001● 
L Middle frontal gyrus (8) - 30 23 46 3.41 <.001● 
Anticorrelations default mode network 
L Inferior frontal gyrus (46/9) - 45 38 7 4.02 <.001● 
R Inferior frontal gyrus (9) 42 5 34 4.34 .050 
R Middle frontal gyrus (6) 48 5 43 3.92 <.001● 
L Inferior parietal lobe (40) - 42 - 31 40 5.18 .002 
R Inferior parietal lobe (40) 45 - 28 43 3.42 <.001● 
 Midcingulate cortex (24) - 3 17 28 3.32 <.001● 
 Supplementary motor area (6) 0 2 58 3.20 <.001● 
Left frontoparietal network  
L Inferior frontal gyrus (46) - 48 41 7 4.34 .050 
R Inferior frontal gyrus (46) 48 38 10 4.50 .027 
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L Inferior parietal lobe (40)  - 33 - 43 34 4.48 .030 
R Inferior parietal lobe (40) 39 - 49 46 3.18 <.001● 
Right frontoparietal network  
L Inferior frontal lobe (46/9) - 45 44 7 4.49 .028 
R Inferior parietal lobe (40) 48 - 43 46 3.28 <.001● 
L Inferior parietal lobe (40) - 45 - 52 49 4.67 .014 
Salience network 
R Insula  36 23 - 2 3.84 <.001● 
L Insula  - 36 17 1 4.97 <.001● 
 Anterior cingulate cortex (24/32) 9 23 25 3.43 <.001● 
L Pars opercularis (Broca’s area 44) - 42 5 7 5.98 <.001 
L Superior temporal gyrus (primary auditory cortex 41) - 42 - 34 16 5.23 .001 
L Superior temporal gyrus (Wernicke’s area 22) - 51 - 10 10 6.29 <.001 
Sensorimotor network 
 Supplementary motor area (6) 3 - 13 55 4.56 .024 
R Claustrum 36 - 13 - 2 4.49 .031 
Auditory network 
R Superior temporal gyrus (22)/ Insula 45 - 10 - 8 3.74 <.001● 
L Superior temporal gyrus (Wernicke’s area 22) - 60 - 16 25 3.80 <.001● 
 Anterior cingulate cortex (24) 0 26 16 3.92 .039 
R Claustrum 36 5 - 8 5.08 .002 
Visual network  
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 Primary visual cortex (17) 3 - 79 13 5.11 .002 
L Primary auditory cortex (41) - 48 - 25 10 4.37 .049 
L Insula - 42 - 13 10 4.37 .035 
P values are corrected for multiple comparisons at family wise error rate p<.05 for the 
whole brain volume or using an 10mm radius spherical small volume correction (●) 
centered on a priori coordinates identified in an independently assessed group of healthy 
individuals. 
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Figure titles and accompanying legends 
Figure 1. Decreases in fMRI resting state connectivity as a function of the level of 
consciousness. 
Large - scale resting state functional connectivity is identified in “higher - order” and 
sensory - sensorimotor networks in healthy controls (red areas; asterisks indicate the 
position of seed region). Between - group contrasts showed a connectivity breakdown as 
a function of the level of consciousness (blue areas). Note the decreased crossmodal 
interaction between visual and auditory cortices (indicated with an arrow) that parallels 
the decreases in consciousness level. Graphs represent contrast estimates with 90% 
confidence interval for a representative area of each resting state network in the group of 
healthy controls (CON), minimally conscious state (MCS), vegetative/unresponsive state 
(VS) and comatose patients. The effect size for two locked - in syndrome patients is 
illustrated by a square and a triangle. Results for controls are thresholded at family wise 
error rate corrected p<.05 (whole brain volume). For the anticorrelations with the default 
mode network and the between - group contrasts, results are thresholded for display 
purposes at uncorrected p<.001. Statistical maps are rendered on a structural T1 magnetic 
resonance template (x, y and z values indicate the Montreal National Institute coordinates 
of represented sections). 
 
Figure 2. Salience network connectivity reflects nociception processing in patients 
with disorders of consciousness.  
The figure illustrates increased functional connectivity between the right insula and 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (small volume corrected p<.05) as a function of 
Demertzi, 26 
 
increased total score on the Nociception Coma Scale. The scatter plot summarizes 
regression results in 13 patients with disorders of consciousness. The statistical map is 
rendered on a mean structural T1 magnetic resonance of the patients (x indicates the 
Montreal National Institute coordinate of represented sections). 


Supplemental Table e-1. Peak voxels (FWE p<.05, whole-brain level) of the resting state networks identified in an 
independently assessed group of healthy controls (n=12).  
Area x y z z value p value 
Default mode network 
Precuneus/ Posterior cingulate cortex (7/31) 9 -49 37 Inf <.001 
Anterior cingulate cortex/ Mesiofrontal cortex (32/10) 3 47 -5 6.53 <.001 
L Temporoparietal junction (39) -45 -64 25 7.37 <.001 
R Temporoparietal junction (39) 42 -58 28 7.11 <.001 
L Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (6/9) -33 11 31 5.97 <.001 
R Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (6/9) 24 20 52 6.39 <.001 
Anticorrelations default mode network 
L Inferior frontal gyrus (47)/Insula -39 -1 -2 6.80 <.001 
R Inferior frontal gyrus (47)/Insula 45 5 -11 7.61 <.001 
L Inferior parietal lobe (40) -48 -10 49 5.90 <.001 
R Inferior parietal lobe (40) 63 -25 25 5.57 .004 
Supplementary motor area/Midcingulate cortex (6/24) -18 17 28 6.11 <.001 
Anterior cingulate cortex (24) 12 5 70 6.03 <.001 
Mesiofrontal cortex (10) -36 44 25 5.53 .001 
R Superior Temporal gyrus (21) 39 -46 -35 4.87 .019 
L Fusiform gyrus (37) -54 -67 -14 5.87 <.001 
R Fusiform gyrus (37) 57 -61 -8 5.32 .002 
Extrastriate cortex (18) 30 -85 -2 5.23 .004 
L Cerebellum  -27 -55 -23 5.27 .003 
R Cerebellum  18 -73 -23 5.88 <.001 
Left frontoparietal network  
L inferior frontal gyrus (46) -45 35 19 Inf <.001 
R inferior frontal gyrus (46) 45 41 13 Inf <.001 
L inferior parietal lobe (40) -57 -43 43 6.45 <.001 
R Inferior parietal lobe (40) 36 -58 46 5.13 .007 
L Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (6) -21 8 52 5.35 .002 
R Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (6) 24 8 61 5.29 .003 
Anterior cingulate cortex (32) -9 20 37 5.64 <.001 
Right frontoparietal network  
R inferior frontal gyrus (9/46/47) 45 35 19 Inf <.001 
L inferior frontal gyrus (9/46/47) -45 26 25 Inf <.001 
R Inferior parietal lobe (40) 36 -55 40 Inf <.001 
L Inferior parietal lobe (40) -42 -55 40 inf <.001 
Anterior cingulate cortex (32) 9 20 43 7.01 <.001 
Salience network 
R Insula/Middle frontal gyrus (10) 39 23 -11 inf <.001 
L Insula/Middle frontal gyrus (10) -33 26 -14 inf <.001 
Anterior cingulate cortex (24/32) 6 20 40 6.43 <.001 
L Inferior parietal lobe (40) -66 -43 22 5.19 .005 
R Inferior parietal lobe (40) 51 -43 31 5.36 .002 
L Putamen -15 5 -2 5.20 .005 
R Putamen 15 8 1 5.67 <.001 
R Middle temporal gyrus (21) 51 -25 -8 5.49 .001 
Sensorimotor network 
Supplementary motor area/Midcingulate cortex (6/24) -3 -13 43 inf <.001 
L Primary motor cortex (4) -27 -22 64 7.58 <.001 
L Premotor cortex (6) -27 -13 52 7.35 <.001 
R Premotor cortex (6) 39 -13 40 7.45 <.001 
R Somatosensory cortex (3) 27 -28 67 6.77 <.001 
L Insula -39 -19 22 6.43 <.001 
R Insula 36 -16 13 6.89 <.001 
L Claustrum -36 -1 7 6.38 <.001 
R Claustrum 33 5 7 5.93 <.001 
Auditory network 
Superior temporal gyrus (41)/ Insula -39 -22 7 inf <.001 
Superior temporal gyrus (41)/ Insula 39 -16 4 inf <.001 
Midcingulate cortex (24) -3 5 37 6.32 <.001 
L Primary motor cortex/Somatosensory cortex (4/5) -18 -22 70 6.37 <.001 
R Primary motor cortex/Somatosensory cortex (4/5) 24 -31 67 5.83 <.001 
L Thalamus -15 -22 1 6.02 <.001 
R Thalamus 15 -19 -2 5.81 <.001 
Midbrain 15 -19 -2 5.81 <.001 
Brainstem 6 -25 -20 5.59 .001 
Visual network       
Primary visual cortex (17) 0 -85 7 inf <.001 
L Extrastriate cortex (19) -24 -91 25 5.08 .008 
R Extrastriate cortex (19) 6 -79 40 5.13 .005 
Supplemental Table e-2. Patients’ demographic characteristics.  
     Coma Recovery Scale- Revised   
Patient Gender (age) Cause 
Time of 
fMRI        
(days since 
insult) 
Diagnosis Auditory function 
Visual 
function 
Motor 
function 
Oromotor/ 
Verbal 
function 
Commu-
nication Arousal 
Total 
score MRI/CT EEG 
Pat 1 Female (61) CVA 38 Coma 
None None Flexion withdrawal Oral reflex None None 
3 
R anteromedial ponto-
mesencephalic, bilateral  frontal 
and middle corpus callosum 
lesions; peri-cerebellar subdural 
collections; hydrocephalus (Evans 
index 0.37) 
BR 6.5 Hz theta 
Pat 2 Male (73) CVA 7 Coma 
None None Flexion withdrawal None None None 
2 L frontoparietal hemorrhage with 
subfalcine herniation 
BR 6 Hz irregular 
non-reactive, R 
lateralized theta 
Pat 3 Male (70) CVA 5 Coma 
None None Abnormal posturing None None None 
1 Hemorrhagic lesion R lentiform nucleus and thalamus, R cerebral 
and cerebellar peduncle 
BR irregular delta 
 
Pat 4 Male (79) Trauma 379 Coma 
None None None None None None 0 
L subdural hematoma, contusions 
in corpus callosum, cingulate gyrus 
and L external capsule 
BR 4Hz (badly 
structured on the 
L, R slower 
electrogenesis 
Pat5 Female (64) CVA 7 Coma 
None None None None None None 0 
Bilateral brainstem, midbrain and 
cerebellar non-hemorrhagic 
ischemia 
BR 8Hz, irregular, 
symmetrical 
Pat6 Male (20) Trauma 1475 LIS 
Consistent 
movement to 
command 
Object 
recognition
Functional 
object use 
Vocalization/
oral 
movement 
Functional Attention 22 
Hemorrhagic lesions in R cere-
bellum, L lenticular and R anterior 
frontal, cingulate gyrus. Multiple 
axonopathy lesions in frontal and 
parietal lobes. Quadriventricular 
hydrocephalus with vermian and 
midbrain atrophy. (Evans index 
0.34) 
NA 
Pat7 Female (28) CVA 2130 LIS 
Consistent 
movement to 
command 
Object 
recognition
Functional 
object use 
Vocalization/
oral 
movement 
Functional Attention 21 
Ischemic lesions in L cerebellar and 
pontine peduncles. Occlusion of 
distal vertebral arteries 
NA 
Pat8 Female (43) 
Subarachnoid 
hemorrhage 31 MCS 
Auditory startle Visual 
pursuit 
Flexion 
withdrawal Oral reflex None 
Without 
stimulation
7 
Anterior interhemispheric sub-
arachnoid hemorrhage, saccular 
aneurysm on R internal carotid 
artery 
BR theta range 
 
Pat9 Male (38) CVA 1854 MCS 
Reproducible 
movement to 
command 
Visual 
pursuit 
Flexion 
withdrawal
Vocalization/
oral 
movement 
None With stimulation
9 
Lesions in L thalamus and posterior 
limb of L internal capsule, 
extending to the cerebral peduncle 
and corpus callosum 
BR 5-6 Hz 
irregular reactive 
Pat10 Female (34) Trauma 3034 MCS 
Reproducible 
movement to 
command 
Visual 
pursuit 
Flexion 
withdrawal
Vocalization/
oral 
movement 
None Without stimulation
12 
L thalamic contusional lesion. 
Juxta-cortical lesions in frontal and 
temporal lobes. Atrophy of the L 
cerebral peduncle and cerebellar 
vermis 
BR 6-7 Hz 
irregular reactive 
 
Pat11 Female (74) 
Subarachnoid 
Hemorrhage 18 MCS 
Auditory startle None Abnormal posturing Oral reflex Intentional
With 
stimulation
5 
L parieto-occipital subarachnoid 
hemorrhage. Leucoencephalopathy 
in frontal and parietal lobes. 
Supratentorial hematoma including 
R thalamus and internal capsule 
extending to pons 
BR 4-5 Hz 
irregular non-
reactive delta. 
Pat12 Male (52) Seizure 20 MCS 
Reproducible 
movement to 
command 
Visual 
pursuit 
Flexion 
withdrawal
Vocalization/
oral 
movement 
Intentional Without stimulation
13 R cortico-subcortical fronto-insulo-
temporal lesions 
BR theta, non-
reactive 
symmetrical 
Pat13 Male (47) Trauma 533 MCS 
Reproducible 
movement to 
command 
Object 
recognition
Flexion 
withdrawal Oral reflex None 
Without 
stimulation
13 
Bilateral leucoencephalopathy. 
Lesions in anterior pons, midbrain 
and frontal lobe. Hydrocephalus 
and atrophy in bilateral 
hippocampus and cerebellum 
(Evans index 0.35) 
BR diffuse theta 
Pat14 Male (29) 
Trauma and 
anoxia 64 MCS 
Auditory startle Visual 
pursuit 
Flexion 
withdrawal Oral reflex None 
Without 
stimulation
9 No lesion on CT 
BR 7 Hz, irregular 
non-reactive, 
symmetrical 
Pat15 Male (41) Anoxia 9900 MCS 
Reproducible 
movement to 
command 
Visual 
pursuit 
Flexion 
withdrawal
Vocalization/
oral 
movement 
None Without stimulation
12 
Periventricular leuco-
encephalopathy. Lesions in bilateral 
frontoparietal convexity and 
external capsule. Atrophy of frontal 
and temporal lobes hippocampi and 
thalami. Hydrocephalus (Evans 
index 0.37) 
BR 6-7 Hz, 
symmetrical 
 
 
Pat16 Male (37) Trauma 342 MCS 
Reproducible 
movement to 
command 
Object 
recognition
Localization 
to noxious 
stimulation
Oral reflex None Without stimulation
14 Lesions in R posterolateral pons, R cerebral peduncles and corpus 
callosum 
NA 
Pat17 Male (60) Trauma 12 MCS 
Reproducible 
movement to 
command 
Object 
recognition
Automatic 
motor 
reaction 
Intelligible 
verbalization Intentional
With 
stimulation
18 
Diffuse axonal injury more 
important on R side. Lesions in R 
cerebral peduncle, pons and 
splenium of corpus callosum 
BR theta-delta, 
irregular 
 
Pat18 Female (36) Anoxia 460 MCS 
Reproducible 
movement to 
command 
Visual 
pursuit 
Flexion 
withdrawal
Vocalization/
oral 
movement 
Intentional Without stimulation
13 Hippocampal atrophy BR 8 Hz, symmetrical 
Pat19 Male (74) Anoxia 92 VS/UWS 
Auditory startle None Abnormal posturing Oral reflex None 
With 
stimulation
4 
Diffuse leucoencephalopathy most 
pronounced in occipital lobes. 
Diffuse atrophy in bilateral frontal 
and parietal lobes, hippocampus 
Unstructured non-
reactive theta 
and cerebellum. Anoxic lesions in 
bilateral basal ganglia. 
Hydrocephalus (Evans index 0.38) 
Pat20 Female (44) Anoxia 8 VS/UWS 
None None Abnormal posturing None None 
With 
stimulation
2 
Lesions in occipital lobes and 
parieto-temporo-occipital junction. 
Diffuse cortico-subcortical 
ischemic lesions 
Diffuse non-
reactive low-
voltage delta 
Pat21 Male (67) CVA 43 VS/UWS 
Auditory startle None Flexion withdrawal Oral reflex None 
With 
stimulation
5 
L medial temporal hematoma 
extending to L thalamus, posterior 
internal capsule, lenticular nucleus, 
insula and Wernicke's area. Diffuse 
leucoencephalopathy most 
pronounced in front al lobes 
BR 6 Hz, non-
reactive, 
symmetric 
Pat22 Male (63) CVA 30 VS/UWS 
Auditory startle Visual 
startle 
Flexion 
withdrawal
Vocalization/
oral 
movement 
None Without stimulation 8 
Bihemispheric ischemic lesions 
predominantly in posterior parietal 
and occipital lobes 
BR unstructured 
delta 
 
Pat23 Female (63) Anoxia 1210 VS/UWS 
Auditory startle None Abnormal posturing Oral reflex None 
With 
stimulation 4 
Multiple subcortical lesions in 
frontoparietal and temporal lobes. 
Diffuse atrophy in pons, midbrain 
and thalamus. 
Quadriventricular hydrocephalus 
(Evans index 0.42) 
Hypovoltage 
unstructured non-
reactive 
Pat24 Male (87) 
Subarachnoid 
hemorrhage 7 VS/UWS 
None None Flexion withdrawal Oral reflex None 
With 
stimulation 4 
Subarachnoid hemorrhage and 
bifrontal lesions 
Diffuse non-
reactive theta 
Pat25 Female (41) Anoxia 1572 VS/UWS 
Auditory startle None Abnormal posturing Oral reflex None 
Without 
stimulation 5 
Atrophy of corpus callosum, 
thalami, lenticular nuclei, midbrain, 
pons and cerebellum. 
Hydrocephalus (Evans index 0.44) 
BR unstructured 
theta 
Pat26 Male (44) CVA 27 VS/UWS 
Auditory startle None Abnormal posturing None None 
Without 
stimulation 4 
Lesions in frontal and temporal 
lobes, caudate nucleus, thalamus, 
bilateral insula and hippocampi 
BR 6 Hz, 
irregular, non-
reactive, 
symmetrical 
Pat27 Female (69) Anoxia 50 VS/UWS 
Auditory startle None Flexion withdrawal Oral reflex None 
With 
stimulation 5 
Bilateral fronto-parieto-temporal 
leucoencephalopathy including 
external capsule, caudate nucleus, R
thalamus and L insula. Bilateral 
hippocampal atrophy and 
hydrocephalus (Evans index 0.36) 
Diffuse theta with 
L lateralized delta 
Pat28 Female (49) CVA 129 VS/UWS 
Auditory startle None None Oral reflex None Without stimulation 4 
Lesions in pons and external 
capsule. Diffuse leuco-
encephalopathy 
Diffuse 
unstructured non-
reactive delta 
Pat29 Male (36) Anoxia 2031 VS/UWS 
Auditory startle None Abnormal posturing Vocalization None 
Without 
stimulation 6 
Bilateral periventricular leuco-
encephalopathy. Supratentorial 
cortical and subcortical atrophy 
including basal ganglia and 
cerebellum. Hydrocephalus (Evans 
BR 7 Hz, 
symmetrical 
index 0.41) 
Pat30 Male (34) Anoxia 7814 VS/UWS 
Auditory startle Visual 
startle 
Abnormal 
posturing Oral reflex None 
With 
stimulation 6 
Diffuse cortical and cerebellar 
atrophy. Hydrocephalus (Evans 
index 0.42) 
BR 6 Hz, irregular 
non-reactive, 
symmtrical 
CVA: cerebrovascular accident, LIS: locked-in syndrome, VS/UWS: vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, MCS: minimally conscious state, BR: 
basic rhythm, R: right, L: left. 
 
Supplemental Table e-3. Areas (peak voxels) of the resting state networks identified in healthy controls. 
Area x y z z value Corrected p value 
Default mode network 
 Precuneus/ Posterior cingulate cortex (7/31)† 6 -43 31 Inf <.001 
 Anterior cingulate cortex/ Mesiofrontal cortex (32/10) 3 56 4 7.66 <.001 
L Temporoparietal junction (39) -51 -61 28 Inf <.001 
R Temporoparietal junction (39) 45 -58 37 Inf <.001 
L Middle frontal gyrus (8) -21 26 37 5.99 <.001 
R Middle frontal gyrus (8) 24 29 40 5.09  .002 
R Thalamus 15 -28 7 4.58  .021 
Anticorrelations default mode network 
L Inferior frontal gyrus (46) -45 38 7 5.87 <.001 
R Inferior frontal gyrus (46) 45 44 7 4.61 .018 
L Middle frontal gyrus (6) -24 -1 61 5.65 <.001 
R Middle frontal gyrus (6) 48 2 46 5.81 <.001 
L Inferior parietal lobe (40) -60 -28 31 4.50  .029 
L Superior temporal gyrus (22) -54 8 -5 6.29 <.001 
R Superior temporal gyrus (22) 54 14 -5 5.92 <.001 
 Supplementary motor area/Midcingulate cortex (6/24) 3 5 52 6.88 <.001 
L Extrastriate cortex (18/19) -15 -73 -2 5.96 <.001 
R Extrastriate cortex (18/19) 12 -70 4 5.81  .005 
L Cerebellum -9 -67 -23 4.92  .005 
Left frontoparietal network  
L Inferior frontal gyrus (46/9)† -42 32 22 Inf <.001 
R Inferior frontal gyrus (46/9) 48 38 10 Inf <.001 
L Inferior parietal lobe (40) -48 -43 46 6.58 <.001 
R Inferior parietal lobe (40) 48 -37 46 4.87 <.001 
Right frontoparietal network  
R Inferior frontal gyrus (46/9)† 45 35 19 Inf <.001 
L Inferior frontal gyrus (46/9) -45 32 22 Inf <.001 
R Inferior parietal lobe (40) 48 -40 43 7.16 <.001 
L Inferior parietal lobe (40) -45 -49 49 6.56 <.001 
Salience network 
R Insula/Middle frontal gyrus (10)† 39 26 -8 Inf <.001 
L Insula/Middle frontal gyrus (10) -35 14 -2 Inf <.001 
 Anterior cingulate cortex (24) 9 23 25 5.42 <.001 
R Putamen  24 2 1 4.78 .008 
L Putamen  -27 -13 4 4.33 .048 
Sensorimotor network 
 Supplementary motor area/Midcingulate cortex (6/24)† -3 -13 43 Inf <.001 
L Primary motor cortex (4) -12 -37 55 6.62 <.001 
R Primary motor cortex (4) 12 -37 52 7.08 <.001 
L Premotor cortex (6) -36 -4 52 5.83 <.001 
R Premotor cortex (6) 36 -7 46 5.22  .001 
L Somatosensory cortex (3) -39 -19 52 6.01 <.001 
R Somatosensory cortex (3) 24 -25 58 6.47 <.001 
Auditory network 
L Superior temporal gyrus (22)/ Insula†  -39 -22 7 Inf <.001 
R Superior temporal gyrus (22)/ Insula 51 8 1 6.34 <.001 
L Pars opercularis (Broca’s area 44) -57 5 7 7.45 <.001 
L Superior temporal gyrus (Wernicke’s area 22) -57 -34   22 6.84 <.001 
 Midcingulate cortex (24) -9 -1 40 4.83  .008 
R Claustrum 39 8 -2 6.81 <.001 
 Thalamus 15 -25 4 4.57  .022 
Visual network  
 Primary visual cortex (17)† -3 -82 7 Inf <.001 
R Extrastriate cortex (19) 27 -76 -11 6.61 <.001 
L Extrastriate cortex (19) -27 -76 -14 5.46 <.001 
P values are corrected for multiple comparisons at family wise error rate p<.05 for the whole brain volume. † Seed 
area. 
Supplemental Table e-4. Regression analysis of the Nociception Coma Scale total scores on the functional 
connectivity of the auditory network in 13 patients with disorders of consciousness. Areas show peak voxels at an 
uncorrected p<.001 for the whole-brain volume. 
 
Area x y z z value p value  
R Caudate 24 -31 16 4.03 <.001 
L Claustrum -30 11 4 3.67 <.001 
L Thalamus -18 -22 10 3.50 <.001 
R Postcentral gyrus (2) 66 -22 28 3.47 <.001 
L Parahippocampal gyrus  -18 -43 7 3.33 <.001 
R Inferior frontal gyrus (47) 36 14 -17 3.15 .001 
 
 
 
 
